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Preamble and acknowledgements 
A connected account of the decline of Greek power in the 
Hellenistic East can be justified nowadays by noting the relative 
antiquity of available works on the subject when archaeological and 
numismatic work has continued and has rendered dated such works as those 
by Bevan and Bouche-Leclerq although still valuable e The excavation of 
Ai Khanum and Shahr-i-Qumis alone should provoke a reassessment of 
Seleucid objectives and so of Seleucid history. We are grateful to Getzel 
Cohen for a recent coherent study of the process of the colonisation 
movement in these Eastern parts. Recent events in Afghanistan and Iran 
should encourage historians of the central Asian land mass to study 
pressures which in the past affected these countries from the north, and 
in particular to pay attention to the cultural dimension of such contacts. 
There has been a tendency to omit the Seleucid enterprise from thorough 
1 
study, and to give Livy the benefit of the doubt in his comment that 
2 
'no power was despised so much by the Romans'. Such omissions and this 
attitude could be seen as a current emphasis on Hellenism as a Western and 
not an Eastern phenomenon, thus leaving - quite wrongly in my view -
Bactrian and Indian history in the Hellenistic Age to be seen simply as the 
purview of Indian Historians and Indian History.3 
This work is an account of Seleucid history from 280 to 
roughly 100 B.C., with a summary account of the end of Seleucid Rule down 
$ 
to its extinction under Pompey for the sake of completeness. It tries to 
~ 
take in most modern work on the subject in the fields of archaeology, 
numismatics and literary comment on what scant sources we have. Being an 
account of Seleucid history it is valid to term the process it records 
'The oriental context for the end of Greek Rule in the Hellenistic Age.' 
I do recognise the blurred edges of the Graeco-Macedonian partnership, 
if it can be called that, and this is discussed, as is the Macedonian-
Iranian partnership of Seleucus and Apama. 
Proper names are used as they normally occur: Greek proper 
names are latinized if that has become the general usage: e.g. Seleucus 
not Seleukos. Mithridates of Parthia is differentiated by the 'il in his 
name from Mithradates of Pontus for the sake of convenience. The usage 
in the matter of proper names in authors I have quoted is their own, not 
mine. 
I am most grateful for facilities accorded me for Study 
abroad by the British School in Athens and the British Institutes in 
Teheran and Kabul, and acknowledge the invaluable assistance of museum 
curators in this country and abroad, in particular the Iran Bastan Museum 
(to whom I am indebted for the inscription frontispiece), and the 
British Museum Coin Department. The coin portraits were photographed in 
Hull University by its photographic service and the casts involved were 
provided by the Ashmolean Museum: to Dr. Metcalf and above all to 
Colin Kraay, my thanks. Valuable comment is acknowledged from David MacDowall, 
David Selwood and David Bivar. Derek Waite's splendid maps deserve 
grateful comment. 
Past and present professors of Classics in the University 
of Hull have given time and effort to the perusal of what I have written. 
To them too I am grateful. 
NOTES. 
1. Current general works on Hellenistic history in English (at present 
in print), e.g. Cary: 'Greek History from 323 to 146', and P. ~mal: 
'Hellenism and the rise of Rome', represent respectively a very 
pro-Tarn view of the East and omit it almost completely. Neither is 
remotely satisfactory now although both have excellent sections on 
other hellenistic issues. E. Will is first class but has a very wide 
area to cover and is a source book rather than a monograph. We await 
Walbank's forthcoming work with great interest. 
2. Livy: Book XXXVII, 39, 3. 
3. As Narain assumes it is and Tarn assumed it wasn't. 
CHAPTER 10 
The establishment of Seleucid Rule. 
In an attempt to chart the process of the disintegration 
( 
of the Seleucid empire and to indentify some of the causes of that decline, eft 
L.-
a narrative account must also note those episodes outside the Seleucid 
Empire which were part of that process. 
When Seleuclls Nicator crushed the aspirations of 
Lysimachus at Corupedion in Lydia in 280 he established himself as the 
natural successor on the Asian continent to Antigonus Monophthalmos, and 
so, it could be said, to Alexander himself, whose kingdom Antigonus - and 
all the diadochoi - had so much wanted to inherit. By the time of Corupedion, 
Seleucus' own kingdom had been securely established (311) with its centres 
at Seleucia-on-Tigris and Antioch-on-the-Orontes; and the eastern 
boundary had been trimmed by the tactically expensive but strategically 
1 
sensible barter of territory in north-west India to Chandragupta the Maurya 
(305) in exchange for elephants, due to which heavy cavalry accession 
Antigonus had been defeated in the crucial battle at Ipsus in Phrygiain 301 
by the coalition of Ptolemy, Seleucus, Lysimachus and Cassander. 
Seleucus I lived only a short time to enjoy his new-found 
hegemony as the last of the Diadochoi. His death at the hands of Ptolemy 
Keraunos only months after Corupedion meant that his son Antiochus 
succeeded him in a good position to strengthen the resources and structure 
of an empire whose eastern section he had already been ruling as Eastern 
Viceroy for seven years2. This wise allocation of duty by Seleucus I had 
~-
potentially ensured that loyal and secure government would be available, 
as Bengtson had described3 , to the eastern provinces of what Seleucus I had 
'"', 
demonstrated was a long empire with long lines of communication. What 
would now have to be proved was the resilience of this arrangement, given 
the chance that future appointees would not implement it with the same 
loyalty and competence that Antiochus seems to have displayed; for 
Seleucus' and Antiochus' judgement was correct: their eastern territory 
was vulnerable, for reasons which they might not then have fully understood4 , 
and the erosion of Seleucid power was to come at least as menacingly from 
the nomad east as from the as-yet distant Roman west. In a phrase the 
east was possibly more uncertain than the Seleucids, even with their 
Iranian marriage ties, had imagined. Other less well-known political and 
military forces were gathering. And whereas one would wish to give full 
value, when examining the relationship of Graeco-Macedonian control to its 
eastern provinces, to the links between Iran and Macedon deriving from 
Seleucus' marriage to Apama the daughter of Spitamenes, this is a different 
matter from proceeding on the assumption that the insecurity of these 
provinces had bJen notably strengthened by that marriage or that their 
tenuous retention was simply a fiction designed to make Seleucid problems 
seem more drastic than they were. 
It is however noticeable that, from all we can discover, 
attitudes adopted towards the 'Greeks' in the east were qualitatively 
different from attitudes expressed in (e.g.) Coele-Syria and Egypt where 
from about 200 B.C. native revolts were a continuing problem. The wellknown 
reversal of a previous antagonism between the Greeks in newly-independent 
Bactria and the rising Parthian state of Arsaces II, which took place 
under Diodotus II, suggests that this alliance between Barbarian and Greek 
was not too difficult to achieve; and one might speculate that a half-Iranian 
Seleucid royal house should have therefore been able to establish a stronger 
hold upon the eastern provinces than seems actually to have been the case. 
That, of course, would make the presumption that a royal lead on the issue 
of cooperation with Iranians in the broad sense was acceptable to ruling 
circles in Macedonian and Iranian society, and that too is conjecture. 
To the problems of administration and defence in the 
Seleucid Empire was added the problem of its Graeco-Macedonian population of 
settlers and soldiers, importing into the military and civilian structure 
of the dangerously-extended state the rivalries and incompatibility which 
had been demonstrated on the Greek mainland since the days of Philip and 
5 Demosthenes. In many instances, including the dissimilar sources of 
Trogus and Arrian, the Greek settlers are referred to as 'the Macedonians,.6 
In Indian writing we find 'Greeks' referred to as 'Yavanas,7 - a straight 
derivation from 'Ionians', which many of them, including one of their most 
distinguished kings Euthydemus of Magnesia, were in fact. It is not our 
object to make out that all the dynastic quarrels of the Seleucid State 
were attributable to this continuing resistance to the Imperium Macedonicum: 
it would be idle to ignore the feuding of the Diadochoi and the running sore 
of the Lagid-Seleucid conflict in Coele-Syria; but it is true that in 
Strabo, Arrian and Trogus (as preserved in Justin's Epitome), Macedonians 
are the people from whom others revolt, while, at least in the 
Milindapanha, Greeks are those with whom one holds a philosophical dialogue, 
even although the Greeks themselves might be 'viciously valiant ,.8 
The attempt of Antiochus III in his European campaign 
to 'reclaim', as he put it, the empire of his ancestors is another instance 
of the distance politically between a great Macedonian king and the Greeks 
he was claiming, by invading their country, to free. As John Briscoe 
points out clearly, Antiochus' argument to the Romans, who contested his 
right to be in Europe at all, was that he was entitled 'to all the lands 
which had belonged to Lysimachus' and passed to Antiochus' great grandfather 
, 
Seleucus' by his victory at Corupedion. 'The conflict', Briscoe continues, 
'is one of different legal conceptions'. Rome did not recognise rights 
d . d f h· t . 9 erlve rom suc VlC orles. What we do not detect in Livy1s narrative 
is the assessment Antiochus (should have) made as to whether he would be 
likely to succeed in drawing Greeks into his imposed freedom. It is 
Badian who comments that Antiochus would have been received by the Greeks, 
had he won at Thermopylae, with the same 'cowed resignation' that the Romans 
received from these same Greeks. 10 The whole question of the Graeco-
M d · b·· 11 b ace onlan sym lOSlS can e regarded as a part of the cultural back-
cloth against which the decline of Greek power in the east was enacted. 
In the matter of establishing an administrative centre in 
Iran, Altheim is quite clear that the Seleucids were affected by a 
renunciation of the policy of racial fusion upon which Alexander appeared 
12 
to have embarked. I would not want to argue that Seleucus I went about 
establishing his power as a crusader for 'equal opportunities' for Greeks, 
Macedonians and Iranians, for example. But it does seem clear to me that 
Antiochus I could not help being the son of his Iranian mother as well as 
his Macedonian father; and that one cannot easily leave this fact out of 
the reckoning when considering the policies for stabilisation that he seems 
to have followed, and which we glance at in the next chapter. We do not 
know that the eternal antagonism of the Greek towards the barbarian was the 
natural attitude of the Seleucids towards the steppe people or to the 
Iranian town-dwellers, and the point made by Tarn that the subject peoples 
of the empire showed loyalty to the reigning Seleucid needs little defence. 13 
A striking instance was the return to loyalty after the revolt of Molon 
early in Antiochus Ill's reign. 
Seleucus I had made a home base in the 'Seleucis t round 
about Apamea-on-the-Orontes; and although we may note grounds on which to 
disapprove of this choice, the reasons at the time seemed very good. 14 
There was access to the Mediterranean for trade and for contact with the 
Greek homeland, and there was the possibility of participation on the 
power-politics of the Mediterranean seaboard, to have abandoned which would 
certainly have led to erosion of western Seleucid influence in the 
relationship with Egypt. 15 By 280 Seleucus and Ptolemy had still managed 
to maintain their peaceful co-existence between friends, despite differences 
over policy and an incipient conflict over Coele-Syria. Also Egypt was at 
that time a formidable naval power in the Mediterranean upon which a 
Seleucid check had to be kept. 
More generally, 280 marked the end of a stage, generally 
referred to the 'wars of the Successors' which had been fought since the 
agreement at Triparadeisos in 32016 between the immediate circle of 
Alexander's colleagues; or, more accurately, since the breakdown of that 
agreement, leading to the hegemonial ambitions of Antigonus Monophthalmos 
and the coalition of Ptolemy, Seleucus, Lysimachus and Cassander which 
arose to contest the hegemony. In the course of that contest not only was 
the 'legitimate' line of succession eliminated (which would have secured a 
succession based upon Alexander's son by Roxane, Alexander IV) - and the 
rule of the regents until the child's majority; but the ruthless killing 
of Alexander's secretary Eumenes of Cardia raises again the question of 
the relationship of Macedonians to Greeks within the ranks of the Diadochoi, 
and the extent to which such tensions would find a reflection in the rule, 
extent, organisation, colonisation and settlement objectives of whatever 
successor-state or states took over Alexander's inheritance. By 280 it 
was clear that Seleucus' successor Antiochus I would have a major role 
in deciding the future course of what was now 'the Seleucid Empire', not 
least because he was Spitamenes' grandson: the question as to whether and 
to what extent, Greeks were committed to Alexander's concepts of 
oecumenical strategy, particularly if led by a monarch of mixed Macedonian 
and Barbarian stock, was raised by 280 in such an acute form that the 
difficulties of social organisation posed by Antiochus I's heterogeneous 
realm seem as substantial as the problems posed by its geopolitical shape 
and extent. l ? 
The uneasy tension which existed in the Seleucid Empire 
between its various ethnic minorities and the ruling administration was 
further accentuated by ancient kingdoms like Aradus, which had a 
ill h 
'flourishing maritime commerce' ,and had been a coin-issuing mint throug 
most of the period we will be examining. The issue of 'free cities', 
itself a cherished expression of the ~ which Alexander and Philip 
had for long accused Persia of denying to their citizens, need not be 
viewed as a symptom of disarray or danger within the Seleucid empire, given 
that overall government was wise, liberal and strong. If it weakened, 
pressures to disaffection might result, as we shall demonstrate: if it did 
not weaken)Seleucid commerce flourished and vigorous trade kept down piracy. 
As Seyrig points out19 the Macedonian engineers constructed artificial 
harbours at Seleucia in Pieria and Laodicea in order to facilitate maritime 
trade, and presumably to respond to it. 
It is frequently pointed out that at no time was the 
Seleucid 'empire' ever a homogeneous block of territory: it was a loose 
association of poleis and of the territory surrounding them which the 
M d Ot 0 h d 1 0 d 20 ace onlan occupa lon a co onlse • It was an empire built upon 
communications and its political integrity was dependent on the lines of 
communication which existed: mainly the old Achaemenid royal roads. 
Consequently any fracture of these lines of communication would have 
serious consequences and might effectively sever the east of the Seleucid 
t ot f th t S 1 0 TO 0 21 t f 'h ld o errl ory rom ewes. e eUCla-on- 19r1s was 0 per orm a 0 lng 
function' as a more easterly focus of Seleucid activity and to be the seat 
of the Seleucids' eastern governor, Bengtsonts 'General Commander of the 
'" :> \ , \ ' I 
East' - the 0 £1(1 TIVV cl..v"J q';' r'(.,tl Tt 1,11-./1/ of the inscriptions. 
By 280 the hellenistic stage had been cleared of the original participants 
in Alexander's arrangements, and so of the dispositions they made or 
fought over; Antiochus I's organisation was both personally and politically 
committed to an Ost-Politik in circumstances that were finely balanced for 
failure or success. 
I 
Notes for Chapter 10 
1. On relations between Seleucus and Chandragupta, Strabo XV, 29 and 
Justin XV, 4, 12 - 21. Also Appian, Syriaca 55. As E. Will points 
out and P. M. Fraser has recently underlined, the exact extent of 
territory ceded to Chandragupta is not known. We do know that 
Arachosia (or more specifically Kandahar) yielded Asokan rock edicts 
in 1958 and 1964 (printed in the Appendix to this work). On all 
this see the discussion in E. Will: Histoire Politique I, 1979, p. 265 
(with full and recent bibliography.) Excavation reports on 
Kandahar are in Afghan Studies I, 1978 and II, 1980, the last with 
a thorough discussion and notes accompanying p. M. Fraser's article: 
'The Son of Aristonax at Kandahar', pp. 9 - 23. 
2. 294 or 293; as Will says in Politique I, p. 267, the date is 
uncertain. 
3. H. Bengtson: Strategie in der hellenistischen Zeit, Munich, 1944. 
A good account of the nature of the state the Seleucids inherited is 
in Pierre Grimal: Hellenism and the rise of Rome, London, 1968, 
p. 271 f. 
4. Quite apart from the indications of full-scale nomad invasion 
(studied in greater detail in Chapter II), whose indications, 
pressed by Josef Wolski, are not uncontested (Wolski: L'effondrement, 
pp. 22 - 31), as Will points out in Politique I, p. 271, the 
existence of a developed system of crop irrigation points to a 
secure civilisation in the Chroasmian region between the Oxus and 
the Jaxartes even before the Achaemenid conquest. (Will, Ope cit., 
p. 272), Frumkin: Archaeology in Soviet Central Asia, Leyden, 
1970, p. 82 f. 
5. Traced out with implications by T. T. B. Ryder in Koine Eirene, 
Oxon, 1965. 
6. Justin XLI, 2, 1: Arrian Fr. Gr. H. Parthica Fr. 30 a. 
7. Milindapanha: Passim. (Ed. Rhys Davids: Sacred Books of the East). 
8 0 Yuga Purana of the Gargi Sarmita. 
9. John Briscoe: Commentary on Livy (XXXIII, 40, 4 f.), Oxon, 1973. 
10. E. Badian: 'Rome and Antiochus the Great: a study in cold war', 
quoted also in its Roman context in Chapter IV ,p. g~ • 
11. The whole issue is carefully dealt with in Charles Edson's article 
on 'Imperium Macedonicum
' 
in Classical Philology, LIII,1958} p. 153 f. 
120 F. Altheim in 'Les Successeurs d'Alexandre', Paris, 1954, p. 156. 
13. W. W. Tarn: The Greeks in Bactria and India, Cambs. 1952, p. 5 • 
Tarn discussed the issue of Seleucus ' marriage to Apama in 'Queen 
Ptolemais and Apama' in Classical Quarterly 1929, p. 138 - 140. 
I 
Notes to Chapter I - continued. 
14. Do Musti describes the choice and development of Northern Syria 
as a Seleucid heartland in 'Lo Stato di Seleucidi' (Studi Classici 
et Orientali 1966, p. 59 - 201). Useful comments are in H. Seyrig's 
article in Syria XLVII, 1970, pp. 290 - 311. 
15. So Seyrig, compellingly, in Syria, 1970, p. 300, making the point 
that the quadrilateral of Greek cities: Seleucia-in-Pieria, Antioch, 
Apamea-on-the-Orontes and Laodicea ad Mare was a cornerstone of 
Seleucus' home organisation. The emotional reasons are developed 
by D. Musti (Op. cit., passim), and also by Seyrig (Op. cit., p. 302). 
16. The period between Alexander's death and the Treaty of Triparadeisos 
is traced out carefully by R. M. Errington in JHS 1970, pp. 49 ff. 
17. The issues are spelt out in substantial detail by Edouard Will in 
Hist. Pol. I, 1979, pp. 262 f. He is extensive and fair in his 
summary of the problems. The more purely geographical issues are 
faced squarely by H. C. Schmitt: Untersuchungen, pp. 66 f. 
18. H. Seyrig: 'Aradus et sa peree sous les rois Seleucides', Syria 
1951, p. 206 f. 
19. H. Seyrig in Syria 1970, OPe cit., p. 305. 
20. Getzel Cohen: The Seleucid Colonies. Historia Einzelschrift, 
Wiesbaden 1978. 
21. G. Gullini: Fifth Preliminary Report of the Excavations at Seleucia 
and Ctesiphon, Mesopotamia 1972, Vol. VII, p. 9 - 41, contains the 
most recent series of reports on work conducted earlier by the 
American mission in the 1930s, and often noted in this work, at Tel Umar 
in present-day Iraq. 
• 
CHAPTER II 
The Revolts of Parthia and Bactria 
Tribal movements 
As a stage in the diminution of the territorial extent of 
the Seleucid Empire the secession of Parthia and Bactria has a particular 
importance. 
j 
It demonstrated a process in the erosion of Seleucid power in 
the east which turned out to be irretrievable, and in the last analysis it 
was a process which the Seleucids, despite all their counter-measures, 
could not finally prevent. The consequences were to have powerful 
repercussions for the history of the next five hundred years in central Asia. 
From Alexander's ti~e and before it, the Oxus and Jaxartes 
frontiers had marked the edge of the civilized world, beyond which there 
were nomad tribes with their own agriculture and stock-rearing, social 
organization and art. 1 Spitamenes had represented this danger as far as 
Alexander had been concerned, but the nomad presence was constant and was 
not confined to anyone period of Greek history, although its character 
might change with the arrival of a different tribe or confederation of 
tribes such as the Massagetae. 
So Greek defences in the Jaxartes region were organized on 
the basis of a holding operation, with cities and colonies holding the line 
against a nomad presence, but all of them consisting of Macedonian and Greek 
veterans whose loyalty were not to the principle of founding the cities but 
rather to the particular Seleucid king who had established the settlement. 
For instance. the northernmost Alexandrian foundation of Alexandria Eschate 
was designed to defend Soghdiana and to preserve the Jaxartes as a far 
northern frontier for the Greek presence in the Upper Satrapies. And Merv, 
Achaea, Bactra and Alexandria Oxiana, for example, were all founded as 
• 
Greek settlements or poleis with the object of checking the influence of 
nomad power in the northern marches of Alexander's empire (Plutarch: De. 
Fort. A~:x I, 328E). When the Seleucids inherited that empire, following 
the establishment of Seleucus's rule in Babylon in 311, the maintenance of 
the Greek presence in these northern parts became a Seleucid responsibility, 
as Appian points out (Syriaca 57). 
Invasion was a constant possibility, and we hear of a 
penetration by barbarians from Turkestan which spread fire and confusion in 
the north of Iran and threatened the towns in Aria, Margiana and Bactria 
sometime after 290 BC. 1a Alexandria in Margiane (Merv) and Heracleia in 
Aria were subsequently rebuilt by Antiochus I as Antioch and Achaea 
respectively, Antiochus himself having been placed during the reign of 
Seleucus I as co-regent in charge of the Upper Satrapies in 293. 
Pliny is not precise about who these early third-century 
invaders were, but we are told that the troops of Demodamas advanced into 
the Steppes to bring the nomad tribes under control again. The fortifications 
of Alexandria in Aria (Herat) were increased, and to protect the oasis of 
Margiana against nomad attack Antiochus put a wall around it. That this 
was a wise policy is shown in that we have no reason to doubt that the 
expedition that Demodamas led seems to have settled a serious invasion of 
Seleucid territory. Strabo suggests (XI, 8, 3) that the Dahae invasions 
must have lasted a long time, but the Dahae were themselves newcomers to 
the country south of the Oxus, having been in the territory between the 
Jaxartes and the Oxus during the time of Alexander the Great. Possibly 
pushed forward by other elements of the Massagetae horde, they were in a 
position to make permanent conquests in the region of the Greek provinces 
of Parthia and Hyrcania. Our evidence is that a branch of the Dahae called 
the Parni = Aparni ('Sparnos t ) probably split away from the main horde 
between the Jaxartes and the Oxus in about 282 and proceeded to the banks 
• 
of the Oxus. Justin tells us that the Parni I ••• domesticis seditionibus 
pulsi Scythia solitudines inter Hyrcaniam et Dahas et Areos et Sparnos et 
2 Margianos furtim occupavere.' The actual migration probably took place 
from about 282 to after 250, and, if we follow Wolski's view of Strabo XI , 
the Parni may themselves have constituted the early irruption which Demodamas 
had had to deal with. The steppe north of Aria, Parthia and Hyrcania 
became Dahae country and the Parni tribe became poised for another drive 
southwards to the lush vegetation of the Caspian littoral and the easier 
pasturage which would result for their flocks and herds from such a move. 
On this view, not only will the Parthian and Hyrcanian satrapies now have 
been exposed to the danger of an invasion from a neighbouring region 
immediately to the north - which was not the case to the same extent when 
Alexander took over the former Achaemenid satrapies in that area - but the 
effect of these nomad population movements and the efforts of Antiochus I 
to take measures to contain them cannot have been unobserved by the other 
Greek satrapies of the area, notably Bactria and Aria. These formed a bloc 
of Greek-controlled territory north of the Dasht-i-lut and Dasht-i-Kavir 
and south of the new Parni zone of influence. So the Greek satrap of 
Bactria is bound to have looked at the situation with concern. His own 
territorial security will have assumed a rapidly-increasing significance. 
He will have had to look to his own defences on his own terms while there 
was time. 
Another aspect of the difficulty of governing the eastern 
satrapies, which Antiochus'!Il s own appointment as viceroy in 293 was designed 
to ameliorate, (Appian: Syriaca 62), was the growing concentration of 
Seleucid power and interests, already so early in the history of the 
dynasty, in the west of the empire. The emotional ties with the Mediterranean 
world constituted a reason for a continuing interest in the Mediterranean 
Ar-
area, but to this was quickly added the increasing pol~zation of attitudes 
and objectives between the Seleucids and the Ptolemies. The first 
• 
Seleucus (Nicator) and Ptolemy Lagus had been fellow commanders under 
Alexander, and their comradeship had stood the test of a dispute over the 
control of Coele-Syria. This had been disallowed to Ptolemy by the victors 
of the battle of Ipsus in 301 owing to Ptolemy's absence from the coalition 
at the time of the battle. And the result had been that Ptolemy's successor 
Ptolemy II Philadelphus had fought the first of a long series of wars with 
the Seleucids for the control of that Mediterranean coastline with its 
harbours and forests, as well as actions that ranged more widely over 
Egyptian possessions in Asia Minor and the Greek islands. This contest 
between Egypt and the Seleucid Empire was to occupy the disproportionate 
attention of both the Seleucids and the Ptolemies for the whole of the 
future history as major powers, but its immediate effect on the conduct of 
the Seleucids' western enterprise was to ensure a permanent change of focus 
away from Babylon and Seleucia-on-Tigris, where Seleucus I had originally 
made his capital., to the city to which it was later moved, Antioch on the 
Orontes in Wes.tern Syria. 2a 
This removal of royal authority westwards rendered the 
proper control of the Eastern Iranian satraps very difficult to maintain. 
And the tendency was established for these eastern satraps not only to 
exercise a proper autonomy in domestic affairs but to have to make judgements 
of a strategic nature regarding the integrity of their provinces and about 
the best methods of preserving them intact in the face of nomad attack or 
Jv/ provoca tion, as has been the case when Demodamas had this task during his 
I 
period of command, which included the refounding of poleis(Pliny NHYI, 48). 
As we have seen, by 282 or thereabouts this became a major issue for the 
Seleucid satraps in Parthia and Bactria, alarmed not just by the near 
presence of the Dahae but by the sight of what destruction they could 
wreak on neighbouring territory. To this concern will have been added the 
awareness that help was less likely (and less swiftly) to come from the 
• 
• 
Seleucid home government since its transfer westwards out of effective 
administrative range. Provision for interim authority in the person of 
the Commander of the Upper Satrapies had been made, as we saw, but the fact I 
remains that when it came to doing something about the situation in Parthia 
and Bactria events had to wait before Seleucus II himself could bring 
troops. 
Formal Secession 
In a passage which is most probably taken from Apollodorus 
of Artemita's Parthica, Strabo says that 'when revolutions were attempted 
by the countries outside the Taurus, because of the fact that the kings of 
Syria and Media, who were in possession also of these countries, were 
busily engaged with others (or with each other)3, those who had been 
entrusted with their government first caused the revolt of Bactriana and 
of all the country near it, I mean Euthydemus and his followers; and then 
Arsaces, a Scythian, with some of the Daae (I mean the Aparnians, as they 
are called, nomads who lived along the Ochus), invaded Parthia and 
conquered it'. An attempt to refer this passage to a co-regency said to 
have been established between Antiochus II Theos and his son Seleucus II 
Calinicus, appears to be unnecessary in view of the contest which we know 
was taking place over a considerable period of time between Callinicus 
and his brother Antiochus Hierax over much of Western Asia - the Fratricidal 
War - which would thus justify the ascription of the phrase 'the kings of 
Syria and Media,.4 
Justin in his Epitome of Trogus also has a section which 
appears to bear out this view of events: 'Huius defectionis inpunitatem 
illis duorum fratrum regum, Seleuci et Antiochi, discordia dedit, qui dum 
invicem eripere sibi regnum volunt, persequi defectores omiserunt'. 
Wolski is clear that this also refers to the Fratricidal War, and it 
seems a conclusive argument because of the specific mention of both brothers. 
From this chronological pointer it would seem that the Arsacid state was 
indeed established during this period and not earlier under Antiochus II, 
as Arrian - a much later source in an even later transmission - seems to 
indicate. 5a 
The view quoted in Strabo, that Arsaces was himself a 
Bactrian, and that in escaping from the increased power of Diodotus I of 
, " Bactria and his followers, he caused Parthia to revolt (~~O~T~'-~\ ) 
does not win much support from Strabo himself. 6 There is a continuing 
discussion as to the date of the revolt of both Parthia and Bactria, and in the 
view of A. K, Narain7, who nowhere mentions the work of Wolski in his 
bib~iography, seems to have had unjustified pre-eminence in the very recent 
works of Mitchener on Indo-Greek coinage8 , and even Bickerman on chronology.9 
The difficulty may well arise from the coinage of Diodotus I who, as is 
well-known~ued coinage with his own head but with Antiochus II's name, 
, 1 0 c,o'''''$ possibly as an indication of gradually-increasing autonomy • The Rem8~ of 
both Diodotus I and of Diodotus II who succeeded him, seem to have carried 
lOa the name of Antiochus, according most reliably to E. T. Newell ,but there 
are coins in their own names, and the series can best be explained on the 
grounds that their hegemony over their eastern Seleucid provinces was being 
gradually increased. 'Defecit' , 'Revolted' is Justin's word: (XLI, 4, 5) 
it need not represent any more than the description of a process, complete 
in itself, but gradual. Or why would they use Antiochus' name? There is 
plenty of evidence of satraps who revolted, for example Timarchus, issuing 
coinage unashamedly in their own name. 
In a comparison between the passage in Justin XLI, 4 and 
Strabo XI, 9 2 - 3 speaking of the revolts of Parthia and Bactria, the 
phrase 01 Its-e.t Eu9..,t",.t)"/ should be emended A.loOOTb'{ because, as 
Strabo himself goes on to mention, it was Diodotus who was the contemporary 
in question; it could be that 'Euthydemus and his followers' is used 
(XI, 9, 2) because the Greeks knew about Euthydemus better (or Apollodorus 
of Artemita, Strabo's source did) as the result of Antiochus Ill's 
expedition. In the matter of the comparison of sources as between Strabo 
and Trogus, Wolski, in one of his more recent contributions to the debate11 , 
makes the point that the main problem is whether the source of the Parthian 
accounts in Trogus' Historiae Philippicae is distinct from the source that 
Strabo used, as Tarn thinks12, or the same, as Altheim believes13 • 
Wolski will have nothing to do with coinage when pressing 
for an accurate chronology, and so quotes the problems that have arisen 
over the various Diodotus issues as an example of the pitfalls that can 
14 
occur. This seems a safe way of proceeding, but it is limited, because 
judgements may and should be made about the inscriptions on this Diodotid 
coinage, which, if they are made at all, do bear on chronology_ It is a 
factor that cannot be left out of the reckoning. But I feel sure that the 
substance of Wolski's case has been left holding the field, and his I 
objection to a reading of Strabo XI, 9, 2 as &",'" 10 nto) ~~oI5(iAAb )~ •• ~ 
i,'1~' 10'"'$ T''lS !U~Jal~ instead of (,,,,, TI) nl~ ~~~?~O'5 (.(l~,ADUS) ~~\IpJ,1 ••• 
is well-made, and does seem indeed to be a suspect emendation which he says 
d t ·th A . 15 was ma e 0 agree Wl rrlan. Whether or not the last point of the 
argument is true,or just Wolski's suspicion of Arrian, it cannot be denied 
that in Strabo we have independent evidence of Civil war in the Seleucid 
empire from the phrase 'the kings (sic) of Syria and Media.' 
The account of Justin in XLI, 4, 4 (not 3) to 7 does agree 
with the Strabo quotation, in that his source has preserved the names of 
Seleucus and Antiochus. In Narain's summary of the text of Justin16 , this 
part of the passage is significantly omitted (in three dots:), and whereas 
it is also true that Wolski has begun his quotation after, and therefore 
excluding the mention of I ••• the first Punic War when Lucius Manlius Vulso 
and Marcus Atilius Regulus were consuls ••• ', we should observe that Justin 
has ,a.lready said that the trevoltt, as he puts it, took place under Seleucus. 
The question of the consular date given in Justin is important, but is not 
solved in Justin's own rendering as he has already given Seleucus as king. 
The passage has been used by Eusebius as the basis of his own dating of 250 
for the Parthian revolt - which is also outside Seleucus's reign. We do 
know that G. Atilius Regulus was consul with Vulso in 25018, but also know 
how a Roman epitomist might have included the name of M. Atilius Regulus 
on account of his (well-justified) fame. It seems that Justin did make a 
mistake in the epitomising of Trogus, and as Wolski pertinently remarks, 
a Greek author would have been unlikely to have called the first 
Carthaginian war 'primo Punico bello,.18a 
A fixed point in the chronology of the breakaway of Parthia 
is the date 247 BC which marks the start of the Parthian era19, at which 
point Arsaces, the chief of the Parni, was crowned at Asaak on the River 
Atrek on the borders of Astauene. It is important to separate the 
settlement of the Parni, in an encroaching movement to the north of the 
SeleuciQ provinces of Parthia and Hyrcania, which seems to me a 
straightforward if protracted military campaign, from what Justin calls a 
'defectio Parthorum' - a revolt in the more usual sense but about which 
there are a good number of questions remaining to be asked - also in the 
20 
reign of Seleucus II. Strabo and Justin speak of the attack of the Parni 
on Parthia after they have mentioned Diodotus' secession, whereas the 
revolt of the province of Parthia probably took place earlier, as allowed 
by both Strabo and Justin, at the point where Seleucid defences were at 
their most fully stretched, namely at the time of the Third Syrian war 
during which the invasion of Seleucid territory by Ptolemy III made 
drastic inroads, and will have exposed Seleucid weakness. There is good 
circumstantial evidence therefore for 245 or thereabouts being the time 
when the satrap of the province of Parthia, who was probably called 
Andragoras, for reasons which we will give below, revolted. As we have 
observed, the nomad threat and also the absence of nearby royal control 
will likewise have made a greater degree of autonomy both necessary and 
desirable. The occasion for such a break had now for both these reasons 
arisen: 'revolted' is in these circumstances a dubious phrase. 
Andragoras is not mentioned directly in the context of the 
revolt, but a satrap Andragoras is mentioned in Justin XLI, 4, 7 in the 
context of Arsaces' invasion. Justin had earlier said that a certain 
Andragoras was the ancestor of the subsequent 'kings of Parthia,21. 
Inaccurate as this point of information may be, it is near enough to 
suggest that Andragoras was the name of the satrap in question, a conclusion 
backed up by the legend ANDRAGORAS on coins of the period,22 accompanied by 
a portrait but omitting the title of king and without the diadem23 • He may 
have been a relation of the Andragoras who was a general under Alexander 
and who is referred to above. 
There were certainly good reasons for a nearer source of 
" 
control than Antioch-on-the-Orontes, for the Greek and Macedonian forces 
manning the garrison towns, or otherwise settled in Parthia, Bactria and 
the other Upper satrapies; and Andragoras may well have seen taking matters 
into his own hands as justified by the practicalities of the situation 
alone, without there being any sense of a political rupture of otherwise 
close links with the far-off Seleucid power. With the arrangements for the 
overall command of the upper satrapies thrown into some confusion by the 
events of the third Syrian war and its inevitable requirement for troops 
to be supplied from these satrapies, such an arrangement becomes very 
plausible and is suggested by subsequent events as well as by the personal 
position such satraps of outlying territories found themselves in24 • 
The Arrian passage in Parthica Fr. 1 refers to Arsaces as 
having a brother Tiridates who was similarly involved in the original 
attack on Parthia and the subsequent penetration into Hyrcania. There is 
I think no reason to doubt the existence of this Tiridates and no reason 
to doubt his partnership; the fact that the sources of Strabo and Justin 
do not mention him is not an argument that he did not exist25 , although 
there is no compulsion to believe Arrian's story that one of the brothers 
was insulted by Andragoras whereupon they killed Andragoras and raised the 
26 P . d revolto Both Strabo and Justin say that warfare between the arnl an 
the Greeks followed the Parthian takeover in the satrapies that had been 
occupied by Arsaces and his troops. According to Arrian, Hyrcania to the 
south west of Parthia, a well-watered region at least in parts, due south 
of the Caspian, was conquered by 'Tiridates', presently to succeed to the 
throne as Arsaces II. A radically different lifestyle would be required 
by Parthian settlers there: the terrain would demand it. 
The present-day town of Gorgan lies in this region, and 
another part of the information we have about Andragoras may come from 
an inscription discovered near Gorgan some time in 1958-9. In his article 
describing this inscription, Louis Robert says that the name (and although 
he does not say so, also the location) of the inscription both suggest 
that we might be dealing with the Andragoras of the Parthian secession. 
Agreeing with Wolski's dating - of the striking of Andragoras' gold coinage 
to 245 and his 'disappearance' to 238 or 27 so - Robert suggests that as 
Co 
tI"te. ftJ..(f"'I)..t/J) A>rnoXov ,<..(, 
;"~cr,~, cr6''15 1-T'r, ... TO'#' t f(.,., lines 4, 5 and 6 of the inscription have 
we have a dating during the reign of Antiochus I, i.e. between 281 and the 
28 beginning of June 261 • Possibly it predates 266, the year in which the 
future Antiochus II was associated in the throne, and who would therefore 
be mentioned in official proclamations29 • There is no final certainty that 
we have here the mention of the Andragoras whom we are discussing, but it 
is conceivable that the Andragoras of the inscription was still exercising 
authority in 247 - 245 (or later), and it is quite possible that his writ 
extended to Hyrcania during this period. There are certainly traces of a 
hellenized town in the vicinity of Gorgan in a region which is at present 
heavily populated30 , and will have been so at an earlier period. The 
inscription is in 
) 
divini ty J..;llVf(t 
fact an act of enfranchisement by consecration 
) ; 10 \ / ,) • 
tA1.u92.eo\f) '1(D~ LJ..(..J.. no.) 
The fixed points of chronology arising out of our 
to a 
(0 
investigations are therefore that Arsaces was proclaimed chief of the Parni 
at Asaak in 247, inaugurating the Arsacid era, that Andragoras satrap of 
Parthia - with authority possibly also in neighbouring Hyrcania - seceded 
from the Seleucid empire in 245; and that in Bactria, Diodotus, having 
gradually untied his moorings, was independent as king of Bactria in 239, 
while Arsaces' invasion of Parthia - with its consequences for Andragoras 
and the Greek satrapies of both Parthia and Hyrcania - took place in 23831 • 
By that time Seleucus II was heavily committed against 
Antiochus Hierax and his Galatian allies, having been defeated by them at 
the battle of Ancyra (Ankara)short~.~240 and was in no position to 
reclaim lost ground in the east of his empire. However, if the process of 
the secession of these two satrapies is one matter on which there can now 
be, within limits which I have tried to chart, general agreement, the causes 
of the secession and its subsequent course raise issues also not just of 
military action and uncertainty about chronology, but of ideology and 
political control as well as of culture in its widest sense. To these we 
will now turn. 
POLITICAL CONTROL 
What was the position of the Greek power in Bactria and 
Parthia at that time? In order to examine this we will have to cover the 
antecedants to their secession in these two provinces. As a security zone 
against nomad intrusion 20,000 Macedonian soldiers had been settled in 
Bactria by Alexander and distributed among the Greek towns of the province 
such as Alexandria Oxiana and Alexandria ad Caucasum. On Alexander's death 
in 323 these settlers had risen in revolt to be crushed with some ferocity 
by Peithon32 • Those who survived that massacre were the continuing Greek 
presence in Bactria, no doubt bearing a grudge against the central 
government for that massacre, quite apart from any strategic insights they 
may have possessed as to the reality of their own political position in 
Bactria. 
It was this situation which Seleucus I inherited when he 
took the eastern provinces in 311, and which he began to rationalise 
by his treaty with Chandragupta in 305, by which he obtained his heavy 
cavalry of ~lePhants in exchange for the Punjab region which then he ceded e 
to Chandragupta. Bactria he kept, but will have been able to exercise some 
control over the nomad situation perhaps, owing to his marriage to Apama 
the daughter of Spitamenes of Soghdia. This marriage did mean that the 
children of this marriage - and in particular Antiochus I who was to 
succeed his father, were therefore half-Iranian, and it would be difficult 
not to see this as having implications for future Seleucid policy - or at 
the very least of people's expectations of that policy. 
Under Antiochus I, whom as we have seen Seleucus placed in 
charge of the eastern satrapies long before his own death, as a viceroy in 
the east, defensive precautions were taken - for example the fortification 
of Merv - which probably ought to be seen as an indication that Seleucus' 
beneficial influence on the nomad problem, if he had one, was waning. As 
a scheme for dealing with the problem the appointment of Antiochus I to 
this task was probably very wise, and it was certainly followed as a 
point of policy by his successors. It will have enabled Antiochus I before 
his own accession to have a good knowledge of the territories most at risk 
from outside forces. It does seem significant that the first serious nomad 
invasion of Greek-controlled territory did not take place until Seleucus I 
was dead, and the inactivity of Spitamenes f own successors may have ceased 
at that point. There is always the possibility of course that Spitamenes 
in his barony in Soghdia was himself - and his successors - at risk from 
other Iranian, more truly nomad forces. 
Antiochus I took steps, as we have already noted, to 
fortify the Greek cities wrecked by the nomad invasions which took place 
during his reign. And there is archaeological evidence about Merv itself 
made available as the result of Russian excavations there. 
Tarn believed that similar circumstances as had attended the 
founding of Merv must also have led to the founding of Ptolemy's Alexandria 
in Soghdiana on the north bank of the Oxus. 33 In his reconstruction of the 
evidence for the existence of 'Tarmita' as the hellenistic polis near the 
modern town of Termez Tarn points out that this outpost, of which there are 
archaeological traces,34 was in a good position strategically at the point 
where the trade route from Bactra to Samarkand crossed the Oxus: at least 
a part of the Silk Route subsequently crossed the river there also. Tarn 
made a case for there being a Demetrias in that location and previous to 
that an Antioch -'Tarmita'. Tarn makes Demetrius, the son and successor of 
Euthydemus of Bactria, have no scruples about refounding Antioch as 
Demetrias as he was in no way committed to maintaining Seleucid names for 
cities. This Antioch, Tarn claims, was destroyed in the same nomad 
invasion as had put an end to Alexandria Eschate (referred to by Stephanus 
as Antioch-in-Scythia) and which was the cause of Demodamas' punitive 
expedition. At some point after 293 he was ~T~T~(05 of Bactria/Soghdiana, 
and is said by Pliny to have crossed the Jaxartes and to have erected altars 
to Apollo of Didyma, ancestor and patron of the Seleucids: Pliny VI, 49. 
Tarn believed that these were connected with the foundation of the new 
Antioch-in-Scythia, and he saw the action of Demodamas as the final activity 
in the drive to repel fa very considerable Saca invasion'. (p. 93). The 
Sacae may have learned how to storm walled cities, and Tarn makes an 
interesting speculation that the diminution of the Greek element in the 
cities destroyed was one of the causes of this conquest by the Saca. 
Certainly Antiochus I when king - or earlier when viceroy - must have 
brought out east a considerable number of Greek settlers. 
Demodamas himself was probably succeeded as Strategos in 
these parts by Patrocles who, sometime later than 285, explored the Caspian 
for peaceful commercial purposes, noting that a tribe called the Cadusii 
'for a stretch of almost five thousand stadia' occupied the mountainous 
H . 36 country of the Caspian seaboard near yrcanla • It had been a salient 
point of Alexander's policy to retain orientals as governors in the 
ex-Achaemenid satrapies of his new empire; but even before his own death 
Alexander had had to revise this policy, and Stasanor's appointment to 
Bactria and Peithon's to Media had been a part of this revised policy. It 
is tempting to speculate upon the hypothetical consequences if oriental 
satraps had been left in charge of these provinces. 
Strabo is at pains to point out that the original governors 
of 'the Hyrcanians' were 'barbarians' and that the whole country was 'full 
of brigands and nomads and deserted regions': he goes on to inveigh 
against the Seleucids, but calls them 'Macedonians' and says that they did 
indeed rule over Hyrcania for a short time, 'but they were so occupied with 
wars that they could not attend to their remote possessions,.37 
It seems that it was not so much a question of the control 
the Seleucid monarchs could or could not exercise upon their eastern 
governors, as the expectation of the Seleucid kings that military 
reinforcements would be forthcoming from these eastern satrapies for the 
frequent hostilities in the west, notably with Egypt, which must potentially 
have sapped the vitality as well as the good intentions of these satraps 
to contribute men and materials to distant conflicts. An alert and 
informed appreciation of possible invasion on their own doorstep will have 
been sufficient to make such satrapal responses to central government in 
Antioch and Seleucia less than whole-hearted. Some idea of the extent of 
the demand can be gained from noting Polybius' inventory of Antiochus Ill's 
forces at Raphia in 217. 38 
We have echoes of this tension in the military movements of 
the year 245 when war broke out between Seleucus II and Ptolemy III of 
Egypt (the Third Syrian War) which involved Seleucus' wife Laodice and 
his second wife Berenice, whose feud was a severe handicap to Seleucus' 
plans for dealing with a dangerous situation in the west and the east of 
his empire at the same time. 39 Appian is specific that this was the time 
the Parttdans began their revolt, taking advantage of the confusion 
in the house of the Seleucids.' 
At this juncture Seleucus' brother Hierax was persuaded by 
his mother Laodice to make himself an independent ruler: already in charge 
of Asia Minor and recognised as joint king by Seleucus II, there was 
wisdom in Seleucus' policy of splitting royal control over such a large 
kingdom at this critical time - or there might have been, were it not 
for Laodice's policy of interfering with the working of the law of 
primogeniture which seems to have helped to corrupt a good working 
arrangement. It was too late to try to negotiate with Hierax, and 
Seleucus was distracted from action against Parthia in order to face a 
real rebellion in the west, thus allowing the Arsacid annexation of Parthia 
and subsequently Hyrcania to become a reality. The beginning of the 
Fratricidal War has been reliably dated by Wolski to 239-8 40. 
There may at this early stage in the Seleucid conflict 
with the Parni have been some sense in an alliance between Diodotus of 
Bactria and Seleucus II - between whom there is no recorded open hostility. 
One of our sources does hint at hostilities between Diodotus and the Arsacids 
(Arrian Parthica, Fr. XVII), and although it is suspect, there would 
plainly have been similar fears among Greeks in Bactria and elsewhere in 
Seleucus' own " existing territories. It is not until the reign of Diodotus II 
that we have evidence of an actual alliance between Bactria and Parthia, and 
this move is itself represented as a reversal of previous policy. 
The place of the third Syrian War in the question of the 
secession of Parthia and Bactria has been often speculated upon, and the 
connection chronologically can seem obvious; it is often less so upon 
examination, but its indirect influence may have been strong. 
As the third in what was to become a whole series of extended 
and wasteful conflicts between the ptolemies and the Seleucids the third 
war is peculiar in that we have no really substantial account of its 
circumstances or its course. The Appian passage in Syriaca 65 is short 
and quite late, and will have relied on an earlier source which is lost, 
but he is probably the most connected account we have. 
In origin, the war involved an attempt by Ptolemy II to 
repair relationships with the Seleucids, the better to deal a blow against 
Antigonus Gonatas of Macedonia whose activities in the Mediterranean had 
led to Ptolemaic losses in the second Syrian war. Ptolemy's scheme was to 
offer the hand of his daughter Berenice (conventionally known as Berenice II) 
to Antiochus II, now an ageing king in Antioch, along with a dowry possibly 
consisting of territory in Asia which had been earlier captured from the 
Seleucids by the Ptolemies. All this was to happen on condition that the 
Seleucids renounced their claim to Coele-Syria. 
Antiochus II did indeed marry Berenice and had a child by 
her, whom he told her would be the next Seleucid king. The matter was 
complicated by the fact that Antiochus was himself already married to 
Laodice his cousin whom he thereupon divorced, leaving her with four 
children - and a large estate in Asia Minor as a consolation prize. On a 
visit to Laodice at Ephesus Antiochus died leaving Seleucus II, his eldest ) 
son by Laodice, as king; and Berenice, with a son also by Antiochus, was 
put into a position where her son was at a disadvantage in the contest 
which now began between the queens to decide whose son should rule - a 
contest made personal because of the minority of Berenice's child implying 
a regent. Berenice recruited Syrian cities to her cause and sought help 
from Egypt. By the time her request reached there Ptolemy II was dead and 
Ptolemy III Euergetes was ready to take energetic action in support of 
his sister Berenice. 
In the opening moves of this war Berenice was captured in 
41 Antioch and her son killed. Berenice herself died soon afterwards ; but 
Ptolemy, apparently anxious for his own reasons to prosecute the war, 
represented to the Seleucid court that Berenice and her son were still 
alive and that he, Ptolemy, would be their champion. 
It was at this point that Ptolemy III undertook his 
expedition into the heart of the Seleucid empire, and this seems to have 
led him at least as far as Seleucia on Tigris. Accounts which claim more 
for him, including an advance as far as India are almost certainly 
legendary42, but in any case have to bear the weight of their own 
chronology, let alone the logistics of slow overland military expeditions. 
We do have cuneiform indications that Babylon had resumed its alliegiance 
to Seleucus II by the Summer of 24543 • If Ptolemy was still at Seleucia 
In the summer of 246 receiving the alliegiance of some of the eastern 
44 satraps ,two questions arise: firstly, why then did he need to go east 
subsequently - if he did, and second, how could he possibly have got as 
far as Bactria and India and back in a year, bearing in mind the 
distances involved? One is inclined to opt for Appian's more conservative 
account of the campaign. 
The possibility of a ptolemaic advance as far as these 
eastern limes is fascinating to contemplate in the circumstances of what 
we know by hindsight was really their imminent secession, but this makes it 
easier to admit that Polyaenus 8, 50, 1.36 could indeed have got hold of an 
earlier account which exploited the known weakness of the Seleucid east as 
the background for what was in fact a wholly fictitious advance. 
In attempts over the next four years (to 241) to reinstate 
his Mediterranean coastal possessions, Seleucus was only partially successful; 
and a peace signed in 241 gave the Seleucids very little and Ptolemy most of 
the Syrian coastline. But it was a treaty which was to stand for twenty 
years, and this was to be important from the point of view of the Seleucids' 
other concerns further east. The problem was that by 241 secession in 
Parthia was progressive; and in Bactria, for what may have been the best 
of defensive reasons, Seleucid rule was not absolute by any means, although 
'hostility' involves far too many assumptions ~bout Bactrian attitudes to 
the Seleucids and about the adequacy of Seleucid defence against Bactria's 
neighbours which cannot be supported by any evidence that we can cite. 
Seleucus was probably unable to undertake any expedition to 





This may additionally have been spurred on by the extension of Parthian 
conquests into Hyrcania which happened under Arsaces.II (Tiridates) in about 
235, but the proximal reason was the pressure of internecine strife in the 
west, and the relations between Hierax, Laodice, Ptolemy III and Seleucus II. 
Not until the twenty years peace which we have mentioned between Ptolemy 
and Seleucus was the extraordinary geopolitical nature of the Seleucid state 
to allow Seleucus any real eastern concentration. It is significant that 
when Seleucus was able to move his forces onto the offensive in Hyrcania 
success was spectacular. 'Tiridates' retreated into the steppe country of 
Turan, the country of the Apasiacae, (the water Sacas) on the east coast of 
the Caspian where the Jaxartes flows to the sea45 • There is a coin of 
Seleucus II from the Seleucia mint which could be a celebration of this 
victory: the bronze double-drachm has Nike placing a wreath on Seleucus 
who is standing facing her in armour and with his hand placed on a spear46. 
On Seleucus' return from the east the war with Hierax resumed, 
with Seleucus' motive now to regain some access to the Aegean, which had 
been in Hierax' possession since the closing stages of the third Syrian war 
when Hierax had been granted sovereignty over Asia Minor in return for help 
against Ptolemy. Had Hierax' joint kingship with Seleucus been regularised 
and organized so that sea access was not allowed to become a major issue, 
all might have been well; as it was, the action against Hierax - who had 
now contracted an alliance with Galatian mercenaries - meant a constant 
campaign-emergency in the west of the empire and serious involvement again 
with the Galatians. The major action fought by Seleucus against them has 
47 48 
already been mentioned and has been dated to 240 and 236 ,but should 
probably be placed after Seleucus' return from the east, and so about 235. 
The battle was indeed a serious defeat for Seleucus, but it 
led to the eventual eclipse of Hierax, whose alliance with the Gallic tribes 
of Asia Minor had reached the point at which he was in their control. His 
future career need not detain us in detail, but an important by-product of 
the strength of the Galatian threat (with or without Hierax) was the enforced 
rise of the power of Pergamum as a state with the will and the capacity to 
contain this Gallic threat. Attalus was able to defeat the Tolistoagii 
and the Tectosages - as well as the troops of Hierax - in battle twice, 
on the second occasion in the city of Pergamum itself. The results of 
this victory were not only significant for Hierax, whose power in Asia Minor 
was now broken, but also for Pergamum, whose reputation in the Greek world 
was considerably strengthened as an emerging major power. The results of 
that were momentous. 
In the future Pergamum's strength and influence and the 
independent alliances she was now strong enough to make would have to be 
borne in mind in all Seleucid strategic dispositions. And, most important 
for the eastern provinces of the Seleucid empire, a hostile Pergamum would 
constitute yet another reason for the Seleucids to watch over their western 
concerns and consequently another reason for satraps in the east to go their 
own way, or to be allowed to do so. The need for a governor general of the 
c:. C I 
Upper Satrapies 0 1"T. raJ" ~ytt) !Td.-T(tl..rrr,'I.I'J whose jurisdiction may have 
included Babylonia, was now stronger than it had ever been49 • Such powers 
we have noted were delegated to Antiochus I by Seleucus I, and by 
Antiochus I possibly to Seleucus II: Seleucus II was now to delegate 
them to Antiochus III. The appointments were not in all cases to succeed 
in their object of holding the west and the east of the empire together 
under Seleucid rule. Both Molon and Timarchus were to lead revolts against 
the Seleucid government from their position in that command, and the 
inscription from Teheran now indicates that in Seleucus IV's reign also 
c.183-l82 an official whose name has not been preserved had this function 
. 50 in the Upper Satraples. 
By 230, Antiochus Hierax seems to have been overtaken by 
the course of events which he had set in motion in Asia Minor, and to have 
conceded to his Galatian allies nut only a right to levy tribute from him, 
but also to enjoy a 'free-fire' area for plunder and extortion. Hierax 
lost Hellespontine Phrygia, Lydia and Caria, and was defeated in three 
actions with the Pergamene army: by 229-8 he had been confined as a local 
ruler to Sardis. After this, Hierax sought refuge with Arsames of Armenia 
Minor, and gained his support in a new campaign against Seleucus II. He 
suffered a reverse during a campaign in Mesopotamia from a Seleucid army 
under Andromachus (Seleucus Ills father-in-law). Following this Seleucus 
himself drove him out of Asia Minor, and Hierax, compelled to flee to Thrace 
was killed by the Galatians there. Seleucus was also able to recover 
Antioch which had been seized by Stratonice, the kingts aunt, on behalf of 
Hierax at an earlier stage. Seleucus himself died shortly afterwards. 
In retrospect, it is difficult to stress how calamitous ~.' 
Antiochus Hierax and his ambitions had been to the whole Seleucid cause. He 
was indirectly responsible, as we have observed, not only for the eventual 
loss of the Parthian and Bactrian satrapies, but also for aiding the rise 
of Pergamum: two losses which effectively shrank the Seleucid empire at 
both ends, and furthermore did so in a manner which was to leave active 
opponents in power in both east and west: Parthia and Pergamum owed their 
chances to the other concerns of Seleucus II's reign. As we have seen, 
given the opportunity, Seleucus was a decisive and successful general - his 
defeat by the Galatians at Ancyra was in every wayan exception - but by the 
end of his reign, with almost continuous military action on two fronts 
having taken its toll, his strategy was fatally weakened, and the final 
blow must surely have come with the accession of Diodotus II to the throne 
of Bactria to succeed Diodotus I 
51 in about 235, when a pact seems to 
have been struck between Parthia and Bactria thus converting the two 
neighbouring secession states into a virtual power-bloc. We have no grounds 
for supposing de facto Bactrian hostility to the Seleucids in 238 - as we 
have seen there were other, better reasons for independent administration. 
In 230 the Bactrian state will have had to recognise the power of Parthia, 
now in occupation of at least part of Hyrcania, as a reality with which it 
had better come to terms. It is that Parthian-Bactrian accord which 
marks the decisive break of the eastern satrapies from Seleucid control: 
other secession arrangements were ad hoc measures and preliminary and 
provisional in character. It would be extremely difficult to maintain 
that either the general assumption of sovereignty, which we note in the 
case of Bactria, or the several phases of the Parthian secession, were the 
result of policy 'decisions' by the Seleucids. Future action by Seleucid 
kings suggests that there was a longing amounting to paranoia to recoup 
losses in the east, and that in the process of future attempts to do so 
1 h f th ' d' 51a ay muc 0 elr un olng. 
The question as to whether Seleucus II was able to arrive 
at a treaty with Arsaces I is certainly raised in connection with the 
defeat he inflicted on the retreating Parni following his campaign in 
the steppe country. In view of the fact that he was subsequently attacked 
by the nomads and suffered heavy losses this is unlikely52• The statement 
that Antiochus III had Dahae contingents in his army at Raphia in 21753 
is possibly better explained by confining Arsaces' conquests to a section 
of Hyrcania in the north of the province rather than supposing that he 
annexed all of it54 • 
We will need to look at the General Command of the Upper 
Satrapies in the chapter dealing with Antiochus III in greater detail 
than has been attempted so far, but in the meanwhile it is necessary to 
view the est~blishment of such a post as a real attempt by the Seleucid 
kings to compensate for the lack of an administrative centre in the east 
in which the king himself might live and work - by the appointment of an 
important deputy, usually royal, who would do so and be what the 
commentators on the rulers of Bactria and India would call a 'sub-king'. 
The question was to arise as to how much power this official should have: 
enough to rule adequately or enough to rule independently. 55 If he was 
to have sufficient power to rule adequately, would he be seen as a threat 
to the king by himself - or by the king? We have no evidence that this 
was so under the first Seleucids, but the occupant of this post would have 
to have sufficient autonomy to impose his will on the eastern satraps as 
though he was king in all but name. The power of devolved authority was put 
to severe test, and it is not unrealistic to see the secession of Parthia 
and Bactria as being in essence a breakdown of the credibility of the 
'Regent of the East' as an administrative concept, rather than an act 
of treason ~gainst the king on the part of Andragoras or Diodotus. 
Newell's evidence for the extreme gradualness of the 
change in coin designations56 , and his statement that Diodotus I was still 
minting coins with Antiochus II's name 'for a considerable time after 
accepting the diadem,57 are strong evidence against a 'treason' argument 
and good evidence for the inadequacy of the control being exercised by 
whoever was the Upper satrapies' regent at the time. It may be that we 
are near a solution to that problem when we note that Ptolemy Euergetes 
appointed Xanthippus as viceroy of the whole area from the Euphrates 
eastwards following his invasion of 245, thus replacing the Seleucid 
appointee who was there at the time, and who was dismissed or killed in 
the course of Ptolemy's invasion. If, then, the person whose authority 
was not enough to hold Andragoras and Diodotus was probably not a Seleucid 
at all but an Egyptian appointee, would they have had the same respect for 
him, always supposing that he was militarily and politically competent? 
Our written tradition is unfortunately not complete enough to answer 
these questions definitively, but the possibilities remain. 
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Chapter III. 
The Eastern Question during the reign of Antiochus III. 
A look at the eastern situation facing the Seleucids during 
the reign of Seleucus II produces the dominant impression of the king 
being unable to make the two flanks of his long empire settle sufficiently 
for reasonable government to be imposed again. It also suggests that the 
strategy of dealing with the eastern question by placing a high, usually 
royal official permanently at Seleucia as Grand Vizier or Viceroy, 
successful under the first Seleucids, had now become inoperative or 
ineffective - or distrusted by the king at Antioch. It ought, for example, 
to have been unnecessary for the King to leave Antioch in the critical 
circumstances of the civil war against Antiochus Hierax and his Galatian 
allies, in order to wage a temporarily successful retaliatory war upon the 
Parni. If the war was to be waged at all, rather than negotiations being 
conducted, it should surely have been done by the General commander of the 
East with forces organised - and paid - by him.l In the event Seleucus 
turned his back on the west to deal with the east, and vice-versa 
alternately, and each time trouble blazed up in his absence. 
After the short reign and murder of Seleucus III, Antiochus III 
came to the Seleucid throne in 223, and inherited an unstable eastern 
situation from his deceased brother. This involved the appointment of 
2 Molon as commander of the upper satrapies along with his brother Alexander; 
and to Achaeus, a great grandson of Seleucus Nicator, was entrusted the 
province of Asia Minor at a time when the Pergamene threat in the west of 
the empire required strong and resolute but also loyal activity.3 At the 
age of 19 Antiochus had to undertake the rule of this unsettled state in 
company with his Carian chief minister Hermaeus whose despotic and harsh 
f t · 4 influence he may have had little chance then 0 coun erlng; and whom it 
is possible to see as a force acting against the interests of the Seleucids 
in that risings against the royal control could easily have been in fact 
opposition to Hermaeus' control. 
Molon was satrap of Media and Alexander his brother 
satrap of Persis at the start of Antiochus' reign, and by 222 Molon had 
taken the title of King. Antiochus appears to have been originally 
responsible for putting these governors into their respective offices, 
and whether he was coerced by them, or badly-advised by others, preparations 
for their own revolt seem to have begun straightaway. By the summer of 222 
Molon was in revolt and had begun to coin at Ecbatana in his own province 
of Media with the title of King,6 before advancing westwards towards Seleucia. 
We have POlybius' mention of Alexander's satrapy as Persis 
(V, 40, 7) as our only indication of a Seleucid reclamation of this province 
after a continuous period of rule by independent kings since the time of 
Seleucus' death. The British Museum has tetradrachms of Bagadat, Oborsus 
and Autophradates I, all native rulers of Persis, and all coining at 
Persepolis or Istakhr in the years between 280 and 222. As E. T. Newell 
points out there is a break in the coinage of independent Persis after the 
time of Autophradates, and this may mean that Seleucus II had re-annexed it 
in the course of his reign. It would seem that Seleucus III did not reign 
long enough to do so, and here we have Polybius statement (V, 40, 7) that 
Alexander was satrap of Persis - in this instance under the new king 
Antiochus III. 
The campaign which followed against Molon was not so much 
a campaign to re-take the upper satrapies as a necessary emergency action 
on Antiochus Ill's part to stabilise the empire as it had come down to him. 
If by 'upper satrapies' we mean Parthia, Hyrcania, Bactria, Carmania, 
Gedrosia, Drangiana and the Paropamisadae, these had been independent 
under Greek and Parthian rulers for something approaching twenty years at 
the time of Antiochus Ill's accession; and reclamation of them was indeed 
to occupy Antiochus during the middle years of his reign, but it was then 
to involve a major and lengthy £nabasis against rulers already confirmed A! 
in considerable power by their own people, and it is a different issue to 
that of the revolts of Molon and Alexander - more of a police action than 
a foreign re-conquest o The situation presented by this comparison does 
illustrate the change in the composition of the Seleucid Empire since 
250-240, and therefore the alteration in attitude and disposition which 
Antiochus III would be required to make in order to deal with it. 
The first necessity in either the long or the short term 
strategic disposition was to reclaim the loyalty of the people in the east 
of what was ~ his empire, however much he might be dissuaded from doing 
so by the machinations of Hermaeus or Achaeus with their own insistence -
for whatever reason - upon the king's involvement with the west of the empire 
and the Egyptian question. 
The question as to whether Carmania, Aria, Drangiana, 
Gedrosia and Arachosia joined what Schmitt called the secession movement is 
answered largely on geographical grounds where there is no more concrete 
evidence. The Parthian movement from 240 to 230 had split the Eastern 
provinces of Antiochus II and Seleucus II's Seleucid empire away from its 
central Iranian provinces by driving a wedge into the chain of Greek poleis 
along the northern trade route. The southern route through Carmania was 
much less populated with Greek settlers and their cities, and was also 
separated from the northern Iranian settlements by the Dasht-i-Kavir in 
the north and the great Persian desert further south; thus Carmania 
itself was isolated in a way which made it more accessible to first the 
Mauryas and later the Euthydemids. Arachosia, as we know from the Rock-cut 
edicts of Asoka found at Kandahar, was Maurya during Asoka's time. Broadly 
we have to say that all territory east of the Caspian had fallen away from 
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Seleucid control by the time of Antiochus III s acceSSlon. It is not, I 
think, true to say that any attempt to discover anything beyond the bare 
fact of the loss of Bactria and Parthia always leads to contradiction and 
confusion. 
In an attempt to arrive at a definition of Seleucid 
territorial holdings by another route to that of Justin and Strabo, i.e. 
by using Erastosthenes, Schmitt attempts to define Ariana. According to 
Erastosthenes Ariana basically included the provinces whose political 
alliegiance was doubtful in the years after the breakaway of Bactria (i.e. 
after 239), or in geographical terms the whole Iranian upland east of the 
central desert, now either independent of the Seleucids or only loosely 
connected with them, the Parthian empire of Erastosthenes' own day, which 
Schmitt says included Parthia, Hyrcania and the northern steppe. lO 
Erastosthenes himself, as Schmitt says, was not writing a political 
geography but more of an astronomical one. 'Ariana' to him was one of the 
into which he divided Asia in order to calculate the area of 
the earth's surface. 
Perhaps the best way to discuss the extent of Seleucid 
control in Antiochus Ill's reign is to compare what countries' forces he 
could draw upon for his army in the two crucial campaigns in the west at 
the beginning and end of his reign. At Raphia in 217, which he was able to 
fight after the extinction of Molon's revolt, his army according to 
Polybius included Medes, Persians, Carmanians, and Cadousians from the 
Caspian lit oral near the lands of the Mardi. In addition there was a 
Cissian contingent from Susiana. ll Even after the great eastern anabasis 
of Antiochus' middle years the forces which comprised his host at Magnesia 
in 190 were not greatly different: Medes, Elymaeans, Cadousians and 
Cyrtians from the mountains of Persis and Media. He did have 1200 mounted 
12 
archers from the Dahae who may have been there as a result of Antiochus' 
treaty with the Parthians, to whom the Dahae were related. But, as Wolski 
says, there is nowhere any mention of contingents from Aria, Arachosia or 
D . 13 ranglana. This absence rather suggests that Euthydemus was able, after 
the treaty Teleas had arranged in 206, to keep these provinces as the 
western marches of the Bactrian state. 
Today, as in Antiochus' day, Aria, Arachosia and Drangiana 
are separated from Media by the Persian desert which tends to make an 
obvious political division. Parthia and Hyrcania are further north in a 
different climatic zone. In this way, now as then, these provinces would 
tend to gravitate towards the east rather than to be easily assimilated 
into a central Iranian bloc - particularly if ruled from the west. Today 
they form part of Afghanistan not Iran, and are administered from Kabul and 
not from Teheran. From the time of Diodotus I the whole northern connecting 
route through Media, the Caspian Gates, Parthia and Margiana was in the 
control of either Parthia or Bactria, both seceding states. These facts 
suggest that Antiochus III was not able to impose his will on Bactria and 
that the treaty he entered into was a much more equal agreement than his 
all-conquering attitude to the campaign might lead us to suppose. It is 
difficult to believe that Polybius would have invented a Dahae contingent 
or concealed the presence of contingents from Arachosia, Drangiana and Aria. 
The extent of the territory which he ruled is important in 
the context of Molon's revolt and its aftermath, as the position of strategos 
or Viceroy of the upper satrapies was made more or less untenable according 
to his capacity to hold at bay foreign invaders or, alternatively, to rule 
Greek and Macedonian settlers and the local population at one and the same 
time. Antiochus' first priority was to arrest the further fragmentation of 
the territories he had inherited as an empire (in many ways a misleading 
term to apply to the Seleucid state), and having stabilised the position, 
to continue to strengthen what he had managed to retain. As we shall see, 
with one disastrous mistake he was largely able to do this. The suppression 
of the revolt of Molon (and Alexander) was the first move in that direction. 
Molon's campaign began successfully with a rapid advance 
beyond the Zagros into Apolloniatis leaving Media behind him, with the 
royal generals Xenon and Theodotus retreating in front of him, according 
to Polybius 'into the cities,.14 This large acquisition of territory 
enabled Molon to build up supplies and communications with his Median base 
(presumably at ECbatana): he had already made sure of the cooperation of 
15 ° ° dO local satraps by means of bribery, although here we mlght detect preJu lce 
on the part of Polybius who is our only source. There is nothing to suggest 
at this point that the local rulers required any coercion to join the revolt: 
they may well have been Greek anyway; and there is equally nothing to suggest 
that this was not, at least in part, an anti-Macedonian reaction among Greek 
settlers. And although we read that they later deserted the cause of Molon, 
this only happened when Antiochus arrived in person at the head of a 
determined opposition. The suggestion that a better stand against the 
Parthians could be made by Molon in his geographical position than by 
16 Antiochus in his is an attractive one ,and would suggest that such local 
rulers, if threatened by Parthia, would be more likely to join the ruler in 
immediate command in the area. After all Antiochus had acceded in his 
appointment to do precisely that task. Far from coercion being required, 
authority was vested in Molon. 
Antiochus meanwhile was at Seleucia-on the Euphrates (Zeugma) 
where he received as wife Laodice the daughter of Mithridates II of Pontus 
17 
who had himself been married to a daughter of Seleucus II; the continued 
alliance between the Seleucid Empire and another hellenized kingdom to the 
north is an interesting aspect of Antiochus III's statecraft, and he went 
on to found or to refound cities in her name, notably in Media, Molon's 
province. 1S The marriage is not only important for its alliance; it also 
demonstrates at one or two removes the Seleucid willingness to marry an 
Iranian wife following the good example of Seleucus Nicator.
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The point 
may not have been lost on Molon's army, some of whom will certainly have 
been Iranians, (Pol. V, 43). 
Molon appears to have begun his rule with a province which 
had many natural advantages not so apparent nowadays after centuries of 
cultivation and some drying-out of the soil; apart from horses he is 
said to have had corn and cattle in abundance, and his province was a 
governable, relatively easily-defended unit. 20 The retreat of the royal 
generals seems to have confirmed his control of the province, and Antiochus' 
own decision to follow the advice of Hermaeus and leave the reconquest of 
Media to his generals made Molonvs next move - to advance to Seleucia-on-
Tigris and to winter at Ctesiphon, at that time an unimportant settlement 
opposite Seleucia, an obvious and easy development. As matters turned out, 
he was prevented from laying siege to Seleucia by the seizure of the river 
boats by Antiochus' general Zeuxis, and this tactical success was to have 
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most important results, in that it gave Antiochus himself time to join in 
hostilities earlier than would have been possible if Seleucia had been taken 
before the winter set in. 
Hermaeus was responsible, we are told, for forestalling 
Antiochus in his plan to move against Molon at this juncture, and to deal 
instead with the situation in Coele-Syria which Hermaeus is said to have 
regarded as a more suitable war for a king to fight. 23 An Achaean mercenary 
captain called Xenoitas was given full powers for the suppression of Molon 
and was sent east, presumably by Hermaeus. At Seleucia he was joined by 
some of Molon's troops who swam the Tigris to join him, and who encouraged 
him to cross over with his army, as Molon's army were disaffected and would 
desert to the royal forces. Xenoitas' forces did indeed cross, and pitched 
camp near Molon's army; misconstruing the subsequent withdrawal of Molon's 
troops as a retreat, Xenoitas allowed his guard to drop, and while his men 
feasted Molon's army returned in a surprise attack upon Xenoitas' camp, 
inflicted very severe casualties on the unsuspecting royal troops, many of 
whose bodies, according to Polybius, were carried by the current down the 
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Molon's next move was to attack Seleucia, while Zeuxis 
withdrew in front of him, and he was able to take the city at the first 
assault, as Zeuxis and the epistates Diomedon abandoned it. He was then 
able to reduce Babylonia, and in a southerly movement to annex Susiana where 
he was successful except for the citadel at Susa where the commander 
Diogenes held out against the ,detachment Molon had left to complete 
the capture. Molon subsequently regrouped at Seleucia-on-Tigris again, 
and occupied the Mesopotamian region (Pol. V, 48, 16) as far as Dura Europus25 , 
and Dura on the eastern bank of the Tigris. Having gained a large 
territorial holding Molon withdrew to Babylon where he was when Antiochus Ill's 
punitive expedition reached the Euphrates. 26 
Antiochus had abandoned his campaign in Coele-Syria on 
news of Molon's continued success, and had summoned a council to consult on 
measures to be taken against Molon. Epigenes, who was a skilled general and 
who had earlier objected to Hermaeus' misreading of the gravity of Molon's 
rising, now claimed that he had been correct in his assessment of the military 
situation and pressed Antiochus to undertake an expedition against Molon. 
This course of action was agreed by the council and accepted by Antiochus27 
who set out for the Euphrates, collecting reinforcements there and reaching 
Antioch-in-Mygdonia by winter 28 where he rested for 40 days. Epigenes was 
quickly eliminated on the orders of Hermaeus. 29 
Zeuxis, who appears as a general with good strategic sense, 
advised Antiochus to cross the Tigris and to advance into Apollonaitis: it 
was probably a decision of political wisdom too, as the people of that district 
had, according to Polybius, submitted to Molon in the first place, and that 
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recently, not from choice but from fear of the consequences of refusal. 
After a 10-day stay at Antioch-in-Mygdonia Antiochus advanced to Libba
3l
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and eventually, again taking the advice of Zeuxis, crossed the Tigris and 
marched to Dura on the Tigris which he released from Molon's attempt to 
besiege it. Molon then withdrew into Apollonia across the Tigris and in 
this way came into contact with the skirmishers of Antiochus' army on the 
32 heights of what was probably Qyrmyzy Dereh ,and the two main armies were 
brought to battle just south of the city of Apollonia (Baradan Tepe). After 
an abortive attempt at a surprise night action, battle was joined on the 
following day, and was decided in the event by the wholesale desertion of 
Molon's left wing to the king's side; Molon saw that he was surrounded and 
he took his own life while his brother Neolaus fled to Persis, where, in a 
family massacre - described in matter-of-fact terms by Polybius - Molon's 
children were killed and his brother Alexander committed suicide, as 
eventually did Neolaus. 33 Antiochus meanwhile restored Molon's army to 
loyalty and ordered that Molon's body should be impaled as a warning against 
rebellion, at Callonitis34 in the Zagros. Diogenes, who had held the citadel 
at Susa for Antiochus was rewarded with the satrapy of Media, and Tychon, his 
military secretaryjreceived the Gulf area. It was left to Antiochus to 
reduce to obedience the territory of Artabazanes in Atropatene, whose 
potential for waging war in terms of Antiochus' supply lines is stressed by 
Polybius. Artabazanes, partly in view of his age and partly as a result of 
victories Antiochus had already won, came to terms with the king. (Pol. V, 55). 
Discredited in his schemes but unbridled in his ambition, 
Hermaeus, shortly after the treaty with Atropatene, was himself the victim 
of a conspiracy mounted by Apollophanes the king's physician; and, under 
the pretext of walking with Antiochus, was stabbed by Apollophanes' 
accomplices with the foreknowledge of the king: his family perished 
separately at the same time. 35 Antiochus was now able to deal with the 
machinations of Achaeus, whom he had earlier appointed as governor of Asia 
on this side of the Taurus with an appropriate supervision of local officials, 
tribal organisation and poleis similar to that which Philetairos had 
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that of Molon whom Polybius mentions in the same section dealing with 
Antiochus' early appointments, with the comment that Molon and Alexander 
37 hoped that Achaeus would join them in their revolt. Achaeus had earlier, 
in 226, assumed the title of king following an otherwise statesmanlike period 
in charge of this province. Polybius says that he thereupon became 'puffed up' 
, 
by his good fortune (~lfJ..te~I' 
Achaeus' doubts about the capacity of the new king, even after the success 
of Antiochus' suppression of Molon, which led Achaeus to attempt to seize the 
district of Syria and therefore to take the throne in a regular revolt, helped 
by the people of Cyrrhestice who were possibly restive after a royal 
suppression of their own army mutiny.39 In the event the army declared for 
Antiochus and the revolt collapsed. 40 
It had been Hermaeus' plan that Antiochus should invade 
Egypt, which seems then and later to have appeared as the 'natural enemy' 
of the Seleucids, despite earlier, and later, marriage alliances designed to 
bring about peace: 4l we get a poor view of Antiochus' strategic sense at 
this stage from the realization that Antiochus could even have considered a 
campaign against Coele-Syria while Seleucia-in-Pieria remained a ptolemaic 
possession, and it was due to the advice of Apollophanes that hostilities 
began with a land and sea attack on Seleucia to reverse an occupation which 
had existed since the days of Ptolemy 111,42 when it was taken during the 
Third Syrian War. It is to Antiochus' credit that he attempted to negotiate 
with the city magistrates and promised bribes so that the city might be taken 
without an attack; and, although that overture was rejected and the lower 
town in fact carried by storm by Antiochus' commanders Ardys and Diognetus, 
eventually terms were sought and settled for the surrender of the city by 
Leontius its governor, which Antiochus carried out in a statesmanlike manner, 
with a restoration of property to exiled citizens and the installation of 
garrisons to secure the city.43 
A proposal from Antiochus' Aetolian general Theodotus to 
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'put Coele Syria into Antiochus' hands' was taken seriously by the Seleucid on 
account of the influence Theodotus had with the Ptolemies, particularly as 
he had recently taken the important city of ptolemais from the Ptolemies. 44 
At this juncture it is right to point out the bias which Polybius displays 
against Ptolemy Philopator: Polybius adopts a hectoring tone, although his 
observations on the preparations for defence made by Agathocles and Sosibius, 
the chief ministers of Egypt, are much more complimentary.45 At first, they 
pursued a policy of coercion to force Antiochus to evacuate the country, 
backed up by delegations sent to Greek cities and islands which might be 
expected to exercise some influence upon Antiochus; then they reorganised 
the Egyptian army, properly using the time they had gained from the process 
of diplomatic travelling to prepare for war. 46 Polybius gives a full 
account of their military preparations throughout 218 with a view of their 
work which is decidedly sympathetic (V, 63, 64) and represents these 
activities as proceeding while Antiochus besieged the city of Dor (Dora) a 
small Israelite town eight or nine miles north of Caesarea: 47 already the 
Seleucid hold on Coele Syria was spreading south from their original base 
at Apamea over the line of the River Eleutherus, for many years a de facto 
frontier. Achaeus could now be regarded as a formal or informal ally of 
Ptolemy Philopator, and Polybius is quite specific on this point,48 which 
alliance Antiochus should have taken more seriously than he apparently did: 
as matters were, he agreed to a four-month suspension of hostilities and 
withdrew northwards to Seleucia to organize his forces into their winter 
quarters. We gain the impression from Polybius that the Egyptian 
administration was wholly more astute in its diplomatic negotiations, as well 
as in its preparations for war, and that Antiochus waited for Coele-Syria to 
drop into his hands. 49 
Negotiations took place through the winter of 219-218, and 
covered the questions arising from Ptolemy Lagust original occupation in 
319, and the subsequent annexation after the defeat of Antigonus Monophthalmus 
at Ipsus in 301 - an occupation by Ptolemy which was contested by Seleucus 
Nicator on the grounds that Ptolemy was not actually there at the battle to 
help to win it, having been prevented from taking part.
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The valuable 
assets of plentiful timber and harbours acted as a lure for both the 
Seleucids and the Ptolemies throughout the third century, and became a 
reason for the annexation of Coele-Syria quite separate from the more obvious 
territorial advantages which would be gained from the capture of a block of 
territory abutting Egypt on the one hand and Syria on the other. Coele Syria 
was in an unique position to alter the balance of power between ptolemies 
and Seleucids from a geopolitical point of view, and consequently its 
inhabitants were involved in the struggle between Egypt and Syria to an 
increasing extent. 
Having gained time through the negotiations during the 
winter of 219-8, Agathocles and Sosibius equipped and trained a new Egyptian 
field force, including in the phalanx native Egyptians for the first time 
(Polybius V, 82). In doing this they were able significantly to increase 
the total of ptolemaic forces in the field, and in doing so set native 
Egyptians in a new role in the state. Subsequent revolts may have resulted, 
at least in part, from this recognition of Egyptian native status in the 
ptolemaic state. It was a bold move, and was not necessarily a foolish one. 
In 218 Antiochus advanced from Apamea through Galilee to Philoteria, and so, 
via Scythopolis and the Jordan valley to Philadelphia. 51 Achaeus during this 
time was fully employed in Asia Minor in hostilities against Attalus, and 
insofar as he seems to have been involved in Pamphyllia and Pisidia, cannot 
have been an actual participant in hostilities against Antiochus. 52 Antiochus 
wintered in ptolemais in 216 to 217. 53 
In 217 the Seleucid army marched down thecoast of Coele-Syria 
past the Greek towns of the seaboard: Apollonia, Joppa, Anthedon and Gaza 
to Raphia which was the first city in Coele Syria on the Egyptian side after 
Rhinocolura. The armies met just south of Raphia, and prior to the battle an 
attempt on Ptolemy's life failed. 54 The result of the battle was decided 
by the charge of the Egyptian phalanx under the command of Ptolemy IV himself, 
whose conduct before and during the battle does much to redeem his indolent 
reputation. The Egyptian victory was complete, Antiochus' losses being 
10,000 foot, 300 horses and 4,000 prisoners;55 but Ptolemy did not force 
terms other than the restoration of Coele-Syrian territory proper to Egypt. 
The retaken towns of Palestine are said to have been glad to see Ptolemy 
'for the peoples of Coele Syria have always been more attached to that house 
. d ,56 than to the Seleucl ae • Antiochus took steps to make a treaty with 
Sosibius which led to peace for a year, and he was anxious to do this so 
that his hands should be free to deal with the situation in Asia Minor 
where Achaeus seems to have achieved a position which Antiochus regarded as 
threatening and as requiring prompt action57 which had been delayed by his 
conflict with Egypt. 
So, while Ptolemy Philopator returned to face a revolt of the 
native Egyptians, now confident in their own military standing and anxious 
for independence, Antiochus crossed the Taurus, made a treaty with Attalus 
of Pergamum and launched his war against Achaeus. 58 In Greece proper, 
Philip V of Macedon had brought the exhausting conflict with the Aetolian 
league to a satisfying conclusion at the Peace of Naupactus despite the 
simmering discontent of some of the Aetolians. The view which Polybius has 
of the gradual drawing together of various strands of national history in 
the hellenistic world is well put in the words of Agelaus, the Aetolian 
strategos at Naupactus: (Pol. Y ,Io*" I .) 'The best thing of all is that the 
Greeks should not go to war with each other at all ... ', and more in the same 
strain. Polybius' own comment on the situation comes later when, no doubt 
with the benefit of hindsight, he says: 'neither Philip nor the leading 
statesmen of the Greek cities made war or peace any longer with each other 
with a view to Greek affairs, but were already all fixing their eyes on 
Italy. ,59 In,<the June before the August conference at Naupactus in Aetolia, 
Hannibal had decisivelycrushed the Roman armies at the Battle of Lake 
Trasimene; and although this was a disastrous defeat for Rome, events 
relating to Rome could no longer be left out of the reckoning: they had 
implications for everyone, as Hannibal's presence was later to have for 
Antiochus III. Philip himself seems to have had a plan to invade Italy, 
egged on by Demetrius; but, alarmed by reports of the approach of Roman 
ships, abandoned this project as Polybius would have us believe 'with 
considerable dishonour' (Pol.V, 110). 
Philip's next move was one more out of prudence than policy 
perhaps: he made a treaty with Hannibal after the disastrous Roman defeat 
at Cannae in 216,61 which did serve to erect an anti-Roman coalition in the 
hellenistic world in that it indicated tangible opposition rather than 
simple political disquiet as at Naupactus. 
Against this more general hellenistic background, Antiochus III 
meanwhile went about pacifying Asia Minor and dealing with Achaeus. In the 
years 215 and 214 having, as Polybius indicated (ro~bi~ t,/07. ), secured the 
connivance of Attalus, Antiochus laid siege to Achaeus in the city of Sardis 
and captured him when the city was stormed in 213,62 having him tortured 
before death. This defeat of Achaeus effectively stamped out civil war in 
the Seleucid state for fifty years, a long period for a state whose later 
history was for muchof the time occupied and finally terminated by such civil 
wars and their consequences. Antiochus t treaty with Pergamum had given that 
kingdom enough territory to satisfy it for the time being; or rather, it had 
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acquiFed in Pergamene possession of the Caicus Valley, the Troad and the 
west coast from Lampsacus to Teos. In so doing, Antiochus had effectively 
established Pergamene power, and it was to prove an inevitable and increasing 
threat to the Seleucids - and in particular to Antiochus III in the latter part 
of his reign - simply because of the alliances which Pergamum could now 
independently make - or which other powers, notably Rome, c'ould enter into 
with her. It had been the price paid for the extirpation of Achaeus and the 
exclusionof the ptolemaic power. Seleucid power was strong in Cilicia still 
and would continue to be so until the end of the dynasty: other Seleucid 
possessions in Asia Minor were few. 
Having dealt with Achaeus, and with the Pergamene question 
stabilised for the present, Antiochus turned east to reclaim the loyalty of 
the centre and east of the Seleucid Empire. His first target was Armenia, 
and he was successful in besieging Xerxes, the son of the dissident ruler 
Arsames, in his capital city Samosata between the Tigris and the Euphrates 
in 212. 64 An agreement was subsequently concluded by whose terms Antiochus 
gave his sister Antiochis in marriage to Xerxes, and he showed tact and 
sensitivity in his handling of the question of tribute which Arsames apparently 
still owed, commuting this to a payment of three thousand talents, a thousand 
horses and a thousand mules 'with their trappings,.65 The settlement of 
the city and country followed smoothly. Later, following Xerxes' death, 
Antiochus re-annexed Armenia and placed it under the governors Artaxias and 
Zariadris. ( 
In 211 Arsaces II, Tiridates, died, having left his state 
far stronger strategically than it had been when he had inherited it some 
thirty-seven years previously.66 An increased army, and foundations or 
refoundations of cities gave him the possibility of holding his conquests 
once he had obtained them. It was possibly Arsaces II who refounded 
Rh E A " 67 H C agae- uropus as rsacla, and ekatompylos in omisene became a Parthian 
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capital city later on. Arsaces II was succeeded by the third Arsaces 
known as Artabanus I, or on another view as Phriapites,69reliably thought 
to be the brother of Arsaces II d t h " 70 an no lS son. Antiochus III might 
well have seen in this change of ruler a chance to attempt the reclamation 
71 of Parthia: in any case he was at the Euphrates in the Autumn of 211; he 
seems to have invaded first Media and then Parthia at that time,72 and is 
said to have looted the temple of Anahita at Ecbatana (Ramadan) to gain 
revenue to finance what we must deduce that he intended as a lengthy 
expedition: it proved to be so, but this anti-religious action marks a 
volte-face in the liberal attitude of previous Seleucids to the sacred 
shrines and religious customs of subject peoples. 73 By 209 Antiochus was 
again on the march eastwards towards Parthia; and this must now be viewed 
as the real beginning of his great eastern !lnabasis, although judging from J.\j 
the gradual way in which he methodically pacified the west and only then 
turned east, 'anabasis' as a term can give the impression of an expedition 
per se, rather than the inevitable continuation of a process of reclamation 
of territory taken by others - Achaeus, Molon, Alexander or Phriapites as 
the case may be: it seems like an overall policy, energetically conducted, 
proceeding in successive stages. 
The Seleucid forces seem to have reached Kekatompylos without 
much opposition, although Justin's figure for the size of the army is no 
doubt much exaggerated at 120,000!74 An attempt to destroy the qanats, or 
underground canals through which irrigation water is conducted, was at least 
partially foiled by Antiochus' cavalry, and therefore a cavalry action of 
some sort must have taken place; possibly near Calliope, which Polybius 
mentions in the course of Antiochus' march to Hekatompylos, but whose site, 
named by Isidore of Charax, has not yet been 10cated.75 Antiochus seems 
to have followed the caravan route from present-day Teheran to Meshed, and 
in doing so to have reached Hekatompylos, now established to be off the 
gravel road a few miles west of Damghan. From there, whose Seleucid 
remains are yet to be unearthed, Antiochus headed for Hyrcania northwards 
over or through the Elburz. As Pedech points out76 , Alexander had faced 
the same problem, and had split his forces into a small group to force a 
difficult pass and a larger body to take an easier route. Pedech believes 
that Antiochus took the easier route via Shahrud, the route followed by 
Erygnos on Alexander's expedition, and several details in Polybius' narrative 
seem to point to this view being the correct one. 77 
First of all, Antiochus moved with his army to Tagae (Tak) 
northof Damghan in what is now very desolate country; and then, keeping his 
army in one large body instead of dividing it, led it in three echelons or 
waves as the best way of dislodging opposition to his ascent (of which the 
inhabitants of Tagae had already warned him)78 of the Mount Labutas. 
However, inorder to achieve this, he did split both the light-armed troops 
and the pioneers into little groups and ordered them to take independent 
action to open up a pathway for the heavy troops under Nicomedes of Cos and 
an Aetoliannamed Nicolaus. 79 Diogenes and his light-armed units accordingly 
~ 
fought their way up the defiles of Mount Chahkouh, as it is now kno~~ 
through the Tchaltchanyan Col to the village of Soundouk Chaken at the 
80 
entrance to the Tchasman-Sawer valley. The ascent up to this point had 
taken eight days and had covered about 33 miles of mountainous terrain. 
this valley Antiochus regrouped his forces for his descent into Hyrcania 
In 
where he camped in front of Tambrax, which Polybius tells us was without 
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walls but had a royal palace: Tambrax was the summer residence for the 
nearby capital city of Syrinx which Polybius says had three encircling ditches, 
whose necessity is puzzling in view of the steppe nomads being their only 
opposition, unless they had taken a lesson from Antiochus I who, not many 
years previously had fortified Alexandria-in-Margiane in just this way, 
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also against the nomads. Syrinx was invested and its wall undermined while 
fierce fighting took place, until eventually the defending Parthians abandoned 
the city and retreated, later to surrender to Antiochus,83but not before all 
the Greek inhabitants had been killed. 
Some time after this episode Antiochus seems to have made 
peace and an alliance with Phriapites: 84 we know nothing about its terms, 
but it is likely that the Parthian king had to pledge himself to recognise 
Antiochus as king and to assume the status of a vassal. It may be the case 
that the terms also included the provision of troops or finance. 85 
Antiochus' next objective was Bactria whoseruler, since 
shortly after 230, had been Euthydemus, a Greek from Magnesia. He had 
apparently displaced Diodotus II, the sonof Diodotus I who had seceded 
originally, and may have done so in a coup whose implications have fascinated 
scholars. 86 Euthydemus told Antiochus, when terms were discussed at a later 
stage, that he was not a rebel (against the Sele~cids) but had only obtained 
possessionof Bactria by destroying the descendants of those who had revolted 
(viz. the Diodotids).87 We may, and scholars do, conjecture whether Euthydemus 
took this action because Diodotus II had been allied to Parthia; and it was 
8@ t 0 tot t d 0 a view, expressed long ago by Rawlinson ,that Bac rla cons l u e a serlOUS 
potential hazard to the emerging Parthian nation as well as to the Seleucids, 
and that it may have been the Parthian king who suggested this Bactrian 
campaign to Antiochus. Parthia had nothing to lose either way, as an 
alliance with either neighbour would strengthen her hand against the other. 
It is, I think, true that the Seleucid sasus belli against Bactria was much 
stronger than that against Parthia. The Bactrians were Greek and could be 
regarded as traitors by Antiochus III and his army. We have only 
fragmentary information from Polybius upon this campaign, the rest of his 
account having been lost, and so must draw conclusions, where they are 
required, from inadequate evidence. 
Euthydemus' cavalry forces faced Antiochus on the banks of 
the Arius (Hari Rud) possibly about SO m. east of the modern Meshed in 
what Polybius calls Tagouria, and Tarn terms 'Tapuria',S9 where there must 
have been a settlement, to which Antiochus set siege, three days march 
from the river. He very soon raised the siege, and went forward with his 
cavalry to the river where he managed to get most of his horsemen over to 
the other side before Euthydemus, who had withdrawn for the night, attacked. 
In the sharp action which followed, Antiochus' cavalry, led by Antiochus 
himself and his own bodyguard of 2000 horsemen, managed to break Euthydemus
' 
first squadron of horse. And Panaetolus with the rest of the Seleucid 
cavalry turned the narrow victory into something of a rout as the Euthydemid 
cavalry retreated to their camp having lost the majority of their number. 
Antiochus was wounded in the engagement, but earned a high reputation among 
his troops for courage. 90 Euthydemus and his army then retreated through 
Aria to Bactra (Zariaspa) to which city Antiochus promptly laid siege, in 20S. 91 
The siege appears to have lasted for about two years to 206, and was raised 
eventually by Antiochus following an agreement managed by Teleas, whose main 
point was that the common safety of both Antiochus and Euthydemus was in 
danger from the nomadic tribes on the borders of Euthydemus' kingdom. 
Antiochus saw the force of these arguments, and agreed to a peace treaty 
ratified by Euthydemus' son Demetrius to whom Antiochus promised to give a 
daughter in marriage. Euthydemus was officially recognised as king and 
I t 92 Antiochus took possession of at least some of Euthydemus elephan s. 
Thus equipped, Antiochus went forward over the Hindu-Kush 
from Bactria, which is properly the country between the Hindu-Kush and the Oxus, 
and down into the Punjab, perhaps consciously traversing Alexander's route, 
but at all events renewing his alliance with the local ruler who had fallen 
heir to that part of Asoka's great empire. 93 This prince was Subhagesena 
(Sophagasenus), possibly the son of Virasena, himself a sonof Asoka,93a and 
Polybius represents this as a renewal of an amity which had previously 
existed - which it certainly had under Seleucus Nicator and Chandragupta the 
Maurya. But there is room for doubt whether Antiochus, who evidently detailed 
Androsthenes tocollect tribute from this ally and went off with still more 
elephants, now numbered at 150,94 took anything more than an expedient 
lnterest in such a ~U~/~~XI~ 6 But we are nowhere told that Antiochus 
had to campaign against him, or that such terms were the substance of a peace 
treaty, as Schmitt seems to imply;~5 but this writer's view that Seleucid 
influence on the east of the empiretfollowing Antiochus'subsequent withdrawal 
from India,waned is surely correct, and is borne out by events in India as 
well as by Seleucid operations in the west. 96 
Antiochus did not delay in India, but turned west again 
through Arachosia (whiclLhaa been Mauryan territory at the time of Asoka) 
and so over the river Erymanthus (Helmand?) through Drangiana and Carmania 
~7 
with apparently much less discomfort than that experienced by Alexander. 
He arrived with his army at Seleucia on Tigris in 205, having covered himself 
with gloryand a good deal of credibility. Following his return Antiochus 
sailed down the Tigris and the Persia~ Gulf to the port of Gerrha so as to 
be able to control trade there; but he did not annex it, being satisfied 
with tribute, no doubt necessitated by thecosts of his recent expedition. 
Antiochus took the title of 'the Great' at Seleucia in 205, and can be 
thought of as the 'restitutor orbis', but all such phrases about him require 
clarification. 
In judging the results of Antiochus Ill's eastern expedition, 
it depends on what criteria one is making adassessment. As a military 
campaign of lasting territorial significance it was not great; it was 
conducted after Arsacid Parthia and Euthydemid Bactria had consolidated their 
own boundaries, and these countries were both now too strong to be conquered 
in the accepted sense of the" term. What Antiochus had done was to stabilise 
conditions in the east: he had by his de facto (and de iure) recognition 
of Bactria strengthened Hellenism in that part of Asia, and had helped the 
Parthian state to a firmer hold upon its own recent accessions. Bactria 
was confirmed in its status, and that was the value to the panhellenic 
cause which Antiochus' expedition conferred. It did give to Bactria 
legitimacy, and the removal of the Seleucid threat may have released that 
energy which was certainly to enable Bactria's impenaing conquests to the 
q~ 
north and China through the Waikhan corridor, and to the south and east in 
the reign of Demetrius I. Antiochus, in that he failed tocrush Parthia, 
enabled it to recover to a posltion where it was a threat as much to the 
Seleucid state asto the Bactrian kingdom: but he is not to be held 
responsible for events he could not have foresee~, and his achievement in 
the east was not that he restored Alexander's world but that he restored his 
own. 99 
Shortly after Antiochus' return from his eastern campaign, 
Ptolemy IV, the victor of Raphia, died leaving his kingdom to his son 
Ptolemy V Epiphanes who was then a young boy. Polybius carries in Book XV, 
a graphic account of the palace revolt which ensued in which Ptolemy's wife 
Arsinoe was murdered; and Agathocles and Sosibius, Ptolemy IV's energetic 
ministers, seem also to have been killed at about that time. The situation 
presented Egypt's enemies, and in particular Macedonia and the Seleucid state, 
with a chance to corrupt Egyptian schemes at a time when Egypt was not in a 
position to counter such a threat. A native revolt, probably consequent on 
the new status of the Egyptians recognised in the phalanx at Raphia, broke 
out at about that time, and there was no strong government to deal with 
internal or external emergencies. It is probably too easy to see in 
100 Polybius' account a coordinated bi-partisan policy by Philip V and Antiochus III, 
even when Polybius goes to considerable lengths to draw long-range strategic 
conclusions about Rome's future dealings with Philip and Antiochus from this 
situation. Appian (Macedonica 4) and Jerome (Commentary on Daniel) also 
carry brief accounts of the 'alliance', as does Livy who here depends on 
P 1 b " 101 o Y lUS. The problem with this narrative is that the alleged partition 
never actually took place, despite the extremely propitious circumstances. 
Antiochus did begin a fifth Syrian War in 201 with an invasion of Coele-Syria, 
but this was, as we know, simply a continuation of hostllities he had already 
been involved in. That he carried it to a successful conclusion, with a 
resounding victory over the ptolemaic general Scopas at Panium near the 
headwaters of the Jordan in Galilee in 200, is not in dispute; but it is not 
evidence of Macedonian collusion~ Peace was duly signed after that defeat, 
by which Coele Syria was finallyceded to the Seleucids, and Ptolemy presently 
married Antiochus' daughter Cleopatra I in about 195. It is also interesting 
that Philip, who subsequently invaded Pergamene territory (not PtolemaiC) in 
Asia Minor, was not suppor~ed by Zeuxis, who was now the Seleucid satrap of 
L d·" 102 y la. In204 Philip V was at large in the Aegean but was committed 
against Rhodes: it is also true that Philip had been approached by the 
Egyptians themselves at that stage with an offer of Epiphanes' marriage to 
one of Philip's daughters, (Pol. XV, 25) and a request for Macedonian help 
with hostilities against Antiochus, which were as we know shortly to 
commence. The activitiesof Philip against Seleucid foundations in the 
interior of Caria at Stratonicea and Alabanda do not inspire confidence in 
his relationship with the current Seleucid court. 
What is important about this 'personal relationship' between 
Antiochus and Philip is that Rome, recovering after the Second Punic War, was 
led to believe that the relationship existed - which may be why Polybius 
relates it as he does. 103 Antiochus' eastern expedition had ensured that 
Rome would take notice of him, before his impending involvement with the 
Aetolian League led to outright conflict - and Philip was already the object 
of (justified) hostility by Pergamum, to whom Rome was allied in any case. 
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CHAPl'ER IV 
Antiochus III and the West 
Simply because of the increasing involvement of Rome in Greek 
affairs, some attention has to be paid, in a work dealing predominantly with 
the eclipse of Greek power in the east, to relations between Rome and the 
Greek states a good deal further west, because the effects of Roman action 
upon the Seleucid, ptolemaic and Macedonian Kingdoms could not be isolated 
from Seleucid activities in the orient. Many attempts have been made to 
trace the progress of relations between the hellenistic states, in particular 
the Seleucid state and Macedon, and the growing power of Rome. l During the 
Hannibalic War Rome's own resources had been greatly stretched, and not 
until the defeat of Hannibal's reinforcements at the Battle of the Metaurus 
in 207 (Pol. XI, 1 - 3), could Roman fortunes in that contest really be said 
to have changed. It is not our purpose to deal in depth with Rome, as our 
concern is with the Greeks in what was to them (and not to the Romans) 'the 
East'; but some notice has to be taken of Roman politics at the point at 
which the Seleucid thrust westwards and the Roman probing eastwards met 
each other. In general terms this can be dated to the end of the third 
century, and its locus classicus is the Battle of Magnesia which seems to 
mark a watershed in both Roman and Seleucid affairs. We must therefore 
examine the events which led up to this. 
Surrounding this confrontation, however, were the relationships 
which existed between the various hellenistic states themselves, and their 
connection in turn with the Aetolian and Achaean Leagues in mainland Greece. 
Rome's Illyrian Wars had involved her, before Hannibal became a serious 
menace, in the politics of north-western Greece; and the first of four 
Macedonian Wars grew out of Rome's awareness of Greek states with which her 
arch-enemy Hannibal might make alliances. That she did indeed have grounds 
for such a fear is attested by Polybius. 2 Before he died at the court of 
another Hellenistic king, Prusias of Bithynia, Hannibal had been a guest at 
the court of Antiochus; and the idea of an anti-Roman coalition, certainly 
in the years following Magnesia, was never far below the surface. 3 To what 
extent Rome's subsequent actions can rightly be ascribed to 'preventhtive 
imperialism', and how much to territorial (and political) greed, depends 
partly upon one's interpretation of Polybius (not always as pro-Roman as he 
often seems), and partly upon the extent to which we are entitled by 
hindsight to read into Roman policy at the time motives which it seems to us 
to have had, but which at the time may have been the result of fear and 
expediency rather than long-range strategic intention. 4 However the manner 
in which Livy describes5 the army and the defeat of Antiochus leads one to 
agree with C. B. Welles' comment that 'it is pure humbug when Roman 
historians smugly justify Rome's occupation of the hellenistic east on the 
ground that these states had 'failed'. Their primary failure consisted in 
their inability to defeat the Roman legions.,6 
An extraordinary piece of strategic thinking led Philip V to 
attack the Romans during their war against Hannibal (apparently on the advice 
of Demetrius of Pharos) when the Romans were reeling after their defeat at 
Lake Trasimene. The move, attributed by Polybius to Philip's ambition,7 was 
ignominiously foiled while Philip's forces were at sea with no actual 
hostilities being entered into: but the preparations and the embarkation 
had been reported to the Romans, and a casus belli had been established by 
8 the Romans which they could later use. In 215 Philip offered an alliance to 
Hannibal. 9 
The first Macedonian War which began in 214 led to an 
alliance9a between Rome and the Aetolian League in 212 which took Rome into 
the sphere of Greek home politics, and Philip, without naval reinforcements 
from Carthage, was unable to compel the Romans to evacuate their possessions 
in Illyria. Rome therefore was in territorial and political contact with 
Greece, and in a position to build upon this influence. Although the 
prevailing view among historians9b is that further conquest was not at that 
point anticipated (or desired?) by Rome, her future actions had a way of 
building upon these two areas of contact which leaves the suspicion that 
they were bridgeheads, and not merely the result of expedient arrangements. lO 
Polybius even sets out this chain of consequences in terms of a policy of 
world domination: 'I regard the war with Antiochus as deriving its origin 
from that with Philip, the latter resulting from that with Hannibal, and the 
Hannibalic war as a consequence of that about Sicily (the first Punic War), 
the intermediate events, however many and various their character, all 
11 
tending to the same purpose.' It is possible that Polybius saw Philip as 
the one who was waging war with a policy of world domination in mind12 , and 
that Rome - in Polybius' eyes at any rate - saw itself in the role of guardian 
of Greek freedom against the various varieties of Macedonian expansionism. 
That is certainly how Flamininus presented himself at the Isthmian Games in 
196. But we are left with the impression that Philip was heavily encouraged, 
in the instances we have looked at, by Demetrius of Pharos - who had advocated 
precisely the expedition to Italy which Rome could most easily claim as 
t " "t h 13 provoca lon agalns ere What we may not go on to say is whether, left to 
himself, Philip would or could have entertained such imperialist schemes. 
And Polybius' rationalization of Rome's progress to domination in the eastern 
, 
Mediterranean at this stage and later is that it has been destined by ~U)(7 
for Rome to achieve that dominance: 14 Polybius cannot therefore reasonably 
claim, on that basis, that her eventual annexation of the Greek mainland was 
the result of anything else, even Philip V's action. That would go some way 
to explaining Flamininus' actions as a would-be Philhellene in his 
negotiations with the Aetolians (his allies) and eventually with Philip and 
then with the other Greek states. Flamininus himself strikes us as a smooth 
negotiator aware of Greek intentions and disposed to misinterpret them in a 
way likely to benefit Rome. That even the senate was wary of him seems 
indicated in Livy by the appointment of additional legates for Macedonia, 
when Flamininus was prorogued for 197, in Publius Sulpicius Galba and 
Publius Villius who had been consuls in that province. 15 The Aetolians, for 
example, loyal allies of Rome in the first Macedonian war, appear to have been 
excluded from territorial gains at the peace signed in 206 by them, and in 205 
at Phoenice by the Romans. In that the Romans ceded to Philip some of the 
Adriatic coastline, Philip could be said to have come out of the first 
Macedonian war with success. 
The second Macedonian war, which Flamininus was to use to 
stake Rome's claim to be the protector of the Greek states from the designs 6( of Philip, took place from 200 until 19~, and came about very largely as the 
result of atrocities committed by Philip in the Aegean and its coastlands in 
the years since 205, which had antagonised and embittered relations between 
him and the islands, as well as bringing him into direct conflict with both 
Rhodes and Pergamum. This represents a complete change of policy by him, and 
of the attitude taken by the Greek states towards him, since his position at 
the Peace of Naupactus, when he could even be looked upon as the protector of 
G k t t . t R 16 ree s a es agalns ome. And it must be that he brought this change upon 
himself: he had enabled Rome to take his role of Iprotector' from him. Most 
unfortunately his antagonism towards Rhodes (partly understandable, in view of 
Rhodes' attack on Crete in which Philip had an interest as 'prostates' of part 
of the island)17 effectively let Rhodes slip into the Roman camp. 
Rome itself was about to come to a final military account with 
Hannibal in north Africa, and would thereafter be able to take an interest in 
Eastern Mediterranean affairs unfettered by her long struggle with Carthage. 
It was a moment for the hellenistic world to note and act upon. The 
indications that some such alliance, between Philip and Antiochus, did take 
place are provided, as we noted in the last chapter, by Polybius in the third 
book as well as in the fifteenth book (XV, 20, 2f.). Both Appian in his 
Macedonica (4) and Livy in Book XXXI echo such an agreement, but almost 
certainly rely on Polybius, as Livy so often does. The question which 
concerns us, as we proceed gradually to note Antiochus Ill's increasing 
involvement in the Mediterranean, is whether the agreement ever actually 
came into effect in the terms in which it is described. 18 And as we pointed 
out in another context in the last chapter, we are bound to say that it did 
19 
not, and that there was no actual partition of the ptolemaic realm , 
conceived in these terms; what does seem to have happened is that Philip's 
raids in the Aegean, to which we have referred above, were extended to 
impinge upon ptolemaic possessions, for example in Samos and Caria; and 
Antiochus did indeed invade Coele-Syria eventually after winning the battle 
of Panium against the ptolemaic general Scopas in 200: but this as we know 
was a long-cherished Seleucid objective, and had already been attempted, and 
not accomplished, by Antiochus III both before and after the revolt of Molon. 
The activities coincided, to be sure, but as Magie clearly shows, they were 
not orchestrated to do so: so the mention in Justin XXX, 2, 8, is incorrect 
as well - although here there is probably no dependence upon Polybius. 
debate. 
Ptolemy Epiphanes' actual accession has been the subject of 
20 
We have 4th day of Xandikos (April) from the Rosetta Stone as 
the date of the inscription, and this refers to Epiphanes' ninth year, and 
to a ceremony carried out at Memphis to commemorate the coronation of the 
king. The Rosetta inscription itself records an anniversary which seems 
21 itself to have fallen on 27/28 November 197 when Ptolemy was eight years 
of age, which would give 205 as the year of his birth: there seems no 
objection to a date of 204 for the death of Philopator although Polybius 
/ k
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sees 203 2 as the year in which Epiphanes was procl~imed lng. What the 
decree does itself show conclusively is the degree to which Ptolemy or/and 
his advisors had attempted to placate the Egyptian national cause, and its 
religious arm, since coming to the throne, and if this shows the wisdom of the 
Ptolemaic administration at the time it also suggests the size of the problem 
they were dealing with, and might indicate also their lack of muscle in the 
handling of overseas possessions in Asia Minor leading to Philip's successes 
.. 
in that area. But it is not evidence for the likelihood of a Macedonian-
Seleucid pact, even if the results were similar. 23 It is interesting, in 
passing, to note that among the benefits said in the decree to have been 
conferred by Ptolemy upon Egypt (in the second section) is the 'despatch of 
troops by sea and land against the enemies of Egypt' (No. 11)24. 
Philip had actually been asked for a marriage alliance by 
Agathocles, the ptolemies' chief minister, under Philopator, and this was 
, I 
renewed under the young Epiphanes, as security and!.."' YrA/1'~ in the event 
of a war with Antiochus - which, as Magie points out, is more evidence against 
a Seleucid-Macedonian pact. 25 The position of Philip was to change 
critically following the capture and destruction of ChiO's·"' in 202, as this 
~ 
led to the Aetolian League asking for assistance 26 from Rome, and to Rhodes 
declaring war on Philip. Philip was presently to be seriously defeated by the 
combined navies of Pergamum and Rhodes in a naval battle off Chios, although 
he was able to reverse this with a victory over Rhodes at Lade (Pol. XV, 1 - 8). 
Rome was aroused, even in her war-weary situation at the close of the Zama 
campaign in 202, by the two dangerous powers of Philip and Antiochus - her 
intelligence sources may have told her that the Ptolemies had a native revolt 
on their hands as well as a very young monarch - and Polybius (tVI, 25, 2) 
recounts the embassy which carried the senate's ultimatum to Philip; and 
Justin says that it visited both Antiochus and Philip (XXX, 3, 3) to warn 
() . 27 them, according to Appian Mac. 4, 2 , against aggresslon. 
Pergamum's action in appealing to Rome was probably a natural 
reaction to the threatening behaviour of Philip. Rome was not demonstrating 
territorial claims on any part of Asia Minor, and must have seemed the best 
kind of strong ally. Philip rejected the senate's call to refrain from war 
and to compensate Attalus, and Rome took the inevitable step 
of declaring war, 
having first seen that her demands of Philip were well known 
among the Greek 
states. The political statements were orchestrated so as to 
present Rome in 
the role of liJerator, and it is not enough to describe the Greek states as at 
that time simply 'objects of concern,.28 Philip's activities had played 
into Rome's hands and she had taken appropriate action. 
The war began in 200 with a Roman expeditionary force landing 
in Greece and campaigns from 200 to 198 occupy Polybius' 17th book. During 
this period Philip had suffered severe reverses, including the decision of 
the Aetolian League in 199 to join the Roman side. In the Autumn of 198 a 
truce was arranged between Philip and the Romans under Flamininus,29 partly 
at least owing to the fact that Philip's own energetic conduct of the war 
had foiled the aspirations of the various alliances which Rome had engineered 
against him. At the conference which ensued at the instigation of Epirote 
ambassadors, Flamininus ordered Philip to evacuate the whole of Greece, 
evidently for the sake of the Greek cities themselves: 30 it was a direction 
which Flamininus could not possibly have expected Philip to obey, and 
hostilities were resumed. Drawing attention to the time which Philip seems 
to have been allowed by Flamininus to regroup, Badian points out that the 
Roman policy seems to have been not so much to win a war in Macedonia (by 
° dO lOt) tOG 30a b t ° thO h hO d d b th lnva lng as 0 Wln reece; u even In lS e was In ere y e 
crushing military force with which Roman campaigns seem then to have been 
conducted. Galba's operations, noted in Livy (XXVIII, 7, 5) and (XXXI, 23, e.g:) 
in the context of the first Macedonian War, had been characterised by this 
extreme ruthlessness. Not even Flamininus had been able to avoid harsh 
measures against Eretria, Carystus and parts of Thessaly; and all this 
compared unfavourably with the policy which Flamininus had declared at Aous 
in June, 198.31 As Badian puts it: 'If Greece was to be destroyed (by the 
Romans) it would find little profit in being liberated from Philip,.32 By 
this time the Achaean League had also joined the war on the Roman side under 
threat of blockade by the Roman, Rhodian and Pergamene fleets. 
At the conference of Nicaea we understand that Philip was to 
hand over Pharsalus and Larissa to the Aetolians, Corinth and Argos to the 
Achaeans, and the~eraea to Rhodes. The Romans, interestingly, were to retain C~A~ 
t. 
their bridgehead in Illyria.33 In the ag e t th t r emen a was reached, about 
which there is a good deal of discussion, it is difficult to decide what 
Philip himself received, but there is a good deal of support for Holleaux' 
view that Philip should be allowed -to keep 'Ie plupart de ses anciennes 
dependances helleniques,.34 The issue as to whether he should evacuate or 
be allowed to keep the 'fetters' of Greece, i.e., Demetrias, Chalcis and the 
Acrocorinth, is critical, as it was used when the terms of the negotiations 
were referred to the senate at Rome as a point which would mean war if 
Philip refused to evacuate them. He did refuse - or, rather, the Macedonian 
envoys said they had no instructions: (Pol. XVIII, 11, 13) - and the 
negotiations were declared closed by the senate. Flamininus was then able 
to continue the war to its finish, and to win the gloria and auctoritas 
which not only he but the senatorial class was beginning increasingly to 
covet. 35 Although here it is in point to note with Badian that 'the fact 
that we do not admire such conduct gives us no justification for assuming, 
as self-evident, that Flamininus and his friends would be ashamed of it,.36 
I have dwelt on this issue in the Second Macedonian War 
because I believe it to be important and indeed critical for our assessment 
of Roman policy in these years generally, and in particular as far as Antiochus 
III is concerned, with whom Philip was frequently said to be allied either 
by Rome's allies or by Rome. As the Second Macedonian War passed on from the 
conference table to the decisive battle at Cynoscephalae in Thessaly in the 
campaigning season of 197, the issue of Macedonia and 'her relationship to 
Rome becomes clearer. A straight set-piece battle was fought in which the 
phalanx was at first successful and then, hampered by its own inherent 
""'" inflexibility, was cut to pieces by the more mano~v'rable legions. Flamininus 
subsequently acted in what seems a statesmanlike manner over the question of 
terms, and these were that Philip should confine himself to Macedonia proper, 
that his fleet should be confiscated, and that he should pay an indemnity of 
1000 talents: (Appian, Mac. 2; Pol. XVIII, 44): Roman troops were removed 
from Demetrias, Chalcis and the citadel of Corinth in 194 after Flamininus 
had carried out a process of rationalization on the Greek . 1 maln and, including 
conceding to the Aetolian League Phocis and the western half of Thessaly which 
they had claimed were proper to their previous conquests. As for the dispute 
between the Achaeans and Sparta under Nabis over Argos' defection to Philip, 
Flamininus was able to induce the Greek cities to brand Nabis as a tyrant 
rather than the social revolutionary which he really was. A siege of Sparta 
by this collective force followed, and Nabis made peace (195). 
At the end of his eighteenth book Polybius looks at Antiochus' 
progress through Asia Minor, and it will be useful to return to our study of 
his rule at this point. Polybius prepares his readers, in a small section 
which survives from Book XV, for a change in the fortunes of Antiochus by 
suggesting a change in the character of the king who now showed himself to be 
'much inferior to his former self' and that he 'disappointed general 
expectation 1 .37 
In 198, according to Livy, Antiochus was asked to withdraw 
his troops from Pergamene territory by the Senate at the request of Pergamu~ -
which had, for good reasons (as it must have seemed) become allied to Rome in 
the face of Philip's and Antiochus' known power in the Aegean and the Asia Minor 
area since the death of Ptolemy IV. In this instance the senate addressed 
Antiochus as 'amicus', and Antiochus apparently did withdraw, &8 Ljl·-Y 
indicates a Pergamene vote of thanks for this Roman support. 38 198 found 
Antiochus preparing for his serious expedition into Asia Minor launched in the 
next year; but 197 was dominated by the battle of Cynoscephalae, and this 
meant a reconsideration of the position in which Philip should be viewed. To 
Asia Minor states fearing a combination of Antiochus and Philip the suspected 
alliance could no longer be a threat, and Rhodes at any rate seems to have 
changed its attitude to Antiochus. 39 
Polybius speaks of Antiochus' wish to get to Ephesus, but it 
is Polybius' comment that 'Ephesus is always a most favourable point of defence 
against Europe for the kings of Asia,·.40 " f tAt" In ac n lochus seems to have 
taken it with Rhodian assistance, and to have spent the winter of 197-0 there.41 
The seeds of the war with Antiochus may be partly connected with this 
Rhodian change of position: it does seem, if we are to believe Polybius, 
that Antiochus ' seaborne expedition to Asia Minor was the proximal cause of 
Flamininus ' decision to make a quick peace with Philip, however lightly we 
may take Polybius' remark that Flamininus was afraid that if the war were 
allowed to drag on, Flamininus' successor would be the recipient of gloria 
and not he. 42 I th t th I n e even e sthmian Games of 196 were used by 
Flamininus, amid scenes of wild rejoicing, as the occasion for the 
proclamation announcing the defeat of Philip and the Macedonians, and 
proclaiming the freedom of Corinthians, Phocians, Locrians, Euboeans, 
Phthiotic Achaeans, Magnesians, Thessalians and Perrhaebians (a country to 
the north of Thessaly).43 
The impression left by Flamininus' activities in Greece is 
that he did wish to dispose of the problem of mainland Greece in order to 
deal with Antiochus; and this objective, clearly stated by Polybius(XVIII, 39) 
does place the arrangements - and indeed the Isthmian Declaration itself - in 
a different light. It behoved Flamininus to placate and settle the west: he 
might need the Greeks there as allies. The Aetolians had already perceptively 
noted that what was happening in Greece was fa readjustment of masters, and 
not the delivery of Greece out of ~ervitude' (Pol. XVIII, 45, 6), a point to s/ 
note about Polybius l standpoint when pushed to a decision. 
The senatorial commission saw Antiochus' ambassadors after the 
Games, and ordered the king to keep his hands off the Asiatic poleis that were 
autonomous, and to withdraw from those which he had taken previously belonging 
to Egypt and to Philip: and the commissioners pointed out clearly that there 
was no need for Antiochus to cross to Europe as no one was being attacked 
there. 44 One member of the commission had warned Philip of the advisability 
, 
of seeking an alliance ((v~~ ~ X/~ with Rome in case he was persuaded to 
welcome Antiochus!45 
In the meanwhile Antiochus' advance proceeded, and cities 
were taken, although Rhodes and Lampsacus had to be circumvented. 46 Ambassadors 
were sent to Rome to argue that places he had occupied, mostly now in Thrace 
on the European side of the Hellespont, 'had always belonged to his ancestors,:47 
this was shaky ground, as it depended how far back in time one was prepared to 
go - to Seleucus I? -, although Antiochus was quite in order to object to an 
instruction to remit tribute. The nub of the matter is put by Appian so: 
'If Antiochus will leave the Greeks in Asia free and independent, and keep 
away from Europe, he can be the friend of the Roman people if he desires. ,48 
Ambassadorial exchanges took place between Hegesianax and 
Lysias acting for Antiochus and Lucius Cornelius on behalf of the Senate upon 
the issues at stake in territorial terms. And upon the issue of returning 
Asiatic possessions to Ptolemy V Antiochus brought out his trump card, and 
announced that 'a family alliance' was in prospect between him and Ptolemy.49 
In the meantime the future Seleucus IV was established as a governor of the 
new European sector of the Seleucid realm with a base at Lysimacheia. 50 As 
Badian says, the round had gone to Antiochus,51 and as the envoys dispersed 
and Rome turned to deal with Nabis at Sparta, pressure built up for a move 
against Antiochus, led by Scipio, while Flamininus tried to turn Greek 
public opinion towards Rome more definitely by proposing the Roman evacuation 
of Greece. 52 Both viewpoints were ultimately designed to strengthen the 
influence of Rome in the Mediterranean world, and the concept of 'the 
freedom of Greece' was a useful and emotionally-charged tool in Flamininus' 
h OOt dl" n It lOS not clear to me that Greeks ever armoury w en poslng as l s guar a. 
understood until it was too late, in 146 in the ruins of Corinth, what Rome 
regarded as its relationship with Greece. The Aetolians had seen that 
F "" 53 
'deditio in fidem' meant one thing to them and another thing to lamllllnus. 
quall"ty for the Greeks and a state of affairs for And as for freedom, it was a 
t o t As Badian acutely observes, Flamininus the Romans, the eternal pragma lS s. 
'took Greek public opinion as seriously as any Hellenistic ruler did, and in 
this important respect he may indeed be called philhellenic.,54 
It was of course natural that Greeks, who regarded their 
Aegean neighbours in Ionia as kinsfolk, which in many cases they were, should 
find the concept of freedom (viewed in Roman terms) extended to cover Ionia 
also - and so to impinge on t erritory that was already Seleucid in Asia Minor. 
Antiochus had already crossed the Hellespont as we saw in the spring of 196, 
and Madytus, Sestus and other towns had surrendered to him. 55 
The arrival of Hannibal at Antiochus' court in 195 raised 
fears at Rome that Hannibal was 'conspiring with Antiochus to foment war',55a 
and an embassy noting this was sent by the Roman senate to Carthage where the 
faction opposed to Hannibal's apparently successful financial reforms was 
determined to censure himo Scipio objected to this move as discreditable; 
and in view of the fact that there was substantial and knowledgeable 
disagreement about the sending of the embassy, we should beware of accepting 
that 'the arrival of Hannibal was no small factor in making up Antiochus' mind' 
to make war on Rome, as Livy says it 56 was. That would be to impute motives 
for whlch we have insufficient evidence. 
Although Scipio Africanus was awarded a second consulship in 
195, Antiochus did not immediately take up a belicose stance, and Flamininus 
was able to make his proposal that Roman troops should evacuate Greece into 
a fact. They left after becoming briefly involved in the affairs of Nabis 
at Sparta, and marched north withdrawing garrisons, as Livy tells us, from 
Demetrias, Chalcis and Corinth, and so through Thessaly to Oricum and on to 
Brundisium, frequently 'with all the citizens escorting (Flamininus).,57 That 
this withdrawal was intended to be a substantial public relations exercise on 
the part of Flamininus is adequately indicated in the terms in which Livy 
notes F1amininus' speech at the assembly of the Greek states which he had 
convened, it seems, precisely for this purpose at Corinth in the Spring of 
194 (LivyXXXIV, 48, 3). It is Balsdon's sympathetic article on Flamininus 
which goes so far as to note that Flamininus became with experience 
, . 1 ,58 
a harder and more cynlca man. He was a born populist, it seems, but 
saw clearly the requirements of Roman policy and worked to make them more 
easily realised in practice. It lOS the J"ud t f gemen 0 a more gentlemanly age 
which sees all, or most, of his schemes as base trickery.59 It was Antiochus' 
task, on the other hand to have to be recognised as more of a Greek, or at 
least a Greek sympathizer, than the Roman could ever hope to be; in this 
Antiochus had the built-in handicap of being a Macedonian. It was to be 
Flamininus who ultimately won this psychological battle of oratory and 
political manipulation for the allegiance of mainland Greece. In Badian's 
apt phrase, he 'contributed to making the further expansion of Roman power 
technically much easier, as well as more acceptable to those who became 
subject to it.,59a 
Antiochus followed his meeting with the Romans at Lysimacheia 
by making an alliance with the Galatian people - good material possibly for 
his army. Ariarathes of Cappadocia was betrothed to Antiochus' daughter 
Antiochis, and Cleopatra Syra another daughter went, as he had already 
60 
announced, to Ptolemy Epiphanes with Coele Syria as a dowry. A proposal 
of marriage for his remaining daughter to Eumenes of Pergamum was unfortunately 
rejected: and that was a desirable connection which Antiochus could not 
afford to miss. It was another pointer that affairs were going against him. 
A conference took place in the next year in Rome between the 
senate's ten commissioners and Menippus and Hegesianax appearing for Antiochus, 
along with ambassadors from 'all Greece and a great part of Asia'. Flamininus 
took the opportunity to say that basically Antiochus must keep out of Europe 
and the l.mans would keep out of Asia - to which Hegesianax retorted that 
Asia had never belonged to Rome - whereas the cities of Thrace and the 
th L " h 61 Chersonnese had been won by Seleucus Nicator in fair fight wi YSlmac us. 
Appian tells us that the ultimatum of Flamininus was that Antiochus must 
f A " 62 evacuate Europe and 'free' the Greek cities 0 Sla. If he did not, 
Flamininus went on to declare that Rome would liberate the Greeks from 
Antiochus as she had liberated them from Philip.63 This shrewd exploitation 
of the known and long-standing antagonism between Greece and Macedon was 
itself a directive which Antiochus could neither accept with honour nor 
reject without war. 
Both Livy and Appian immediately go on to discuss the 
preparations for war as they concerned both Antiochus and Hannibal, and an 
inscription from Delphi records contacts made by Antiochus' ambassadors 
there on their way back to the king64 in 193. The process of gathering 
allies for a struggle which both sides now knew to be imminent (because of 
the terms in which ultimata had been expressed) gathered momentum. 65 Already 
in the late Autumn of 194 the Aetolian League at a meeting in Naupactus had 
agreed to build a coalition against Rome which included (or was to include) 
Philip, Nabis of Sparta and now Antiochus. 66 By the summer of 193 a Roman 
Embassy was in Pergamum where Eumenes, with Roman allies, stood to gain in 
any encounter with Antiochus. As we have already noted, a marriage alliance 
between Eumenes and Antiochus had been rejected by Eumenes, and as we know 
from Livy (XXXV, 13, 5), Antiochus' son, on being sent to Syria as co-ruler, 
in the manner we have earlier observed the Seleucids using, died there.67 It 
was not so much the grief, one may conjecture, as the instability that this 
unfortunate death might have produced which prevented Antiochus from continuing 
the conference with Villius at Apamea, are-run (aacording to Livy) of the 
degate between Flamininus and Antiochus' ambassadors at Rome~, We ought not, 
I think, to deduce that the Romans could not make any more concessions: the 
conference broke up for personal reasons which could not have been foreseen, 
and the Roman ambassador withdrew, not, we gather, because he had reached the 
end of his negotiations, but because, in the midst of widespread and 
I' d' 68 
evidently sincere mourning, he would have been lncommo us • The source 
Livy used has Antiochus deciding on war at a council convened for the purpose, 
and conducted in inflammatory terms. As Badian points out, this is most 
unlikely to reflect the situation;69 and the Romans at any rate proceeded 
. t N b' 70 
with Flamininus' policy, and only reinforced the Achaeans agalns a lS. 
Roman commissioners were meanwhile visiting Rome's allies to 
ensure their loyalty: Athens, Chalcis and Thessaly were all visited, but 
there was some trouble at Demetrias, whose citizens found that they had 
been promised to Philip by the Romans in a secret deal in order to assure 
Rome of Philip's support. This was not the climate in which Rome could be 
seen as an ally to be warmly espoused. The length of Livy's narrative of 
this episode conveys plausibly its considerable importance. While Rome 
went about nervously reassuring potential or actual allies, the Aetolians 
received Antiochus' ambassador Menippus on a mission of solidarity which 
proclaimed that Antiochus would restore their freedom. 71 As Holleaux 
pointed out, the fear that Antiochus would win over both Philip and the 
Aetolians haunted Rome: one part of that alliance had now been sealed.72 
The Romans had succeeded in prising Philip away from an alliance with 
Antiochus, because, despite Philip's objections to the conduct of the 
decemviral commission, he still regretted Antiochus' seizure of what Philip 
saw as legitimate acquisitions in Asia Minor - and he accepted the Roman 
proposal in 196. The Roman expectation that Greece, now 'liberated' from 
Philip would be 'loyall against Antiochus rested on a belief which shows 
the Romans to be a good deal less perceptive than their advocates lead us to 
believe. This expectation reckoned without the attitude that the Greek 
proletariat would take to Rome's conquest of Nabis, for instance - seen, as 
Holleaux points out,73 as a defeat of the champion of the I have-nots , by the 
champions of the 'haves'. Nothing else, it seems to me, could explain the 
accelerating hatred of Rome, accompanied by the impatient warlike intentions 
which characterised Aetolian behaviour, as we have pointed out, since the 
Roman defeat of Nabis in the Ipring of 192.74 ~I 
Antiochus spent the summer of 192 in Thrace; and the Aetolian 
assembly decided to attack certain points in Greece in a softening-up operation 
to prepare the way for Antiochus and so to ensure that war could not be 
1 The Aetoll'ans under Thoas and Diocles accordingly postponed any onger. 
attacked Chalcis and Demetrias while Alexamenus went to Sparta. Sparta and 
Chalcis withstood Aetolian attacks but Demetrias fell to Aetolian troops:75 
at Sparta, the Aetolians, after being well-received by N b' . t a ls)assasslna ed him, 
which enabled Philopoemen to ensure that the Spartans, disgusted at Aetolian 
treachery, joined the rival Achaean League. 
Demetrias was available to Antiochus as a base therefore in 
mainland Greece, but he did not occupy it until the Autumn of 192. As Badian 
points out, Livy accounts for the small force that Antiochus then brought 
over with him by relating how Thoas the Aetolian pleaded with Antiochus to 
send these ships, already committed to the support of Hannibal at Carthage, 
to Greece instead.76 No doubt, as Holleaux pointed out,77 Aetolian haste 
was for fear of Roman anger, but the plans of the allies were already 
dangerously out of phase, and the Aetolians regretted the paucity of Antiochus' 
forces, although these did enable him to take Euboea and some of Thessaly.78 
War had been begun, one hesitates to say 'declared', although Antiochus' 
hesitancy is underlined by the fact that in Asia Minor Smyrna, Lampsacus and 
Alexandria-Troas were still being besieged by Seleucid forces; presumably 
this was one reason why more could not be brought to Europe until later, and 
another reason for thinking that Antiochus had not intended this scrappy start 
to hostilities. 
The first military conflict seems to have been the 
annihilation of a Roman detachment in the temple precinct of Apollo at 
Delium near Tanagra by Menippus and his Aetolians, which action was seen as 
a flouting of normal military convention, as according to Livy (XXXV, 51, 5), 
( ) 79 Rome had not declared war, although the Achaeans had XXX, 50, 2 • Philip 
of Macedon decided for Rome, as he had been expected to since an Aetolian 
attempt to involve him in a coalition against Rome had failed in 193.
80 
Antiochus had also alienated Philip by his own alliance with the Aetolians, 
and his very presence with force on Greek soil seems to have usurped a 
position that Philip, in other circumstances, would have wished to occupy. 
The course of the war, with a major defeat of Antiochus at 
Thermopylae, and its subsequent denouement at Magnesia, need not concern us 
in detail, although its consequences will. Antiochus seems to have found , 
as many would-be liberators have, that once landed with an army, the 
expected enthusiasm (and consequent indigenous reinforcements) €ither did 
not materialise or were paltry in comparison with what was required. Antiochus 
had to deal with, and suffer, the position he discovered; and it was very 
different from what he had been led to expect, and what he would need. The 
cheap victory won by Menippus at Delium had been a complete propaganda 
defeat for Antiochus, as Flamininus could and did point out. 80a Livy's 
account of the preliminaries and first stages of the war in Book XXXV ends 
with Antiochus in charge of Euboea and the Romans evacuating the Euripus; 
Antiochus is in charge of Thessaly as far as Larissa. 
81 The severity of the defeat at Thermopylae, in which 
Antiochus lost virtually his entire army to a combined force under 
M' Acilius Glabrio and King Philip, was at least in part due to the inadequacy 
of his own Aetolian contingent which, in country familiar to it, left the 
outflanking route, used earlier in Greek history by Xerxes' army, very poorly 
82 defended and able to be used by a Roman force led by Cato. The real tragedy 
of Therroopylae seems to have been this culpable negligence on the part of the 
Aetolians, and it was to become one of the leitmotifs of the war. I do not 
agree with Holleaux's comment that Antiochus 'could not have foreseen the 
ineffectiveness of the Aetolians,:83 the rashness with which they precipitated 
hostilities should have warned him of their ill-ordered and untrustworthy 
propensities. Some of their honour was saved by their subsequent resistance 
in their own cities to Glabrio's attacks on them in the months that followed, 
. 84 
until Glabrio's forces were removed to Asia Minor for the Magnesia campalgn. 
Antiochus left for Ephesus via Chalcis and Tenos, and Euboea 
was reclaimed by the Romans85 shortly after the defeat at Thermopylae. But 
due to Glabrio's Aetolian campaign Roman forces were not available for a more 
immediate pursuit of Antiochus, and, as Livy puts it, 'the Aetolian war remained 
as before,.86 Eventually, with their ambassadors dismissed as still-suspected 
allies of Antiochus,87 by the senate in 189, further Roman campaigns under 
Fulvius Nobilior led to a settlement of th A t 
e eolian question with a 
declaration that the Aetolians were subject-allies of Rome. Antiochus' 
naval forces suffered a defeat off Cape Corycus by Roman and Pergamene fleets 
in 191, and again in much the same location by Romans and Rhodians in 190. 88 
As Livy says of this second defeat, 'Antiochus was alarmed (territus) because, 
having lost his dominion of the sea, he doubted whether he could defend his 
distant possessions',89 and neither could he contest a Roman landing in 
Asia Minor: the initiative had now completely passed to Rome. Antiochus was 
forced, in default of Aetolian support, to seek troops from his son-in-law 
Ariarathes of Cappadocia, convinced that he would have to fight a land battle 
. A' lIIr' 90 ln s la !'!lno r • 
And so it was. As Livy says: 'Antiochus pace nequiquam 
temptata' 91 in negotiations with L. Scipio, Rhodes and Pergamum, turned to 
devastate Pergamene territory in Asia Minor. It is reasonably clear that 
Antiochus had gone a long way to meet Roman requirements - to the extent of 
returning Publius Scipio's son, earlier taken prisoner, without asking a 
ransom: and all Rome could do was to demand Antiochus' evacuation of the 
92 whole of Asia Minor to the north and west of the Taurus range. It does seem 
that the Romans had decided on a resumption of the war whatever Antiochus 
might say; and that, whereas he was prepared to continue negotiations for 
peace, they were not. As Livy puts it, 'with the aid of the gods' the war 
could be finished by winter. 93 
With Antiochus leading an army of more than 70,000, including 
a large cavalry contingent, the Seleucid and Roman armies joined battle on the 
Campus Hyrcanius east of Magnesia-ad-Sipylum behind the rivers Phrygius and 
Hermus. Deprived of an alliance with Prusias of Bithynia94 , Antiochus still 
had a most variegated mass of cavalry and infantry including Galatians, and 
Dahae from the Caspian Steppe95 as well as the Medes, Elymaeans and Cadusians 
who had followed him over the Hellespont in 192.96 As Scipio was ill, the 
battle was directed on the Roman side by Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus. 
At the end of the day Antiochus' army was routed and 
destroyed as a fighting force with a loss of over 50,000 men, many of them 
in the phalanx, whose awful vulnerability in the flank was again demonstrated. 97 
The battle honours went equally to the staying power and flexibility of mind 
as well as of formation of the Roman legionaries and to the quick thinking 
and gallantry of the Pergamene detachment under Eumenes and his brother Attalus. 
The very composition of Antiochus' assorted host added to the confusion of his 
own ranks as his scythed chariots and elephants trampled their own army.98 
Antiochus retreated to Sardis with what troops he had left 
and so to the Seleucid main base at Apamea. The whole of Seleucid western 
Asia Minor declared for Rome, saving those parts which were already Rhodian 
or Pergamene, and as Holleaux points out, that 'was all they sought' (sic).99 
An immediate peace settlement between Antiochus and Publius Scipio was referred 
to Rome, and the full treaty was sealed at Apamea in 188. Antiochus renounced 
his possessions in Europe and in Asia Minor on the Cis-Taurian side. He agreed 
to pay an indemnity of 15,000 Euboeic talents (500 at once, 2500 upon the 
ratification of the treaty and the balance in 12 annual instalments ) - which 
would take the Seleucid State until 177-6 to payoff if every payment was 
prompt, practically the whole of the reign of Seleucus IV. lOO Antiochus was 
ordered to surrender all his elephants and most of his fleet and forbidden to 
recruit troops from what the Romans now regarded as their sphere of influence. 
Twenty thousand hostages were to be handed over, including the future 
Antiochus IV and Thoas the Aetolian. And the Seleucid was to surrender 
Hannibal: 
. . . d ,101 
as Holleaux puts it, 'Antlochus saw to It that Hannlbal escape • 
Rome's allies stood to gain from their assistance, and did so. 
The Rhodians and the Pergamenes were both fully worthy of rewards in this 
connection, and Philip gained at the expense of the Aetolians who in turn 
became a Roman client state 'Aetolia,.102 The Galatian allies of Antiochus 
and were subject to systematic slaughter, rapine and slavery by the Romans; 
Polybius' easy rationalisation that this constituted a release from the 
'terror of the barbarians,103 does not stand much examination, when viewed 
alongside this methodical Roman pillage under C. Manlius Vulso in the kltumn 
of 189. To Eumenes were given Lycaonia, Greater Phrygia and Pisidia, 
Hellespontine Phrygia, Mysia, Lydia and the districts of Caria north of the 
Maeander and Telmessus in Lycia. Rhodes took a much smaller share: Caria 
sou th of the Maeander and Lycia (with the exception of Telmessus ) .• 104 In 
another clause, Antiochus was forbidden to levy export tax on merchandise 
bound for Rhodes. 105 
The actual issue of whether Rome could or should dispose of 
territory and towns - with the connivance of Pergamum, and to a much lesser 
and more critical extent Rhodes, is an issue which raises the inevitable 
question as to whether and to what extent Roman action and that of her allies 
had 'liberated' Greek cities in Asia Minor. And here again one is bound to 
say that the cities had merely passed from one protectorate to another, not 
noticeably more benign despite the long-standing 'rights' of such cities. 
Even Rhodian interests had had to urge that Rome should give full freedom to 
Greek cities on the Aegean seaboard and so prove herself to be a bringer of 
Freedom: Eumenes on the other hand was after a different solution which 
would have added such poleis to his new, expanding empire. Rome settled 
the issue by granting to Pergamum the cities that Antiochus had taken from 
Attalus, and indeed granting independent status to the rest. All the 
autonomous towns which Antiochus had laid under tribute were to be freed of 
106 
this if they subsequently supported Rome. 
Strategically Rome's objectives in Asia Minor were clear: 
to prevent Antiochus from engaging in further aggression there and to protect 
the territory, and the communications, of its Pergamene and Rhodian allies: 
'they had to deny Antiochus any point of strategic advantage in the western 
107 Taurus Range'. There was disagreement between the Seleucid side and 
(' 
Eumenes as to the position of Pamphyllia: if Antiochus were to be allowed 
I 
.... ' 
108 t that, it would threaten Eumenes. Apart from this, a glance a a map 
shows that with Pamphyllia's long coastline Antiochus could use his fleet 
there and make the clause that he should not sail west of Cape Sarpedon 
into a dead letter. l09 The purpose of that clause had been to keep 
Antiochus' ships out of Rhodian territorial waters, and much more important, 
to add a general strengthening to the purpose of the Treaty of Apames, which 
was to deny Antiochus the means of breaking out of his national boundaries: 110 
Cilicia was deemed to be a part of Seleucid territory, but we are left with 
an ambivalence about Pamphyllia whose status was referred to the Senate. III 
V 
Antiochus' naval strength in 197, which had included 100 ~~T~~C~~TOI ~q£> 
and 200 ~~eJ..I<.T,I.. , had constituted enough of a threat to justify Rome's 
112 
strictures ten years later. The 'nuisance value' of Antiochus' fleet 
had probably been a trying feature for Rome in the naval war. 113 In fact 
Rome's limitation of Seleucid naval freedom was not enforced in the terms 
in which it was announced - as we know, and will presently describe, in the 
context of Antiochus IV's and Antiochus V's reigns when envoys had to be 
sent to burn the I<"'TtI.~t.rJ..I(TOI v''l'5 which ought not to have been there if 
114 the terms of the Treaty of 188 had actually been enforced. Subsequent to 
this settlement Roman troops evacuated Asia Minor in the Autumn of 188: 
the fleet had already left and the army reached Rome in Spring, 187. 
That these provisions were not finally enforced until a 
later period in Seleucid history is at least partly attributable to the 
shortness of Antiochus' own reign after the Treaty of Apamea. The peace 
itself was the beginning of a new era for the cities of Asia Minor and 
marks the end of Antiochus' attempt to reestablish Seleucid rule there on 
115 t anything like its former scale. That that attempt failed was no so 
much the fault of Antiochus, or the consequence of the rise of Rhodes and 
Pergamum, whose real ascendancy was made possible by the Treaty, as the 
result of the intervention of Rome. The autonomy exercised until 213 by 
Achaeus had marked a temporary revival only in Seleucid influence, and 
even then it was not centrally controlled. 
Antiochus' empire was to lose Armenia and Sophene to 
the focus of Seleucid activity for the next ten independent dynasts, and 
years at least was to centre on the need to recoup financially and 
psychologically the losses sustained in the war with Rome. This may well 
have been the reason for Antiochus' rare action in apparently pillaging a 
temple in Elymais, although comment has been expressed that this was simply 
a further example of the way in which the Seleucids' attitude to temples 
had changed during the third century - or, more specifically, during 
A t " h' "116 n lOC us own relgn: Ecbatana had been despoiled in 209 during the 
opening stages of Antiochus' eastern expedition, no doubt with a view to 
raising funds for the payment of his troops. After the terms set by the 
Romans at Apamea Antiochus was again in need of money, not least in order 
to pay the Romans some of the indemnity they had imposed. The most 
important result of this raid, whatever the actual reasons for the 
despoiliation, was that Antiochus met his death in the course of the attack. 
Elam is a rugged mountainous area, and the combination of independently-minded 
mountain people and a religious vigilance may have combined to produce a 
successful defence. In the event the attack failed and Antiochus was 
killed. Diodorus recounts the raid so: tAntiochus, pressed for funds, 
and hearing that the temple of Bel in Elymais had a large store of silver 
and gold, derived from the dedications, resolved to pillage it. He 
proceeded to Elymais, and after accusing the inhabitants of initiating 
hostilities, pillaged the temple: but though he amassed much wealth, he 
speedily received meet punishment from the gods!117 In Book XXVIII Diodorus 
goes on to amplify this by stating that in the course of the attack Antiochus 
'perished with all his host,.118 
The actual date of Antiochus' death has been the subject of 
some discussion. It is now fairly certain, on the basis of a tablet in the 
British Museum quoted by Kugler, and settled by Sachs and Wiseman, in their 
119 
account of the Babylonian King-List, to have been July 3 or 4, 187 BC. 
In any assessment of Antiochus' overall stature, room must be found for a 
view of him as a late 3rd century ruler with all the difficulties raised by 
A( an ~nabasis in the vastly-changed conditions of the eastern provinces 
compared to Alexander's tl·me. He had h t d d 
, as we ave no e , ma e assumptions 
regarding his entitlement to territory, for example in Thrace and Asia 
Minor, which paid little heed to the protectorate established by Rome in 
Macedonia after Cynoscephalae - or indeed to the legitimate aspirations of 
the Greek cities of Asia Minor. In both instances he was not in a position 
to reinstate a former Seleucid supremacy_ Circumstances had changed 
radically, and other views of what constituted 'Greek Freedom' were now 
current and were the object of formidable Roman propaganda. As Badian 
acidly observes, 'with vietory in Asia won, the Roman claim to be fighting 
for all the Greeks was quietly buried.' 'Had the fortunes of war been 
different', he comments, 'Antiochus would have been received with the same 
120 
cawed resignation that greeted the Romans'. In all his European schemes, 
or what our sources allow us to discover about them, there appears a 
certain lack of reality as to what actions he could reasonably expect to 
accomplish. In sharp distinction to the east, where as we have indicated 
he could be said to have restored his own (early 3rd century) empire, the 
projects he launched in the Roman-influenced west, seem grounded in a 
belief that he could lay claim to Seleucius Nicatort s or even Lysimachus' 
world, and there were many there to contest not just the legitimacy of 
such a claim, but its justice, and even its credibility. 
As for the eastern enterprise of Antiochus, its weakness was 
not so much in the comparative speed with which (with the exception of the 
siege of Bactra) it had been accomplished, as that conditions had changed 
there too since Alexander's day. Bactrian and Parthian power was now a 
fact, and the blow to his prestige which these events in the west, which 
we have been discussing, dealt to his schemes in the east was very severe. 
Parthia, Bactria and Armenia ceased to send tribute or to acknowledge 
. t 121 Bactrl'an coinage, on the Attic weight standard, continued soverelgn y. 
through its great period with no hint of recognition of the Seleucid power; 
and the change of ruler in Parthia from Arsaces II to Arsaces III122 is 
similarly devoid of any indications of suzerainty. These countries were 
free to grow, for the time being, to political strength outside the orbit 
of Seleucid control. That they were now able to do so would make future 
attempts by the Seleucids to reclaim them very difficult, and so the 
pressure towards the eclipse of Greek rule in Asia gained new strength. 
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CHAPTER V. 
FROM SELEUCUS IV UNTIL THE DEATH OF ANTIOCHUS IV 
1. The reign of Seleucus IV 
By the terms of the Treaty of Apameal which followed Antiochus 
Ill's defeat at Magnesia, the Seleucid Empire was obliged to pay a huge 
indemnity; and it was this financial burden, 12,000 talents in twelve 
annual instalments, which was to confine the Seleucid expectations more 
than the instructions about not sailing further west than Cape Sarpedon, 
and not recruiting mercenaries from the Roman territories. It was the 
task of Seleucus IV, when he acceded in 187 to the throne of Syria, to 
ensure that this was paid, and that there were no rash exploits to imperil 
Seleucid power further. It is increasingly possible to talk of the 
Seleucids as kings of Syria - which is not at all what they would have-
wished as the successors of the great Seleucus Nicator, whose realms were 
secure to the Punjab until 305; and it is a measure of the limitations 
now placed upon their power by invasion or secession in the west or east. 
The traditional home territory of the Seleucids had been Asia Minor, but 
that had been lost largely owing to the intervention of Rome, and Magnesia 
had finally taken it from the Seleucids. Where they ought to have tried 
to be at home was Seleucia-on-Tigris; but that site, as we saw, had lost 
administrative importance when the capital moved to Antioch on the Orontes. 
The old philo-Roman assertion of Tenney Frank and others 
that Rome took nothing for herself from the Treaty of Apamea does seem 
increasingly suspect2 as our knowledge of its consequences for the Seleucids 
increases. Rome simply did not require to 'take'; Pergamum for the moment 
was cowed or bribed into co-operation3 ; and Rome certainly carried out 
her obligations to Pergamum, but no one was under any illusion that 
Pergamum was other than a client state. Rhodes also, as an ally of Rome, 
was granted territory in Caria and Lycia. But the agreements later made 
in a clandestine manner by the Hellenic states as a protection against the 
incursions of Rome prove: one, that the states themselves knew the 
consequences of opposition - a submission to Rome as client states and 
the end of any effective autonomy; and two, that they regarded the moves 
so far made as threatening moves. 
Edwyn Bevan has observed4 that at no previous time could 
such general support have been likely for anyone who, wile observing due 
diplomatic prudence, stood out as the antagonist of Rome. In time this 
responsibility devolved upon Macedon; and when Philip died in 179 his 
illegitimate son Perseus prepared to undertake this role: preparations 
already made were considerable, and it remained both to find a pretext 
which would be militarily realistic, and one which would in fact command 
the support of the hellenic states despite likely moves by Rome to weaken 
the resolve behind such an alliance. 
These states also lacked a power in Asia Minor to act as 
a focus for an anti-Roman movement. Pergamum could not supply this, as 
despite her current expressions of amity towards the anti-Roman Hellenistic 
states, her previous actions appeared too hostile for any easy change of 
heart. Pontic Cappadocia appeared as a candidate for this new role of 
champion under Pharnaces the son of Mithridates II, who was now allied to 
Mithridates the satrap of Lower Armenia. But this warlike alliance had 
aroused the hostility of Eumenes, Ariarathes of Cappadocia and Prusias of 
Bithynia, all of whom had been in alliance with Rome. In the ensuing war 
(183 - 179), Seleucus seems to have marched with an army towards the 
Taurus range in support of Pharnaces, but in the event did not carry 
through this enterprise and Pharnaces was subsequently defeated. Rome's 
hand in the politics of Asia Minor may be seen in the activities of Titus 
Flamininus who was ambassador to both Prusias and the Seleucid court in 
183. He subsequently, as related by Livy,5 contrived the death of Hannibal 
on a visit to Prusias; and Bevan connects his presence with 'the abortive 
6 
schemes of Seleucus f • That may be going too far, as we have observed 
that the whole Asia Minor land mass was in a high state of nerves and 
conflicting ambitions by this time. 
Sometime in 177 - 6 Antiochus, the brother of Seleucus IV , 
was exchanged as a hostage by Rome (under the terms of the Treaty of Apamea) 
for Seleucus' son Demetrius,7 and Antiochus made his way to Athens where he 
seems to have been able to take a fairly active part in Athenian public 
life. This period in Athens was important to him, and his munificence 
towards the city is seen for example in the construction of the temple to 
Olympian Zeus, eventually finished in the reign of Hadrian, a vast and 
splendid structure even in its present-day ruin, whose immaculate 
proportions (of the remaining sections) and dignified Corinthian capitals 
are a notable piece of Hellenistic architecture owing much to Decimus 
Cossutius, Antiochus' architect. 
Meanwhile the situation in the Mediterranean, which was 
later to cause Antiochus severe problems, had been given a new and positive 
twist by the marriage of his brother Seleucus' daughter Laodice to Perseus 
of Macedon, now widely regarded as the principal protagonist of the Greek 
world. The astute Rhodians had lowered their guard to the extent of 
escorting the new queen with their formidable fleet, itself presently to 
suffer the ravages and indignity of Roman meddling. 
According to the Jewish view of Seleucus IV, he appears as 
a money-hungry ruler who debased 'the royal dignitY',8 not involving 
himself in the expensive and, as it turned out, tenuous foreign conquests 
of his predecessor. By the terms of the Treaty of Apamea, which we have 
mentioned, the Syrian monarchyf s affluence on any great scale was made a 
thing of the past - or so it must have seemed at the time; and the good 
and wise ruler would be he who paid the indemnity promptly without 
incurring the displeasure of Rome any further, and who suspended ac~ions 
likely to be either belligerent or expensive. And it cannot be doubted 
that Seleucus succeeded in the main objective. That these years were a 
time of comparative quietness and financial reconstruction in Syria and 
the Seleucid empire generally is shown by the attitude of Rome to another 
provision of the Treaty - the surrender of the fleet and the hanstringing 'nv,l 
9 
of the elephants: these actions were not carried out until much later, 
which is an indication that such a measure was not pressing at an earlier 
date. And the lavishness and the range of Antiochus IV's later activities 
s~ggest that considerable reserves of wealth were in hand, by say 170, to 
enable him to consider his schemes viable. 9a 
Unfortunately for Seleucus IV, and still more so for his 
kingdom, it was by the action of his Chief Minister Heliodorus that his 
reign was brought to a premature close. The Jewish view of him is not 
flattering,lO and reflects an antipathy which was ominous for future 
relations between the Jews and the Seleucids which had begun so well. In 
11 
short, Heliodorus formed a conspiracy against Seleucus, and he was 
murdered in 175, to be succeeded by Antiochus IV. Seleucus' death was 
a foolhardy move brought about by personal motives, and no good could 
come of it; the allaying of Rome's fears about Seleucid foreign policy 
was not yet so complete that Syria could afford the panache with which 
Antiochus was to go about his various enterprises. It could be said both 
that Seleucus died too soon, and that Antiochus arrived too soon for the 
ultimate safety of the Seleucid kingdom. 
For Antiochus did not accede in any normal way. The true 
heir was Seleucus' elder son Demetrius who had been exchanged as a hostage 
to Rome, thus freeing Antiochus. It is probable that Heliodorus intended 
to act as regent, with a great deal of say in the running of the kingdom, 
for Seleucus' younger son, an infant Antiochus, in Antioch. At this point 
Antiochus IV was, as we saw, 
, , \ 'c' \ . d 
at Athens as (1'UT~yOj tn' Ttl-. on~, an news 
will have come to him of the assassination. The chain of events by 
which he himself became first regent then king now began with an offer 
from Eumenes of Pergamum, who wished an ally on the Seleucid throne, to 
assist Antiochus in seizing the throne. Eventually a treaty of amity was 
signed; and, supported by the troops of Eumenes and his brother Attalus, 
Antiochus entered Antioch, and in time silenced or abolished the 
0to lla OppOSl lone The most important element in the legitimate opposition, 
this infant Antiochus, over whom Heliodorus had been exercising 
guardianship, Antiochus had killed by his agent Andronicus whom he 
12 
subsequently disposed of as well; but, as the cuneiform tablets underline, 
there was a relationship (and there was also coinage) until 170 BC. 12a 
Antiochus' character is important to this discussion 
because of the strange combination of insight, recklessness, far-sightedness 
and petulant cruelty which all our sources seem to present13 : and it is 
not sufficient to say simply that he dealt with one situation according 
to one facet of his character and a different one with another. Because 
his actions were full of inconsistency, part of the difficulty involved in 
unravelling the process and implications of his actions is knowing how 
much weight to allow to each part of his chameleon-like personality. The 
historian is entirely at the mercy of contextual factors as all sources 
are suspect for various reasons. 
There were three main areas of Antiochus Epiphanes' activity, 
and each tends to present him in a different light - which is a result only 
partly explained by the different bias of the sources we have at our 
disposal. These were respectively his relations with the Jews,14 his 
involvement with Egyptl4a and the Romans, which really have to be taken as 
one issue, as the ramifications were so interdependent, and finally - much 
the most obscure - his Eastern enterprise, if it can be called that. We 
will deal with these in that order, as I think they show a certain 
development of character as well as a rough chronological progression. 
The Jewish question is really bound up with the ~s~irations 
of the aristocracy and the merchant class within mid-hellenistic Judaism 
who wished to see the cultural colour of Greek civilisation influencing 
in a liberal direction the conservative and exclusivist character of the 
Jewish state. This had existed since the Ezraonic reforms following the 
return of the exiles from Babylon, and had largely been due to the rule 
of the High Priests who combined a religious and a secular role, similar 
of early Athens, or the Prince Bishops 
of pre-19th century Durham. It was not, I think, that the Jewish state 
was in any kind of cultural stalemate - just that it was keei to preserve .f1V,/ 
its distinctive character in an over-defensive way against its own 
class-conscious progressive element, and to that extent tended to invite 
breaches of that system. 
Politically it had apparently welcomed Antiochus III after 
his overthrow of ptolemaic power at Panium in 20014b , but this had never 
led to a unanimous support of the Seleucid cause; and as Coele-Syria 
straddled the land route from Syria to Egypt, it was in a quite critical 
strategic position - which was a factor quite apart from any consideration 
of Jewish particularism and its incipient conflict with Hellenism. But 
its effect on that quarrel was to be profound. It had been the case 
during the period of the Syrian Wars in the earlier Prolemies' time that 
up to a point the little hill state had been content to watch the ignorant 
armies clash in the plain to their westward border; but with Coele-Syria 
now in Seleucid hands, this happy isolation was also now at an end. She 
was involved in Seleucid policy willy-nilly, and the changeover of power 
had left a section of Jewish opinion sympathetic to Egyptian schemes and 
so in effect a fifth-column in a Seleucid state. This state of affairs 
was complicated and inflamed in the case of Judaea by the antagonism which 
existed between the Oniad and Tobiad houses, both of them zealous 
hellenizers, but in political terms contenders for the priestly offices 
in this theocratl·c state. That the Tob· d h la s appened to have Ptolemaic 
sympathies and the Oniads Seleucid, although it varied, was a matter of 
history and served to bring the power politics of the rival Hellenistic 
nations into a sharper focus within a relatively small community, already 
marked by the emotional antipathies we have mentioned. It was a volatile 
situation. But it could not reasonably be expected that either Antiochus 
or the regents for the young Egyptian king Ptolemy Philometor could know 
what a hornets' nest could be upset by their own hostilities.15 
The Tobiad leader Hyrcanus had in fact negotiated with 
Ptolemy V Epiphanes and ingratiated himself with presents to the value of 
1000 talents quite recently, and had therefore, before the Seleucid 
conquest took Coele-Syria from the Ptolemies, acted as a taxation agent 
for the Egyptian government, basing his activities on his fortress at 
'Araq-el-Emir in TransjOrdan. 16 This palace was excavated by the 
Princeton University expedition of 1904-9 and reflects vividly the 
profitability of his ptolemaic appointment. All this bears on the 
Seleucid position in that, at the time of Antiochus IV's accession in 
175, Onias III the High Priest in Jerusalem was a friend of Hyrcanus. 
Hyrcanus t father Joseph, and later he himself, were determined hellenizers 
and were anxious to maintain a lively contact with the Greek world: so 
much comes from the style of architecture employed in their mausoleum 
at 'Araq. The lust for power and profit which they represent became the 
most profound marks for the hellenizing movement in Judaea. Antiochus IV 
had merely to help along this process, long in being, in order further to 
alienate one section of Jewish public opinion from another - basically 
corresponding, although this is an over-simplification - to the division 
between the rich merchants and the tAm Ha Ares, the people of the land, 
the poor. 
Antiochus had seen by his experience in Rome that her 
political success was due to centralisation, and so he aimed at the same 
kind of centralisation in his kingdom, employing in this case the 
unifying Alexandrine concept of divine kingship as a ruling force. Coins 
showing the resemblance of his Zeus-type to this type in Babylon, 
enthroned with victory in its hand, have been seen as a proof that he 
wished Babylon to be the destined capital of the new deity upon earth.17 
According to this view, with which I am inclined to agree as it seems the 
one obvious and possible way to shift the administrative centre of the 
Seleucid empire eastwards again, where it had long required to be, the 
west was to be left alone and the wishes of Rome were to be respected: 
Antiochus' attitude to the peremptory demands of Gaius Popilius Laenas 
t El . l7a h· h a eUSlS ,w lC we will look at in this context presently, can be 
seen as a part of this policy of not antagonising Rome. There seems no 
other adequate explanation for his extraordinary withdrawal in that 
instance. 
In Antiochus' case the ascription of divinity, with its 
centralising intentions in the interests of cultural homegeneity, was 
imposed by the king in clear contrast both to the Greek cities, which 
like Lemnos normally bestowed it on the Seleucid sovereign as a mark of 
esteem, and to the wishes of the Jewish state which in the view of its 
conservative stronger element regarded such an ascription as blasphemy 
anyway.18 For the Jew there was no such thing as formal political 
wor~hip; worship and politics were concerned with different realms of 
thought and activity, though he would agree that they did overlap at 
points - notably in the person and function of the high priest: but that 
again was only because the high priest represented Jahweh to the people 
of Jahweh, and the people in their turn to Jahweh: he was in no sense, 
although a ruler, in receipt of this worship himself. 
So this politically astute and generally acceptable 
religious innovation in Antiochus' empire encountered a tribe in whose 
religious beliefs it could find no part. It was extremely unfortunate 
for Antiochus - maybe he should have foreseen lOt th t J 
- a udaea occupied 
that particular geographical position, centrally situated between Syria 
and Egypt and with sympathies still, as we have seen, partially 
pro-Egyptian. Nor were Rome and Egypt his only antagonists: for as we 
shall see the threat from the East was at least as menacing - and as 
close; and again Coele-Syria was in a crucial position. 
A change of High Priest at Jerusalem in 175 from Onias III, 
who may be referred to as the teacher of righteousness in the Dead Sea 
Scrolls, to Jason and then to Menelaus, who had bribed himself into the 
" 18 position by overtures to Antiochus on his accession, a had given to the 
Tobiads and to the rest of the hellenizing aristocracy in Judaea the 
opportunity to press for political and cultural r~form. Jason had 
, 
obtained permission from the king to convert Jerusalem into a Greek noJ~ 
called Antioch (in this instance after Epiphanes) and to register the 
1 f t o Ant 0 h 18b peop e or vo lng purposes as lOC enes; a Gymnasion and an Ephebion 
were thereupon installed, marking, as they were expensive to attend and 
maintain, a further division between the poor and the better-off within 
the Jerusalem community. The former gerousia of Antiochus Ill's time was 
reconvened as the fiOV}7 of the new Antioch. And youths entered into 
the spirit of the new Greek environment by taking their exercises naked 
d b 0 h t ,19 an y wearlng a s. Antiochus IV was the patron-founder; and 
II Maccabees20 relates the joy with which Antiochus was received by Jason 
and the citizens of the new "~~,~ , possibly in 172, the year of Ptolemy 
Philometor's coronation. 
The building of authentic Greek cities was over, and we 
can see the results of some of this in its great phase at Hekatompylos 
and Nihavend for example. A few exceptions may well be possible in the 
d o 21 case of the Greek kingdoms in Bactria and India, particularly Eucrati ela 
which we will look at later on; but as far as Antiochus was concerned, 
if he wished to have some more Greek cities as allies, he would have to 
create them. As it transpired, the Greek cities of Antiochus were in many 
cases merely Syrian towns that had assumed the shape of poleis: the 
striving of the Jerusalem aristocracy for economic and political growth 
met Antiochus' desire for a friendly power in Palestine's geographical 
position. Meanwhile, the overt alliance between those Jews who favoured 
the objectionable Greek practices in Jerusalem, and gO (apparently) the 
Seleucid power, gave the pro-Ptolemaic faction, which had never really 
abandoned its cause, grounds for action. Their stronghold became the 
fortress of the Tobiads at 'Araq el Emir. 21a 
II Maccabees 4 verses 30 - 38 tells of the murder of the 
ex-High Priest Onias III while he was taking refuge in the precinct of 
Apllo, a suburb of Antioch, in 171 by one Andronicus, an administrator 
~ 
left in charge of Syria while Antiochus was suppressing a rebellion in 
Cilicia. Antiochus dealt summary justice upon Andronicus and seems to 
have genuinely grieved at the murder,22 but he did not then go on to deal 
with Menelaus the more extreme hellenizing High Priest who had succeeded 
Jason by bribery. Menelaus appears to have engineered this assassination 
and, in spite of a complaint actually being brought against him by the 
Sanhedrin to Antiochus, Menelaus' talent for successful bribery bought 
him the support of one Ptolemy, a favourite of the king. When the 
Sanhedrin assembly sent an embassy to talk to the king at Tyre in what was 
23 
now a grave situation, he had them put to death. This was presumably 
because of the influen3e of Ptolemy, but it did not endear him to the Jews 
of Tyre who gave the victims of this outrage magnificent funerals. 
Needless to say Antiochus lost face with the loyal Jews, as now both his 
justice and his policies were suspect. 
It is at this point that Egyptian politics enter the discussion. 
Future repressive activities in Coele-Syria were in considerable measure 
a reflection of the vicissitudes of Antiochus' Egyptian campaigns, and we 
have already seen that there was serious pro-Egyptian opposition to him 
within the Jewish state. Among the larger issues of the years immediately 
M R It lOt lOS lOmpossible to overstress the importance preceding the accabean evo , 
of the Egyptian question and its ramifications. 
Modern scholars admit between two and four expeditions of 
Antiochus into Egypt between the years 172 and 168, and the overwhelming 
majority favour the years 170 to 168; in the matter of harmonising the 
various accounts, I follow Ludin Jansen24 who put the two expeditions into 
the years 170 - 169 and 168; the first is dealt with in 1 Maccabees 1, 20 
and the second in II Maccabees 5, If; it is most unlikely that there were 
more than two. In 170 Egypt invaded Coele-Syria, and so provided Antiochus 
with a casus belli25 for which the Egyptian regents Eulaeus and Lenaeus 
were responsible. The invasion was defeated swiftly by Antiochus at 
Mount Casius near the border with Egypt close to Pelusium; and in the 
panic which ensued the young Ptolemy Philometor was shipped to Samothrace 
for safety,26 only to be intercepted by Antiochus' ships en route and 
captured. His brother Euergetes 'Physcon t was invited to assume the 
throne at Alexandria where the new ministers were Commanos and Cineas. 
The Alexandrian fleet was defeated at a battle near Pelusium while trying 
to block the Syrian retreat, and the Syrian army thereupon moved into 
Egypt without further resistance. Antiochus set up a rival government at 
Memphis in the name of Ptolemy Philometor to rival Physcon's administration 
at Alex~ndria. Alexandria for its part held out and reorganised its 
defences under Commanos and Cineas, while negotiations proceeded between 
the new administration and Antiochus. 
Various Greek ambassadors met Antiochus at Sais in an 
attempt at arbitration, possibly being led to do so by the eastern 
Mediterranean policies of Rome: when Antiochus continued his advance on 
Alexandria, the new ministers sent ambassadors to Rome to move the senate 
to actiono The Macedonian war with Perseus, which had begun in Spring 171, 
delayed the senate's response for some eighteen months, and in the 
meantime Antiochus had raised the siege of Alexandria and had returned to 
Coele-Syria before the winter rains in 169. On the way back, for some 
reason, possibly monetary, he raided Jerusalem, killed some of the 
inhabitants and pillaged the temple, perhaps with Menelaus' . 27 
connlvance. 
Towards the end of 170, apparently between 5 October and 
12 November, the Egyptian government had associated Philometor and his 
brother in the throne, along with Philometor's sister-wife Cleopatra II; 
this had consolidated Egyptian power in that it presented something like 
a united stand at a time when this was beginning to be desirable not only 
in the face of Antiochus' activity, but also in view of increasing 
nationalist Egyptian restlessness which had been brought into the reckoning 
by Ptolemy IV's action of using native troops in his phalanx at Raphia in 
217. As far as the war policy against Syria is concerned, if the first 
round of hostilities began after this joint rule was declared then 
~i Ptolemy Physon (and presumably also his sister) must have been additionally 
~ 
responsible for the war policy: or, if not, on account of their age, 
then their respective factions must. This presents a different picture 
of Egyptian intentions than previous interpretations have suggested; but 
a dating of 170 - 169 for the first campaign would be able to be sustained. 28 
Ptolemy Philometor attained his anacleteria, or coming of 
age, in the autumn of 170 also, and so provided a figure for official 
Egyptian policy to be based around. It was probably an astute political 
move for the regents to have reported this important alteration in 
Phi1ometor's status in an embassy to Rome, POSSib1? in mid-November 170. 29 Y~ 
One is continually struck, in connection with Antiochus' Egyptian campaigns, 
at the effect of time-lag in the sending and receiving of what were on 
any understanding important embassies and delegations: delays caused not 
just by the exigencies of ancient travel - which are understandable - but 
by delays in the reception of embassies, for example by the Roman senate, 
which are not so easily explained. The delay in hearing Antiochus' 
original urgent statement to the senate in the autumn of 170 is a good 
case in point. By the time his representatives were heard war had been 
declared. Collusion, or at least deliberate procrastination by Rome, 
becomes strongly suspect. It may well be that Rome's position in the 
with Perseus would not permit her to take up a decisive standpoint on 
the Egyptian-Syrian conflict until the lssue in Greece was clearer; but 
it is a measure of the delicate nature of Eastern Mediterranean politics 
at that time that she did not allow Antiochus any knowledge of her attitude. 
As a direct consequence, the events of 168 came as a surprise to Antiochus 
in the manner we shall discuss. 
After Antiochus' reconciliation with Philometor and the 
setting up of the rival government for him at Memphis, Antiochus was in 
an extremely strong political position. Because it was the legitimate 
Egyptian king who was ruling - who happened in any case to be Antiochus' 
nephew - a visit by Titus Numisius from Rome to determine the position30 
was met by the fait accompli of a cessation of the war, agreed by both 
Philometor and Antiochus. 
The siege of Alexandria and the ensuing stalemate followed, 
and for this period our sources are scant. Antiochus' next move was to 
try to reconcile Philometor and Physcon, but his efforts to do so were 
compromised at the outset by his own insistence that Philometor was the 
legi timate king, which was after all correct. Ambassadors were di'spatched e/ 
to various parts of the Greek world to draw attention to his policy being 
in the interests of the legitimate Egyptian king. The trouble was that 
however clever Antiochus had been, the very subtlety of it left the 
impression that he had used Philometor to further Syrian ends; and so 
his publicity campaign, far from persuading the Greek world of the 
justness of his policies, actually alerted their suspicion of him. And 
all this at a time when what was wanted above all in the Hellenistic 
states was a strengthening of the common front against the really 
dangerous political moves of Rome. His action in placing NlKf1fC>?OL 
~ on his coins when he returned to Antioch from this campaign does seem, to 
say the least, 'provisional,.31 
In Egypt Philometor meanwhile became reconciled with Physcon 
and Cleopatra, and Philometor re-entered Alexandria where he reigned as 
joint king with Physcon. In 168, Antiochus again entered Egypt, having 
first attacked Cyprus; Greek opinion was hostile to this and the Achaean 
League supported Egypt - but withdrew the support before taking any action. 
Antiochus now demanded the cession of Cyprus and Pelusium; but he had 
already made peace with Egypt in 169, and there had been no new offence, 
such as Eulaeus and Lenaeus' invasion of 170, to justify these new demands. 
He had left an effective lever for this new invasion of Egypt in the 
existence of the Seleucid garrison at Pelusium, placed there at the 
conclusion of the 170/169 campaign. But this was only garrisoned 'so that 
the door of Egypt should be open for him if ever he wished to return,.32 
Antiochus advanced successfully upon first Memphis and 
then Alexandria but at that point, 21 June, 168, Perseus was defeated 
by Lucius Aemillius Paullis at Pydna, and Macedon as an independent state 
vanished for ever; Egyptian ambassadors met Antiochus at Rhinocolura and 
Antiochus stated his terms: that Egypt was to vacate Cyprus and Pelusium. 
In the end the senate did listen to the Alexandrian deputation of 169 - in 168, 
and appointed a commission of three, C. Popillius Laenai, C. Decimus and S/ 
Gt. Hostilius charged to stop the war in Egypt. Polybius says: "The Senate, 
when they heard that Antiochus had become master of Egypt and very nearly 
of Alexandria itself, thinking that the aggrandisement of this king 
concerned them in a measure, dispatched Gaius Popillius as their legate to 
bring the war to an end, and to observe what the exact state of affairs 
was".33 
Antiochus was not to know that the victory of Pydna34 had 
accelerated the journey of the Roman ambassadors, and that the commission 
had landed in Alexandria: they met suddenly at Eleusis. In the celebrated 
incident of Popillius and his staff we have Rome's increasing arrogance 
flexing its political muscles, and the incident - during whicll Popillius 
delivered the Senate's letter, ordering Antiochus out of Egypt forthwith -
reflected better on Antiochus' self-control than on Popillius' courtesy.35 
Laenas also arranged with the Egyptian kings for the expulsion of Seleucid 
troops from Cyprus. Concerning this confrontation, Arnold Toynbee has 
said that IAntiochus had the sense to swallow his pride and obeY',36 which 
does not in itself enhance our idea of Syria's influence at the time but 
does support the view that Antiochus knew what was a politic move, as does 
his subsequent action in sending ambassadors to Rome to compliment the 
Senate on the victory at Pydna. Dancy points out that despite Laenas' 
rudeness at Eleusis the Senate seems to have had more respect for Antiochus 
after his withdrawal than before it,37 because it waited until his death 
in 163 before demanding the surrender of elements of the Seleucid navy 
and the hamstringing of elephants under the terms set at Apamea back in 
188. The success of Laenas' mission itself is somewhat modified by the 
legitimate view that Egypt's troubles were not so much foreign (from 
Antiochus) as domestic from native unrest. 37a 
It is the view of most authorities that it was also in 168, 
on Antiochus' return from Eleusis, that the suppression occurred of the 
rising which had occurred in his absence. 38 For the Seleucids a fairly 
normal occurrence, revolts were normally containable, but this one was to 
have permanent consequences. It seems that at this time the pro-Ptolemaic 
faction in Jerusalem had the upper hand; and that a rumour that Antiochus 
was dead brought Jason back across the Jordan from his base in Ammanitis 
° th °t 39 with a thousand men, and civil war began In e Cl y. After taking 
Jerusalem with bloodshed, Jason was unable to hold it, and was forced to 
withdraw again to his base. There need be no connection between Jason's 
attack and the pro-Ptolemaic feeling as such, but there is a connection, 
I believe, between both and the rumoured death of Antiochus. This will 
have been more than sufficient to convince Antiochus on his dismal journey 
back to Syria in 168 that this civil disturbance in Jerusalem was a 
pro-ptolemaic rising in his rear: 40 whether it was or not, in fact, is 
beside the point. The results were exactly the same. 
According to II Maccabees, 5, 5f, Jason's expulsion by 
Menelaus, after his raid on the city and the killing that accompanied it, 
was the proximal cause of the Maccabean rebellion proper. We have seen 
that if Antiochus understood this raid as constituting a ptolemaic reaction, 
there is point in the view that it was one of the causes of his final 
measures in the field of religion, and so of the Maccabean Revolt which 
was, amongst other things, the means of Jewish religious opposition to 
them. The proximity of the bedouin tribes in the territories beyond the 
Jordan to at least the vanguard of Parthian influence will also have 
caused Antiochus to beware of a resurgence of Jason's power at Jerusalem. 
Parthian relations with the Jews were to become a significant factor by 
th t " f th R t" 40a e lme 0 e oman occupa lone 
In the 145th year of the Seleucid era, or 167 BC, the 
suppression of the Jewish religion began; the date given in 1 Macc. 1, 54 
was the 15th of Chislev (November). On that day an altar was erected to 
Zeus Olympius or Ba'al Shamaim the Semitic Lord of Heaven, of which Zeus 
was the Greek equivalent. Prior to the construction of this altar in 
Jerusalem various orders were apparently published over the whole Seleucid 
kingdom, including Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Persis and the southern 
coast of Asia Minor that 'all should be one people and that each should 
give up his customs,.41 This was politically a potentially wise move, in 
that it was in theory an excellent way of rendering the Seleucid empire a 
more coherent cultural unit, and as such, a more solid barrier against 
Roman and Parthian attack and infiltration. There is probably a bit of 
vanity in Antiochus' choice of Zeus Olympius as the god to whom the 
Jerusalem altar was dedicated - he did claim a special affinity with Zeus 
himself. However, this particular deity does emphasise the essentially 
Hellenic character of the religion he wished to introduce. 
Although, according to the author of I Maccabees, the 
gentiles are said to have accepted the command of the king,42 the Jews 
objected strongly to this measure. However, the systematic carnage said 
to have taken place when Apollonius entered Jerusalem43 is not recorded 
in the more sober account in I Maccabees, which does not inspire 
confidence that the slaughter actually took place; and further it does 
not lead one to believe that the persecution which accompanied the 
imposition of pagan sacrifices was necessarily as widespread or as 
ruthless as is made out in II and IV Maccabees. A groundswell of nearly 
three hundred years of organised seclusion, separatism and strict 
religious orthodoxy of a somewhat blinkered variety will have helped to 
alienate 'progressive' opinion to the point where, when it was really 
required in the national interest, in the face of a real cultural threat, 
such support was not readily available. And this partly explains not 
only the impatience of the trading fraternity in Judaea to break its 
bonds, and to move into the new Hellenistic cultural and economic scene, 
but also the unwillingness of that same community to stand by its 
conservative national, religious and cultural antecedents. 
In a perceptive comment on the revolt which was to follow 
under Judas Maccabaeus and his brothers, and which itself need not concern 
us in detail, John Bright observes: ttAntiochus was probably never able to 
understand why his actions (in setting up the new worship) should have 
evoked such irreconcilable hostility among the Jews".44 
From the Jewish point of view the pressures to revolt can 
be summarised under three main headings. First there was the enmity 
between the Tobiad and Oniad parties of the priestly aristocracy which 
split the population of Jerusalem into factions in the manner of the later 
Roman trouble between the supporters of Clodius and Milo. These factions 
had, as we noted, in view of the political alliegiances of their leaders, 
divided the city into ptolemaic and Seleucid camps, at least by 170 BC, 
and probably before. To this schism had been added all the bitterness 
caused by the contest for the high priesthood between Jason and Menelaus, 
together with the religious and social debasement of the office as a 
result of the bribery which had accompanied the contest. The contest 
resulted in the highest bidder, Menelaus, being allied to the Seleucid king 
so that he was no longer his own agent but the pawn of Seleucid policy. 
This further alienated his opponents. The apparent seizure of gold from 
Y/ the ~il~priests of E~ Sagila, whom Antiochus IV had just appointed, 
seems to be another indication not only of a more tightly-controlled 
priesthood but of its manipulation. 44a 
Second, the population of Jerusalem and of Judaea as a whole 
was divided into the rich merchant and priestly aristocracy and the 
relatively poor 'Am Ha Ares' the people of the soil, and this carried 
religious overtones which were presently to emerge in the personnel of the 
Maccabean party. The alliance of 'godly' with 'poor' against 'ungodly' 
with 'rich' is common to the Bible as a whole but particularly common in 
this period, in view of the orthodox Judaism of the poorer classes and the 
pseudo-Hellenism of the aristocracy. This socio-economic gulf was a 
permanent feature of the Jewish state at the time,45 and combined with 
the religious factors we have indicated to make the division almost 
unbridgeable. 
Third, this religious difference was accentuated by the 
fear of godly Jews that the purity of Jewish religion was being tarnished 
by contact with the Hellenistic religious liberalism. The acceleration 
of the hellenising process from 175 to 170 will have deepened this fear 
of being surrounded by hostile religious forces, even though these outside 
'religions', being differently conceived, may have had no real intention 
of interfering in Jewish religion as such. The objection of gentile nations 
towards the Jewish people, which has regrettably and demonstrably become 
a feature of history, was a social antipathy as well as a religious one, 
even though religion may have caused it. The reaction of the merchant 
class against the separatism implied in the Ezraonic reforms, however 
understandable it may have been, gave a possibility of exposure to 
syncretistic trends among that class which was not the case with orthodox 
Jewish believers. The introduction of the altar of Zeus Olympius with its 
concomitant worship of the royal cult was not taken by the Jews as lightly 
as it was by Greeks who had a long tradition of formal political worship. 
This meant that from an orthodox Jewish point of view, pagan worship was 
now installed; and insofar as the hellenisers in Jerusalem had not 
volubly objected, this new cult was allowed to become an unwelcome 
bedfellow to the Jewish religion. This religious innovation speeded up 
the process of syncretism until it was out of control, and in a religion-
orientated state all the obvious social and political consequences followed. 
Fourth, Jews following the deep-rooted and splendidly-expounded 
religious traditions and beliefs of contemporary orthodox Judaism had 
reason to become very dissatisfied with the quality of life under 
Syrian Hellenism - for which Antiochus IV was not, of course, wholly 
responsible, but which he sought to put in place of traditional Jewish 
culture and religion (in themselves almost interdependent entities). 
Posidonius of Apamea gives a vivid picture of a small campaign in 
latter-day Syria, 50 years on from this Antiochus, which casts doubts 
on the hardihood and 'arete' of the Syria of Antiochus' own earlier days.46 
It is, of course, possible that Antiochus meant to change all this on to 
a higher, and not just a tighter cultural level. But this same passage 
of Posidonius could equally well be used as evidence that in the end 
that attempt failed. It is not true to allege generally that this was 
the fate of Seleucid culture on the Asian continent: Parthian Dura and 
Kushan Surkh Kotal alike bear witness, as do many facets of Taxila and 
Turkmenistan, to the staying power of Greek;Ganguage, institutions and 
coinage in former Seleucid territories. It can, however, be argued 
that the Syrian brand of Greek culture was threatened by internal 
problems much more basic than foreign attack or an abandonment 
consciously of 5th century Athenian ideals. Syria was just rich. The 
Posidonius quotation again makes this point: of an effete rather than 
a desperate society; and in the pompe at Daphne, to be noted presently, 




Under Antiochus I, in 268 there had been repairs to the 
Babylonian temple at Borsippa, and Babylonian life and religion seems to 
have revived under the 1arly Seleucids;47 but the deterioration in 
culture, as the Jews saw it operating in 168, is a powerful case for the 
Maccabees' opposition to the hellenistic way of life. And it was also 
a reason for their objection to any specific reforms its protagonists 
might wish to introduce - particularly if accompanied, as in the gezerot, 
with the threat of force, in itself a sharply untypical action for a 
Greek government to take towards the beliefs and culture of a native 
state, and a course of action furthermore which seems to have been 
specifically ruled out by undertakings given by earlier Seleucid rulers!8 
It is an activity which is paralleled by civic reconstruction of a 
hellenic character at Babylon and dubious royal appointments to the 
post of High Priest, as well as likely seizure of temple finances there 
also under Antiochus IV.4 9 It is not difficult to conclude that a part 
of the reason for the Persecution Decrees was the attitude already taken 
up towards the conservative element - who would wish to stand up for the 
purity of the Jewish religion as they had come to understand it - by 
their own fellow-countrymen whose cultural aspirations found in this 
religious conservatism an obstacle which would have to be removed, and 
in Antiochus an agent whom they could employ to remove it. 
According to the tradition preserved in I Maccabees, our 
best historical source for the revolt, hostilities began as the result of 
the demand of one of Antiochus' officers that Mattathias of the House of 
Hashmon should offer swine's flesh on the altar and repudiate the Jewish 
religion as he saw it (I Macc. 2, 15). From his refusal to sacrifice, 
and the death of the king's agent which ensued, the revolt grew, as those 
willing to fight for the traditional Jewish faith took to the country and 
the hills. The house of Mattathias is said to have been at Modiin, which 
is near the hills on the western side of the central plain of Palestine. 
The skirmishes in which the rebels were involved gradually 
p/ 
grew in importance and in ferocity: and on the death of Mattathias, 
Judas Maccabaeus was made the commander of the insurrection: Judas was 
nicknamed Maccabaeus, possibly from il] 1) t\ h Th b 1 1" r-~ ammer. e re el army was 
joined by a number of Jewish religious zealots, the Hasidim, who may be 
said to be the intellectual vanguard of their day and the true spiritual 
1 d f th t " 50 ea ers 0 e na lon : the determination and piety of many of these 
people is shown by their refusal to fight on the sabbath day and their 
consequent slc:mghter (I Macc. 2, 29 - 38). This passive resistance on 
the sabbath gave way to a resolve to kill or be killed, and it became the 
practice of Judas' army to massacre in return, to fight on the sabbath 
and forcibly to circumcise children. In the sporadic engagements with 
the Syrians which took place at that time the Maccabees easily beat Seron 
and Apollonius. 51 
Judas was able to rally those of the population of Judaea 
who opposed the hellenisation policy - or, following an early line of 
reasoning, who opposed those who for their own ulterior motives wished 
it to succeed. Those who did not so object fled to the Greek cities, 
particularly to the west and north of Judaea, the Decapolis. In the 
ensuing period Judaea was gradually won back for Judaism, and Judas' 
irregulars became consolidated into a national liberation army, while 
Mispeh functioned as their temporary national centre. At this point 
Antiochus left Antioch for the north and east, leaving the regent Lysias 
in charge of the country as the guardian of his son, the young Antiochus. 
And it is, therefore, also at this point that we will follow him to see 
what the implications of his eastern schemes might be. It should be 
emphasised that our sources are scattered or imperfect, and the 
proponents of one line are as suspect as those they criticise. There are, 
however, one or two fixed points. 
In 166 Antiochus held a splendid parade and festival in 
t k " t of Antioch,5
2 
and we the sanctuary of Apollo at Daphne on the ou s lr s 
are at once on the track of an argument as to what the games and 
festivities were actually celebrating. The received account in Athenaeus53 
dwells on the splendours of the festival, and Po lyb ius , account which is 
reproduced in it, includes specifically Polybian understandings of its 
significance - that it was for example intended to outshine the triumph 
of Aemilius Paullus for his victory at Pydna. It really is too much to 
make it into a similar set-piece, in this instance for Antiochus' own 
victory in Egypt. If he were wise enough to obey the requirements of 
Popillius, then he would hardly regard the Egyptian operation as a triumph 
in these terms. Nor does the view that it was all done to outpoint the 
Romans contain much worth if it is also asserted, as it is and I think 
quite correctly,53a that Antiochus' main preoccupation was not to offend 
the Romans. The Romans did indeed attend, and regarded it as impressive 
and not impudent: Polybius speaks of Tiberius Gracchus' satisfaction at 
the attitude and demeanour of Antiochus, on a visit paid to discover the 
position, 54 but Walbank's point - that it is unlikely that Gracchus was 
as simple, or Antiochus as Machiavellian as Polybius suggests - is very 
convincing. 
So if not a triumph for Egypt, and if not a crude overtopping 
P ? d t · t d 55 of Aemilius aullus, then what. A huge propagan a ven ure lS sugges e , 
and it may well be so, but surely not without some specific cause which 
it could depend upon and in some way extol. For its own sake it would 
cause more ill-feeling than it was worth in a power which, like Rome, 
needed pacification. So we come to the less obvious conclusions in search 
of a solution whose logic will stand up to examination more securely, even 
if the evidence for it is more circumstantial. 
Antiochus set out for the East after the festival at Daphne 
and celebrated Charisteria (thank offerings) in Babylon in September 166, 
or they were celebrated for him, and in the inscription which informs us 
. , 56 
of this, Antiochus was hailed as 'saviour of ASla • Any attempt to 
relate this to events in Egypt or Coele-Syria, is, if it refers to 
celebrations in Babylon, fraught with obvious difficulties, including 
the one that in both places he had been far from being the saviour of 
anything except his own skin. It is always instructive in a lightly 
explored area of history to discover what else was going on in the wider 
Greek world at about this time. And it is here that we meet again the 
Greek enterprise in the far East, in Bactria, which our sources are 
beginning to illuminate more clearly as the years pass. 
There was indeed victorious Greek action here which we 
shall look at in more detail in the next chapter. But the suggestion 
was made at a relatively early stage in Greco-Bactrian studies57 that 
Antiochus might perhaps have had a hand in the lightning success of 
Eucratides, a Greek usurper who dealt a blow to the continuity of 
Euthydemid power in Bactria and overthrew the line, killing Demetrius 
the son of Euthydemus I before being himself eventually assassinated in 
the particularly bloodthirsty way which tended to distinguish the 
Bactrian Greeks. (Justin XLI, 6, 5.) 
The circumstantial evidence for this hypothesis of Antiochus' 
involvement in the affairs of Bactria is growing, not receding. One 
small detail is the observation by M. Paul Bernard, the excavator of 
Ai Khanum, that Greek Corinthian pillar capitals there seem to demonstrate 
the style of Decimus Cossutius, the Roman architect of Antiochus' temple 
of Olympian Zeus at Athens. 58 The argumentation for this connection 
partly depends on the possible relations between the Seleucids as a 
house and the coin portraits of Eucratides. 59 Basically as far as this 
section of our work is concerned, the thesis of Tarn was that the 
Charisteria celebrated for Antiochus at Babylon was a thanksgiving for 
the success of Eucratides who, if he were Antiochus' regent in the East, 
could claim his success against the Euthydemids to have been in part a 
Seleucid victory - and therefore a partial restoration of formerly lost 
territory. If Eucratides were to have set off from Babylon on this 
enterprise in 168, as Tarn suggests, the timing of the Charisteria at 
Babylon would exactly fit the position politically and militarily in 
Bactria in 166. It is not necessary to make Antiochus out to be a 'man 
f "t t d" .., 60 . o qUl e ex raor lnary vlslons, or lndeed to imply that he was not. 
An eastern policy is a very possible explanation, both of the Charisteria 
and of Eucratides' episode in Bactria. It is not necessary either to make 
the argumentation for this link to depend on the Laodice on one of 
Eucratides' coins being a Seleucid princess, or to discard the hypothesis 
60a because such a relationship is thought to be unproveable. It is 
circumstantial evidence and no more - but it is interesting. And the 
bead-edging of this pedigree-coin is thoroughly Seleucid in any case. 
Taken in conjunction with the extensiveness of his coinage and the probable 
dates of his reign, it is very interesting indeed. It is said that he 
founded a city Eucratideia, and suggestions have been made that Ai Khanum, 
as Alexandria Oxiana refounded, might be that city.6l I think we now have 
to say that the overthrow of Tarn's theory, and of the chronology on which 
he based it, is now much less secure than it once was. 
Antiochus' recorded exploits in the East after Daphne 
included an attack upon Armenia: "Artaxias, the king of Armenia, broke 
away from Antiochus, founded a city named after himself and assembled a 
powerful army. Antiochus, whose strength at this period was unmatched by 
any of the other kings, marched against him, and was victorious and 
reduced him to submission".62 In the meantime a disastrous campaign 
took place in Judaea during which the nationalist army, as it now was, 
inflicted defeats on Nicanor and Gorgias, Antiochus' Syrian Generals, 
and the guardian of Antiochus V, Lysias, was held up by the Jewish 
garrison of the fortress of Beth Zur. 63 
After the Armenian campaign, Antiochus undertook an 
expedition against the Eastern provinces of his empire as it existed at 
that time, and this may have been limited to a policing action or an 
expedition to insist on the payment of tribute. Good reasons have been 
given against its being an expedition to deal with the Parthians. 64 
Certainly the impression is strong both that Antl"ochus t was no ready, and 
would not have wanted, at least at that juncture, to attack the Parthians, 
and that Mithridates I did not then for various reasons wish to attack 
him. Mithridates' northern border was becoming increasingly hard pressed 
itself by the nomad incursions. These were not to become critical until 
about 134, but the pressure had by 165 or thereabouts built up behind the 
Parthian northern (and Eastern) boundaries to the point where the Yueh-chi 
and the Sacas constituted a formidable hostile force. Quite apart from 
the question of Antiochus' power, the pressure on Parthia from that 
quarter alone will have been enough to prevent her involving herself in 
dangerous exercises against the erratic Seleucid. The existence of an 
inscription on a rock relief at the Bisutun Rock on the road between 
Ramadan and Kermanshah seems to confirm that Media was in Seleucid hands 
at this time, and does seem also to underline the lull in Parthian 
activity until at least the summer of 148. 65 The value of this inscription 
is strong and crucial and gives new significance also to the remains of 
the Greek cities at Nihavend (Laodicea) and Kangavar. Apart from any 
other considerations, the mountain barrier of the Zagros marks a rocky 
western boundary to the wide plain~ of Media; and the terrain changes 
now in a definite way from the scrub and fairly sparse grazing land of 
today's western Iran to the foothills over which the main road to Ramadan 
now winds, and so further west and north to the mountains of Kurdistan. 
It does have the feeling of a psychological barrier as well as a merely 
physical one. 
One Philip was appointed as regent of the kingdom while 
Antiochus was in the East, and this was contested by Lysias who at this 
point in time was involved in the siege of the Maccabean fortress at 
Beth Zaccariah in Judaea. Antiochus himself took part in an expedition 
In against the sanctuary of Artemis-Nanaia in Elymais, east of Susa. 
itself an illustration of the religious syncretism which Antiochus had 
not apparently so far attacked and had, therefore, presumably approved _ 
the sanctuary was a fatal attraction, in view of the widespread middle-eastern 
custom of those days of using the temple sanctuaries rather like banks. 
And it was, naturally enough, defended with a zeal which reflected the 
religious fervour of the worshippers, hardy mountain peoPle. 66 Polybius 
and the author of I Maccabees alike report the failure of this expedition 
and the ensuing death of Antiochus at a place in Iran variously reported as 
Gabae and Tabae: the actual modern location could be Isfahan, with which 
Gabae has been identified. 67 A possibility that this account could be a 
'double' of .the account of Antiochus IIIts death has been proposed and 
68' 
successfully rebutted: . a money shortage was common to them both - as 
was temple-looting. 
With his death the real opposition to Parthia, again 
psychological as well as physical, was removed; and between 161 and 142 
Parthian power grew to be too strong to be resisted by the Seleucids despite 
various valiant and partially successful expeditions, notably under the 
last great Seleucid king Antiochus VII Sidetes. 
Although it would be true to say that the manner of Antiochus' 
repulse from Elymais was symptomatic of his attitude to native religion 
in the latter part of his reign, which he never really understood and 
which was to playa substantial part in the undoing of his dynasty, the 
actual pressures for the Seleucid decline, to which his reign seems to 
have given a new twist, were of longer standing and are simply accentuated 
by the position he found himself in in 163. His seizure of the Seleucid 
throne in the place of Seleucus IV's son, the legitimate heir,69 marks the 
start of a series of dynastic feuds which never stopped until Antiochus XIII, 
incredibly named Asiaticus, and Philip II went down before the might of 
Pompey. Unable to see the long-term dangers of superficially-attractive 
expedients, he was to show a degree of political rashness in this aspect 
of his policies which contrasts oddly with his statesmanlike treatment of 
Popillius at Eleusis, and indeed the Romans and Parthians generally. If we 
leave the question of his 'Ost-Politik' as a moot point in default of 
convincing evidence, it still leaves us with a monarch of ability and 
shrewdness and yet with an enigmatic opacity in questions in which he 
might be most personally or emotionally involved. His religious 
identification with the cult of Zeus Olympius shows that he did concern 
himself with some religious questions and that his treatment of religious 
issues was not, therefore, wholly that of petulance or ignorance: it 
would more likely have been the result of conviction. This goes some way 
to disturbing the easy rationale that the Maccabean revolt was a purely 
political revolt against his socio-political schemes: it largely was, 
but not completely. 
More tangible echoes of Antiochus' stormy reign can be 
found in his coins and in various artefacts displayed among other places 
in the Iran Bastan Museum in Teheran. At Shami in Iran, sited near 
Malamir in the Bakhtiari mountains, was found the great bronze statue 
which Ghirshman suggests may be an effigy of Dionysus: it is more 
obviously a portrait of a Parthian prince. Also at Shami were found the 
various fragments of large bronze statues of Zeus and Dionysus, and a 
face mask in bronze of a Seleucid monarch, probably Antiochus himself; 
it is an interesting side-light on Antiochus' religious policies in the 
East that he is on record 70 as having built two temples at Shami, 
which were later destroyed or at least pillaged by Mithridates I during 
his attack on Elymais. In itself this action was the result of the 
local population's refusal to recognise the new Parthian dynasty: not 
an indication of widespread hatred of Antiochus, even in Iran, or of 
Demetrius II, from whom this territory was conquered in 139 Be. 
Beside the task of consolidating the Seleucid Empire, 
Antiochus' apparent requirement for money does have political implications. 
He apparently still owed the Romans 2,000 talents of the Apamean 
indemnity; 71 and Jansen believed that the Romans had, therefore, a 
, t. 72 
moral right to intervene in Syria s poli lCS, increasing their pressure 
on Antiochus for that reason amongst other ones: they would feel they 
had to guard against wastage on army or fleet. The position Rome had 
achieved in Asia Minor, Greece and Macedonia was well-known personally 
to Antiochus and will have caused many problems of a personal 
psychological nature in addition to the obvious difficulties of running 
a large heterogeneous state under these conditions. 
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Chapter VI. 
The Seleucid East: Parthia And Bactria. 
1. The Nomad Problem at 163. 
The last hundred and fifty years of Greek rule in the East was 
intimately bound up with the problems created by increasing nomad activity 
on the northern and eastern borders of Bactria and Parthia. This stemmed 
from the military situation in China. The Former Han dynasty in central 
and north-western China had been troubled militarily since the accession 
of Mao-Tun as the Shanyu or great chief of the Haiung-nu in about 206 BC. l 
It was against the Hsiung-nu pressure on Han domains that the Great Wall 
of China was originally built. Mao-Tun turned the internal organisation 
of the tribe and its military expertise, including the use of a much improved 
and strengthened bow, into a determined activist policy, not really, so far 
as we can discover,from conscious foreign policy motives but from a need 
for Lebensraum, as the Han effectively blocked any further progress to the 
East and the Gobi Desert lay to the north. 
In the south west part of the Gobi, however, around Lop Nor, 
lived the Yueh Chi, a large confederation of Nomad people who would 
automatically be touched by any Western expansion of the newly-militant 
Hsiung-nu. In about 200 this began to happen for the foregoing reasons, 
and many neighbouring peoples were subjugated between 200 and 175. In 
177 - 6 this led to war with the Yueh chi who were temporarily subjugated. 
Under Mao-Tun's successor Lao Shang, who reigned about 174 - 160, prolonged 
and bitter fighting between the Hsiung-nu and the Yueh chi led to the 
defeat of the Yueh chi tribe, as recounted in the Shi-ki.
2 
As a direct consequence of this war the Yueh chi left their 
home territory in the south west of Kansu province and headed in a body 
slowly westwards. One group went to north-eastern Tibet: and these, 
known as the Little Yueh chi, settled near the Richhofen Range there. 
The rest, the Gre~t Yueh-chi, went west, defeating the Saca (Sai or Sok) 
in the area of the northern Tien Shan, on the upper IIi Valley and 
subsequently dislodged them too, so that the growing succession of Nomad 
migrations caused a chain-reaction and the Saca also began to move in a 
generally westward direction. The Chien-han-Shu3 tells us that some of 
these became amalgamated with the Yueh chi. 
In this region, near the Alexandrowski Range, they came into 
conflict with the resident tribe there around the north shore of Lake 
Issyk Kul, the Wu-Sun people. Only this time, instead of the Wu Sun 
themselves moving west, it defeated the Yueh chi and sent them forward 
again, in two directions: west again towards Bactria and south-west, 
with mainly Saca components, towards Chi-Pin (Arachosia), of which this 
group went on to make a complete conquest; and Arachosia, and the land 
to the south of it, became Sacastan. In the meanwhile war between the 
Wu Sun and the Ta (Great) Yueh chi had led to the death of the Wu Sun 
chief, and the capture of his son by the Hsiung-nu chief, who brought up 
the child to be a resolute and successful military commander who eventually 
defeated the Great Yueh-chi, sending them over the Oxus River into Bactria 
where they settled.4 
In the course of his pioneering work on the Iranians and Greeks 
in South Russia, Rostovtzeff5 discusses the question of the Sarmatian 
movements westwards to the Russian Black Sea Coast, and all the cultural 
consequences which stemmed from this movement. He also examines the 
influence of Iran on the customs of the Han dynasty during this period, 
and says that certain features of the life of this dynasty cannot be 
explained without this influence. He says: "I maintain that the whole 
military life of China was reorganised by the kings of the Han dynasty on 
Iranian lines. The Iranian influence reached China not directly from 
Parthia or Bactria but through the medium of the Sarmatian tribes, many 
. 6 
of which beyond doubt took part in the Hunnish assaults on Chlna." 
The work of Sulimirski7 in recent years has greatly amplified and 
enlightened our knowledge of the Sarmatians in those critical years during 
the first half of the second century, when it must have seemed that the world 
was on the move. It was a restless background against which the Hellenistic 
world was to go through its difficult years. Rostovtzeff takes care to make 
the vital point that the Sarmatians were in no way destructive barbarians 
but 'brought to Europe the achievements of Iranian culture',8 and that their 
aim was not, when they reached it, the abolition of Greek civilisation on the 
Bosphorus - or anywhere else - but a kind of symbiosis: 'they fought with 
the Greeks, but never because they were bent on destroying or subduing the 
G k °to r 9 ree Cl les • Connections of many kinds have been made between what is 
known as the Scythian animal style and the general koine of nomad art forms 
in the culture of the Sarmatians and the Scythians who preceded them, and 
the Parthians who were their Eastern neighbours. lO 
The Sarmatian question is an issue in any discussion of the 
nomadic situation affecting the Seleucid Empire, because they marked for 
hundre~ of years, from the late fourth century BC until the mid-first 
century or thereabouts the westward limit of a possible western expansion 
of the Hsiung nu, the Yueh chi and their associated tribes. In fact, as 
we have seen, the Yueh-chi went to Bactria and the north of India. The 
Hsiung-nu appear to have remained as a threat to the Former Han well into 
the first century BC., and for that reason ceased to be a westward-moving 
threat to Greeks and Parthians. The vexed question of their relationship 
with the Huns of the Roman centuries AD. has really now been solved by the 
11 
comparative work of various scholars, and we have arrived at the view 
that there was no co.hesive horde of Hsiung-nu who would have remained far 
enough west as a distinct people to have become the ancestors of the Huns. 
Some, however, may have been absorbed by Iranian and Sarmatian peoples 
generally, and out of that mixed population the Huns seem to have emerged. 
The most attractive solution is that proposed by Maenchen-Helfen 
12 
who says: 
"1. The theory that the Huns originally came from the 
far east cannot be supported by any direct or indirect 
literary or archaeological evidence. 
2. There is no evidence to demonstrate that the Huns and 
the Hsiung-nu spoke the same language. 13 
3. The art of the Huns, so far as it is known, was 
fundamentally different from that of the Hsiung-nu".14 
The splendid work done on the general field of Nomad Art and its 
cultural effects and preconditions, in particular the examination of 
Hsiung-nu artistic remains at Lop Nor and in the Ordos bronzes, has 
really opened up a new chapter in our way of looking at nomadic people 
in a field where classical scholarship requires this knowledge. We will 
return to the question they posed for the Greeks in Bactria presently. 
Meanwhile further west, in the territories into which Parthia 
had now expanded, Parthian civilisation itself was having to make its 
accommodation with the Hellenistic world. It is now time to examine what 
kind of a civilisation the Parni brought with them, and what they managed 
to evolve when settled. Their first capital in any sense of the word was 
Nisa in the south of present-day Soviet Russia. Parthian Nisa had three 
main parts: a citadel, pentagonal in plan, covering more than ten acres 
and built on a natural crag; the town itself; and the urban precinct with 
its defensive wall: Mihrdatkart, the 'royal city' with the burial place 
and the treasury of the Parthian kings was nearby. In the square hall, 
about 3rd century BC., were founded some remarkable marble statues, 
probably imported from Seleucid Syria, including one of a goddess wringing 
out her hair. The crowning glory of the excavations at Nisa is, however, 
probably the rhytons, horn-shaped vessels, standing some 20 inches high, 
decorated with protomes of centaurs and griffins - and these vessels also 
exhibit masks, scenes of Bacchus' festivities and representations of Zeus, 
Hera and Athene, Apollo and so on. The purpose of these rhytons was in 
connection with ceremonial and sacrificial libations. From this and 
similar finds in contemporary Parthian settlements has been built up a 
picture of Parthia in its Philhellenic period with a Grecizing portrait-
style and a competent assimilation of the Greek language15 which was to 
remain long after the philhellenism had been eroded by conquest and by 
the evolution of indigenous art and architectural concepts and forms, 
such as frontality and the creation of the Iwan. 
The first of six ostraka in Aramaic was discovered in the Autumn 
of 1948 on the site of 'New Nisa', South of the citadel: later, in 1951, 
nearly 150 more were brought to light at Old Nisa, and the total unearthed 
now passes 'un millier'. M. Sznycer: 'Ostraka d' epoque Parthe trQuv~es 
a Nisa' includes text and translation from I. M. Diakonov's first samples: 
the Ostraka were from taxes on wines from royal vineyards, and are dated, 
as are the Parthian texts from Avroman in Khurdistan, to 83 - 64 BC. 16 
The present city of Shahr-i-Rey, or the city of ~, became a 
Parthian city some time in the early part of the tecond century, although ~ 
there is quite a lot of discussion about the speed of the Parthian advance. 
While the Parthians occupied it, they took steps to fortify the existing 
city which had previously been rebuilt by Seleucus I, and to build temples 
there. The city later became the spring residence of the Parthian kings 
and was described by Isidore of Charax as the greatest city in Media. l ? 
Its previous name under Seleucus I had been Europos, after his birthplace 
in Macedonia; Shahr-i-Rey is now a suburb of Teheran, and of the remains 
of the original Hellenistic and Parthian site little remains which has not 
been overbuilt. 
Any idea of an Iranian revenge on the Greeks by the advancing' 
Parthians can be dismissed: they seem altogether broader-minded people 
18 
than that. Their architecture has been well popularised by Colledge and 
others; and it has grown in dignity as scholars have discovered more about 
it. The work of Rostovtzeff is of' first importance here as is that of 
Ernst Herzfeld and before him Aurel Stein, whose work on the fortress of 
Kuh-i-Khwaja is essential for our assessment of the cultural quality and 
staying power of the Parthians o Ghirshman cites two factors which seem 
to have played a maj or part in the Parthian episode in Mi'1dle Eastern 
hl" story "Fl" rst, the forward d" f th I 
• rlve 0 e ranians, as well as the 
Turco-Mongols, in the wake of the advancing nomads; and secondly, the 
decadence from a military point of view of the Seleucids and Graeco-
Bactrians who were now incapable of making a united stand against the 
invaders, their energies being dissipated in internecine strife".19 This 
has perhaps long been accepted too glibly, as though we knew that attempts 
to co-operate never occurred to them. This depressing conclusion is now, 
we believe, less likely to be true, because of the relationship, e.g.: 
between the Parthians and Diodotus II and the questions it raises. 
Ghirshman is, however, marvellously broad in his insistence that 
the Iranian tribes really did have a deep and lasting influence on the 
culture of many countries in Central Asia. "The Sarmatians, the Sacae 
and the Parthians succeeded in creating a composite civilisation where 
ever they established themselves •.•.• Their civilisation acted as a 
centripetal force, the movement which originated in the region of ••••• 
outer Iran was of a centrifugal nature. In some of its developments it 
broke through the limits set by the resistance of its neighbours: the 
Graeco-Roman world in the west, India and even China in the East. And in 
20 
this movement the Parthians played a leading part." Ghirshman gives a 
round figure of 110 years (250 - 140 BC.) for the Parthian 'reconquest of 
Iran', and he does not believe that Parthian art in the full sense existed 
before the accession of Mithridates II in about 123 BC,21 but that depends 
upon how much intrinsic value one proposes to give to the products of the 
earlier phil-Hellenic period: it is not necessary to dismiss them as 
non-Parthian. 
C. N. Debevoise22 gives an admirably thorough survey of the 
political history of Parthia during our period. Th bl e pro em of the doings 
of Arsaces r brother rTiridates r have been much disputed, partly due to 
the suspect nature of Syncellus r source, and the Arrian account on which 
it seems to be based has already been found inferior in respect of its 
chronology and context to that used by Justin and Strabo. 23 A late 
encounter between Tiridates and Seleucus Callinicus on his eventual 
expedition to, recapture dissident Parthia led, as we saw in Chapter II, 
to Seleucus' eventual defeat: Tolstov has proposed the very sound 
hypothesis that the original revolt of the Tribes of Chorasmia and 
Turkestan. was not against the Greeks but against the Macedonian 
24 hegemony : this agrees with Strabo's view of Arsaces I as a 
Bactrian anxious to throw off the ¢uzerainty of Diodotus I - but 
raises the question of whether Diodotus was himself therefore a 
Macedonian - and, if so, from whom he was revolting. 25 We do not, I 
think, require to agree with Tolstov (and Ghirshman ?) who see in 
this revolt a liberation movement of the tribes of Central Asia and 
Eastern Iran. 
Tiridates was succeeded by Artabanus who had to bear the weight 
of Antiochus Ill's much more resolute action, but seems with admirable 
s( 
diplomatic farsightedness to have bowed before the inevitable but short-lived 
presence of Antiochus, and in the end to have made an agreement with him,26 
very likely at Antiochus' instigation in view of his more serious impending 
contest with Euthydemus. It would have been an elementary precaution for 
Antiochus to guard his exposed rear in this way. 
Nomad trouble with Mardi, which will have been a warning to the 
Parthians, themselves lately nomadic, of the pressures building up in the 
Steppe even early in the 2nd century, occupied Phraates the son of 
Priapatius, who was Artabanus r successor. This action on the part of the 
Parthians was successful, and the defeated tribesmen of the Mardi were 
deported to Charax. 27 Phraates was succeeded, possibly at his own 
suggestion, by the next great Parthian conqueror Mithridates I in 171, 
and the chronology is suddenly clearer. It becomes possible to ~';ork out a 
harmony of events with the Seleucid enterprise at this time with some 
surprising results, due to Mithridates' dated coinage. 
Mithridates' first responsibility was to develop his strength in 
the East. There was a Median campaign, as a result of which Mithridates 
forced the defeated Medes to accept the rule of his nominee Bacasis (Justin 
XLI, 6, 7). After the death of Antiochus IV, in 163 Mithridates moved 
against the people of Elymais whom Antiochus had himself attacked in a 
punishment expedition, as we saw, shortly before his death. This was an 
important geopolitical move on Mithridates' part as it really was 
striking at the 'soft underbelly' of Seleucid power in the area bordering 
the Persian Gulf, where there was unrest and disaffection, and where 
there was,as Le Rider points out, great commercial activity in the reigns 
of Seleucus IV and Antiochus IV in connection with the sea route to India. 
Danish excavations in the Persian Gulf area have revealed a Seleucid 
settlement at Falaika-Icarus, an island off Kuwait; and, although the 
inscription from its temple is dated to the reign of Seleucus II, and 
other buildings to before 200, it is, I think, fairly certain that 
Antiochus IV was already conducting prevent~tive measures, some of them 
probably naval, against Parthian expansion in his Eastern campaigns of 
166 - 16328 ; if so, it is another interesting light on Antiochus' wary and 
prophylactic Eastern Policy. And in fact no actual Parthian move against 
his realm occurred during his life time, or if it occurred - we have no 
evidence - then his measures, such as this possible Gulf presence, were 
enough to contain it. And, as has been pointed out,29 the Elymaeans were 
not welcoming to Mithridates when eventually he did come, (Justin XLI, 6, 8). 
In the north the Parthians attacked Armenia which had been in 
Seleucid hands following Antiochus IV's expedition of 166, and Mithridates' 
brother Valarsaces became its new king, which Moses of Chorene recounts 
. 30 
with an exaggerated view of the territorial extent of Valarsaces ' klngdom. 
Armenia's critical strategic position as the protector of Parthia's northern 
salient was, therefore, to be secured as a point of Arsacid policy by 
some kind of blood tie. It was d t a pru en move, as Armenia marked not only 
an ex-Seleucid province, and, therefore, an attack-angle for any 
potential avenging Seleucid, but also a northern barrier against nomadic 
intrusion from the southern elements of the Alani and the other Sarmatian 
tribes north of a line occupied by the Phasis River on its westward passage 
into the Black Sea. 
On Parthia's eastern frontier, where the greatest extent of 
expansion took place, Strabo says that the Parthians were able to take 
'Turiva' and 'Aspionus' from Eucratides, whose reign can be seen springing 
to light in several different contexts now. The interpretation of this 
passage has long been a source of scholarly worry, and W. W. Tarn produced 
a genuinely workable solution which he has not seen any reasons to alter, 
and nor has anyone else, to any real extent. 31 Strabo XI, 517 says that 
the Parthians took from Eucratides of Bactria two satrapies '1V To 4~ff/~VOV 
and subsequently (XI, 515), that they had to retake the 
same territory from the Scythians (Sacae) who had earlier occupied it. 
Strabo seems to be referring to Bactria as a province and not to what we 
know as the burgeoning Bactrian Empire: he mentions Bactra, Eucratideia 
and Darapsa. 32 Strabo says the Greeks divided Bactria into satrapies as the 
Seleucids did,33 e.g., Cappadocia, Elymais, Armenia, Adiabene and Parthia. 
Bactria itself seems possibly to have been divided into little satrapies 
or eparchies, whose names are unfortunately lost to us, perhaps in a 
similar way to the contemporary division of Afghanistan into police districts 
each with its commissioner, but this proposal of Tarn's was cogently 
I 33a 
rebutted in Charles Edson's careful review of Tarn's work. 
Tarn34 says that these two lost Satrapies are to be identified 
with Tapuria and Traxiane, and that Eastern Tapuria (in Kiessling's 
designation) was the valley and watershed of the Upper Atrek which was 
Parthian country, part of Astauene; nthe Bactrians then in the days of 
their power had reached out westward across the Arius, taken a wedge of 
territory from the then weaker Parthia, added it to B t . d 
ac rla ••• an 
made of it two little satrapies like the Bactrian. This wedge of territory 
was Astauene; and when Mithridates I recovered these two satrapies from 
Eucratides, Justin (XLI, 6, 7) calls it an expedition into Hyrcania •.• for 
Astauene had probably been part of the old Seleucid Hyrcania".35 
The Bactrians would have found it impossible to hold Eastern 
Tapuria without holding also the tract of territory to the east of it, the 
rest of Astauene - the valley of the Kasef Rud, a tributary of the Arius 
(Hari Rud). At present the principal town of the area is Meshed, on the 
main railway from Teheran and a major Moslem pilgrimage centre. Ruins at 
Tus (Susia), the birthplace of Firdausi, a few miles to the west are said 
to denote the importance of this site as a Seleucid garrison town. 36 
It would seem that prior to about 100 BG. (the date of Apollodorus 
of Artemita, Strabo's source), Susia was the seat of a provincial governor 
( fJ..~ JA'tl o..{ ) - Isidore implies ( ~ 1/ ) that the capital of Astauene was 
Arsacia, 7A,rtJ..I\.K.. : Kusan on the Upper Atrek. Therefore, if we follow 
Tarn, at some point in the 2nd century the Kasef Rud valley with its chief 
city at Susia was a separate province from the Atrek country. So the 
'Pasiani' who occupied that area could be called invaders of Bactria: 
'Pasiani' can, in that context, only mean Parthians.37 
Tarn goes to one of the campaign coins of Parthia38 for the 
name of the second western satrapy: the three provinces taken from the 
Sakas by Eucratides were Aria, Traxiane and Merv (Alexandria-in-Scythia), 
going from south to north - this is a straight line - so Traxiane must 
lie between them and must be the missing Bactrian province. 
2. The Rise of Bactria as a Kingdom 
If Tapuria and Traxiane were the eastern marches of the 
Parthian kingdom, it is now time to deal with Eucratides himself in his 
Bactrian, as distinct from Seleucid context, and to discover what the 
Bactrian state was doing in the middle of the second century. 
Following Antiochus Ill's negotiated withdrawal from Bactria 
in 206 or thereabouts Euthydemus had continued to extend his territory 
" d" t" 37a ln every lrec lone The evidence of coin find-spots indicates that he 
ruled in Bactria and Soghdiana, which we may call his 'home state', but 
also in the Parop~isadae - the region to the south of the Hindu Kush 
around Kabul and Kapisa, and in Arachosia - where his coins have been 
unearthed in the current British excavation at Kandahar (Alexandria 
Arachosia) - in Drangiana, Margiane and Aria to the south and west. It 
is possible that Euthydemus extended Bactrian arms also to the north and 
east, to Ferghana and Sinkiang: 38a Tolstov, following Tomaschek 
and Marquart, holds that what Strabo meant by saying that 'the Bactrian 
kings extended their posessions as far as the Seres and the Phryni 
was that they had established an alliance with the nomads, and that this 
was actually with the 'Huns' under Mao-Tun against the Yueh-chi who as 
Chiang K'ien knew were a threat to both Huns and Greeks - as well as to the 
H n state. His coins show him to have a stern and resolute expression at 
various periods of his life,39 and we may also deduce from his coinage that 
his reign was a long one from approximately 225 to 190.40 His son Demetrius I 
succeeded him, and his now extensive territories were very probably 
governed in his name by a small number of Sub-Kings in the areas which he 
would find it inconvenient or impossible to rule personally. In this 
category came Antimachus 1,41 ruling probably in Arachosia, and Euthydemus II 
his brother. Dates, locations and relationships for the Bactrian kings -
and queens - have always been hypothetical with few exceptions; the 
following account tries to be a plausible synthesis in the prevailing 
uncertainty in this field. 
Demetrius I seems to have continued his father's expansionist 
policies, because to his reign is to be assigned the extension of Euthydemid 
conquests southwards over the Paropamisadae into Gandhara and later under 
Demetrius II into India proper, territory which had lately been Mauryan 
but which had fragmented on the collapse of the Mauryan power in 187. 
Demetrius I was able at least to annex the western Punjab,42 and 
Demetrius II may have penetrated much further south and east, even to the 
region round Mathura,43 while his brother (?) Apollodotus I seems to have 
gone in the direction of the Gulf of Cambay and the valley of the Nerbudda. 
Demetrius' reign is celebrated by echoes in Indian literature44 and 
for us by a probable reference in Chaucer. 45 He may well have founded a 
city, Euthydemia, which existed in the Punjab sixty miles from Lahore, west 
of the River Hydracotes, and which probably later became the Sagala of 
Menander's day. There is, according to Isidore (~19) a DemetriQs in 
Arachosia but so far there is no sign of it. He seems also to have founded 
a name-city in Sind and may also have founded one at Termez on the Oxus46 : 
this city on the Oxus has been the subject of Russian investigations, and 
seems, as was often the case with Greek cities, to be a rebuilding on 
earlier foundations. It was an important halting place on the caravan 
route from India and Bactria to Eastern Turkestan, where there seems to 
have been Greek penetration anyway, and China which had outposts in the 
T . B . 47 arlm aSln. 
There is reason to suppose that Demetrius divided his Bactrian 
and Indian possessions into smaller units for easier government with 
groups of these 'eparchies' - if we accept Tarn's phraseology - under 
viceroys or Sub-Kings, an analogy to the earlier satraps. There was 
Seleucid and Achaemenid precedent for this form of organisation as far as 
the territorial division was concerned, and such sections would have 
logically formed the residual principalities to which the Greeks were in 
the end reduced. 
Rawlinson's comments on the small satrapal divisions of this 
organisation and its implications are worth quoting in full for their 
conciseness: ttThe small satrapy appears to have been the natural political 
unit in India, as the city state was in Greece. However, Demetrius did 
not arrive at a satisfactory solution of the bl pro em of simultaneously 
governing two distinct and diverse kingdoms. Perhaps his continuous absence 
in India aroused the jealousy of the Graeco-Iranian kingdom in the north; 11 
it may be that the inhabitants of Bactria looked upon Sagala with jealous 
eyes, as a new and alien capital; at any rate the absence of Demetrius 
gave ample opportunity for a rival to establish himself securely in Bactria 
before the arrival of troops from the far south to overthrow himn.48 
How far Demetrius I actually went himself towards the east is 
not known with certainty. With his son Demetrius II left to take charge 
of the Paropamisadae and probably Gandhara there was no immediate 
requirement of Demetrius to confine himself to the western part of north 
India. Tarn believed that Demetrius lIs forces reached Pataliputra (Patna) 
on the Ganges at this time, taking the years of the invasion to be 183/2 -
167,49 the date of Eucratides t irruption into Bactrian politics, but that 
they were commanded at that point and in that direction by Menander whose 
task it was to press eastwards, leaving Demetrius in Sind. The attack on 
Pataliputra is not itself in question, as evidence for it comes from 
Apollodorus of Artemita,50 a major source of Strabo, and also from the 
Indian side in the Yuga - Purana of the Gargi Sarmita,51 an astrological 
work reproducing an older source. There seems no need to make the attack 
and capture of Pataliputra seem just like a raid, as some have tried to 
do. That is to downgrade the enterprise and to ignore the planning and 
scale of such an advance, and it avoids the implications of the source 
which talks of the Yavanas not being able to stay in Pataliputra because of 
a terrible civil war in their own country. They did not stay, not because 
they would not or could not organise it municipally like any other city they 
took of such importance, but because their enormously long lines of 
communication and their distance from the new source of strife made it 
unsafe for them to do so. Despite the fighting in Pataliputra, which we 
know preceeded his withdrawal, from what we know of Menander this 
withdrawal, when it took place in about 166 - 5 cannot have caused him 
anything other than sadness. His respect in Indian eyes was not diminished 
at the end of his life, and leads us to suspect a larger view of this 
" " th "t "d 52 lnvaSlon an JUS a ral • 
Greek forces are recorded as being at Mathura and Saketa, and 
it seems likely that some degree of Greek control will have been established 
over a large part of northern India during Demetrius' reign, and that of 
Menander which was to succeed it. One circumstantial reason for this is 
that the Greek action had taken place independently, or as a consequence, 
of the collapse of Mauryan power, and not in the harder circumstances of a 
well-organised and unified Indian power bloc. Pushyamitra the Sunga, who 
came from the area ~round the River Nerbudda, had arisen as a contender for 
the Mauryan throne, and had disposed of the last of Asoka's line in 187. 
Being a Brahmin it is very likely that he was antagonistic to the Buddhist 
colour of north India, which was strong enough to interest Menander, if not 
to compel his own conversion. 
We must now turn temporarily to consider the impact of Eucratides 
on this scene. Justin54 seems to imply that Eucratides seized the throne 
of Bactria at about the time of the accession to the Parthian throne of 
Mithridates I in 171. It is not necessary to make them simultaneous; 
and Eucratides' possible Seleucid connections, which might point to a 
slightly later date than 171 for the start of his unfortunate irruption 
onto the Bactrian scene, have a genuine basis. One of Eucratides' coins 
has on the obverse a male and a female head and the legend Hf\lOK.t\E.OY£' 
There is general agreement that this coinage is commemorative 
in character: the question arises as to whom it is commemorating. It 
seems certain that Heliocles and Laodice were Eucratides' father and 
mother, as Eucratides' son will have been named after his grandfather. 
Laodice wears a diadem on this coinage and must, therefore, have been 
a princess - of whom? It would give Eucratides a claim to royalty on his 
mother's side: the head and reel ornamentation would suggest a Seleucid 
connection; as we have observed in the distinctively Seleucid context in 
Chapter V, when added to the appearance of Laodice, a traditionally 
Seleucid name, the hypothesis seems to have been under-valued in recent 
studies, and to be a likely possibility again. 54a The evidence from 
Ai Khanum
55 
of Greek architecture, already noted, does seem to suggest a 
refoundation or additions coinciding in time with Antiochus IV's cities 
in Europe and Western Asia, and would offer, again hypothetically but 
plausibly, an answer to the problem of where Eucratides founded his 
name-city. Strategically, Ai Khanum is where Eucratides should have 
:~J foun~one. As his son Heliocles was to prove the last ruler of Greek 
Bactria, it is reasonable to assume that Eucratides also was aware of the 
increasing danger from the nomads on the other side of the Oxus, whose 
arrival in strength we have just noted. Its salient position56 as a guard 
to his northern marches, Soghidiana presumably already having been lost, 
would have been too valuable not to have been fortified (or refortified, 
for - as we saw earlier - a possibility is that it had originally been 
Claudius Ptolemy's Alexandria Oxiana). 
Eucratides had to begin his reign by justifying his right to the 
throne he has usurped, on his own account or conceivably Antiochus'. 
After besieging Eucratides, Demetrius was himself later beaten by him;57 
and Demetrius' Bactrian, but not necessarily Indian territories then fell 
into the hands of Eucratides, whose victory is probably commemorated in 
the fine coins showing the Dioscuri charging,58 and Eucratides' helmeted 
portrait showing a resolute face without the whimsy of Antimachus or the 
nobility of Menander. Some of Eucratides' coins are bilingual with a 
blending of Greek and Indian motifs and a Pali inscription in Karoshthi 
characters, a parallel to some of Demetrius' own coinage and as usual 
coined on the Indian and not the attic weight standard. We note a 
similar but possibly derivative intention of removing some of the distance 
between Greek-speaking conquerors and native subjects: it was to mark an 
important departure in attitudes as well as coin-types. There is no 
other way to explain the apparent change in coining policy. The commercial 
usage of Western Asia was Greek in language and so in script, and although 
there would have been a reason for the change to Pali, in the business 
sense of making the rulers and their designations better known in the 
recently conquered Indian territories, this had not happened elsewhere 
in the Greek world; and the introduction of a bi-lingual currency and 
€V~ the adher/nce to an Indian weight standard in cOinage can, therefore, 
validly be seen as at least a concession, a recognition of the native 
territories of this very senior civilisation with which Demetrius' and 
Eucratides' Greeks were now in contact. It would have been unsophisticated 
and unfeeling to deposit a totally Greek coinage on it in those 
. t 59 c1rcums ances. In an otherwise strongly critical assessment of the 
political circumstances of the Greek rule in Bactria, Rawlinson did 
long ago agree that there was a 'blending' of Greek and Indian art forms 
. th b' l' l' 60 1n e 1- 1ngua c01nage. 
Eucratides appears to have captured these Indian territories 
in about 160, but by 156 he was dead. According to Rawlinson there is 
a case for either Apollodotus I or Heliocles I having violently 
succeeded him. 61 But I prefer Tarn's view that Apollodotus I acted in 
the regular Euthydemid way as a sub-king, in this case for Demetrius 1.62 
He may have had a brief period of rule before the accession of Heliocles. I, 
and the question of Eucratides' own death is, therefore, raised at this 
point, because we have the brutal story of his murderer driving his 
chariot through the blood of his stricken foe,63 and ordering that the 
corpse should go unburied. Justin assures us that the murderer was his 
son. On balance this would appear to have been HelioclesI, but there are 
lingering doubts in view of the apparent middle-age of Heliocles' splendid 
portrait - one of the most realistic of the whole series64 - difficult to 
reconcile with his own comparatively short reign and the moderate youth of 
Eucratides' own portraits - all of them. This difficulty would be solved 
if one could extend Heliocles I's reign to 129 BC., and we ·11 Wl presently 
see reasons for proposl·ng that. Plato w 1 b bl as a so pro a y a son of Eucratides I, 
and coinage depicting him with his 'Helios on Quadriga' type on the reverse 
has now come to light in greater quantities than previously. The pieces 
are not bi-lingual - no bi-lingual coinage has been discovered of Plato at 
all - and this would suggest that he was not involved in the Indian schemes 
of Eucratides. It seems to me very likely that he could have been a 
sub-king looking after the home territory in Bactria while Eucratides was 
in the Paropamisadae or Gandhara. He bears the title 'Epiphanes' and 
will have been contemporary with Antiochus IV; it is not necessary to 
revive the old theory65 
- that his coin bearing the Greek letteJCMH 
represents 147 of the Seleucid era = 165 BC. - to see in this a 
possibility of a Seleucid parallel if not an outright connection - a son 
of Eucratides destined to bear the title of the great Seleucid. Narain66 
observes the closeness of the modelling of his head to that of Eucratides I. 
It is not necessary to argue that Plato was himself the killer, and 
'Epiphanes' need not represent his ambition but that of his father. I 
agree, however, that 'Dikaios' is a strange name to apply to a parricide 
of such brutality, if we take Heliocles to be the son in question; but 
it would be justified if the Bactrian population loathed the name of 
Eucratides: and there are two reasons, at least, for thinking that. 
First, Eucratides' irruption, for whatever reason, into Bactrian 
political affairs produced a situation - which was foreseeable - which, in 
setting up a new House to contest the Euthydemids - ultimately brought 
about the internecine strife which weakened Bactria to its death. And 
the further Indian teritories of this brilliant oriental episode in Greek 
life were beset by the same feud. Second, he had arrived, for whatever 
reason, (and there is no need to expect the Bactrians to see the 
possible long-term anti-Parthian possibilities of Eucratides' venture), 
at a time when the Bactrian enterprise was going supremely well. Demetrius 
was lord of all he surveyed and had extended the Bactrian influence, on 
any view, considerably into Northern India. He only died because 
Eucratides killed him. The more likely Eucratides' Bactrian subjects 
were to see in his take-over an unwarranted, and possibly foreign-based 
attack on their ruling house, the more likely they will have been to 
honour the man who disposed of him. This is in itself another, if 
circumstantial argument for the connivance of Antiochus. 67 
It does seem that Parthia stood to gain by whatever ill befell 
Bactria, and a dating of about 155 - 6 for the Parthian-Bactrian War 
after, or at the time of, Eucratides' death is consonant with the 
evidence for Mithridates' Jfstward drive to capture Tapuria and Traxiane, 
which we have from Strabo68 and Justin. 69 After his accession Heliocles 
will have had to consolidate his stricken country with a wary eye to the 
situation in Soghdiana, where the advance guard of the Yueh-Chi would be 
gaining ground in its gradual, semi-circular movement south-westwards 
from Ferghana and the region of Lake Issyk Kul. 70 We know that by about 
100 BC. the site of A! Khanum had been destroyed by fire, and that the 
last phase of rebuilding, presumably under Heliocles or Eucratides, had 
lasted 50 years. 
There is recent support for the view that there was an anti-
Parthian party (and presumably also a pro-Parthian party) at work in 
Bactrian home politics, although I do not agree with the conclusion 
°t °d . thO 71 °th that Heliocles and Plato are to be seen on OppOSl e Sl es In lS, Wl 
Heliocles siding with the anti-Parthian party and labelling himself as 
'Dikaios' because of his disposal of the pro-Parthian Plato. We do not 
have enough evidence for this. But we do know that Mithridates' 
aggressive policy was continued against Bactria after Eucratides' death 
and this may have led to an invasion of the southern kingdom as far as 
EuthYdemia.72 This may have been only a demonstration in force, but it 
could not have come at a worse time, and might suggest collusion at this 
~I 
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stage between the Parthians and the Yueh-chi, or perhaps, although 
unlikely in the circumstances, between the Parthians and the Sacas. In 
the event, the government and people of Bactria, unreplenished with Greek 
or Macedonian settlers owing to the land barrier of the Parthian state, 
found support - again too late - from the Seleucids under Demetrius II, 
who had presumably invoked with his home government the obligations 
resulting from the treaty made between Antiochus III and Euthydemus 
and the consequent ties of marriage between the two royal families: he 
may even, if our contentions about Antiochus IV and Eucratides are 
correct, have adduced that episode also as grounds for action in support 
of this, Eucratides' son and heir. Such a connection would be strengthened 
by our evidence of this action in 142 - 136. In these years Demetrius 
advanced against Parthia on another of the Seleucids' waning attempts to 
deal decisively with Parthia - it is a little difficult to decide whether 
this was a move of Seleucid grand strategy designed to isolate Parthia 
and surround her again with Greek forces, or a first-aid action to draw 
fire off Heliocles, or again, an independent effort loosely geared with 
the action which they realised was happening in the Parthian campaign 
against Heliocles. We do know specifically that Demetrius' army had 
reinforcements from Persia, Elymais and Bactria, and that it routed the 
Parthians in a succession of battles. 73 However, in the end, whether 
their activities were concerted or not, it was not Heliocles who went 
down before the Parthians, but Demetrius - who was eventually defeated, 
captured and paraded as a warning both to Syria and her allies, Bactrian 
or otherwise. 
But at this point it was to be the Parthians who in their turn 
had nomadic misfortune. Mithridates I died in 136 and was succeeded by 
Phraates II, during whose reign Parthia was itself invaded by Sacas, 
I SI' dislodged by the Yueh-chi movements in Soghdiana. The sacas had been 
settled partially south of the Jaxartes, whose swamps elements of them 
had occupied as fish-eaters for a considerable time, the Saka-Rawaka; 
and the Greek presence here had been withdrawn partially by the 
southwards drain of the Indian venture of Demetrius, Apollodotus and 
Menander and partly by a kind of tactical withdrawal to strengthen the 
line of the Oxus. We have seen reasons to regard the refoundation of the 
Greek city at Ai Khanum, if indeed it was refounded under Eucratides, 
as a part of this withdrawal. Be that as it may, the area between the 
Jaxartes and the Oxus was no longer an active Greek military area, and 
Phraates II died possibly trying to put down a plundering expedition by 
Saca mercenaries in the Parthian army.74 His successor Artabanus was 
killed in a campaign against the 'Thogarii,75: Rawlinson did not conte~t 
the identification with the Tochari, who he says were more or less 
ensconced in Soghdiana and so would naturally be "the chief opponents 
of the Parthians". 
The beginning of the nomad invasion of Parthia may be dated to 
130 BC. as Phraates II could not, for this reason, be in Babylonia to 
meet the initial thrust of Antiochus VII Sidetes' invasion of Parthia in 
129. 76 Phraates seems to have fallen in battle with the Sacas in 129 or 
128 and was succeeded by Artabanus II. The invasion of Parthia seems to 
have followed two lines: westward and eastward along the roads Merv -
Hekatompylos - ~cbatana, and Merv - Herat - Seistan. Tarn thought that 
t · th' ., 1 . . d t· 77 the Parthian capture of Merv was the last ac In e lnvaSlon s lqUl a lone 
The Sacas occupied Eastern Tapuria and Traxiane and over-ran Hyrcania. 
Hekatompylos was apparently destroyed at that time78 but the Parthians 
seem to have saved Media. The invaders who went southwards from Astauene 
occupied Herat, Seistan and Arachosia: Mithridates II seems to have 
79 
recovered Seistan and Kandahar • "It looks as if the Parthians cut the 
invaders into two south of Herat and then rolled up one end of their long 
line towards Kandahar and India, and the other end northwards towards Merv 
and the desert they had come from". 80 Tarn is at p2.ins to stress the 
very large numbers of the Saca horde when the westwards movement of the 
Yueh-chi sent them south into Arachosia and westwards to Merv. Two 
Parthian kings Artabanus and Phraates II were killed in the course 
of this period of hostilities, and it seems generous and right to agree 
with Tarn when he says that Mithridates II deserves well of western 
civilisation. 
From this account of nomad pressure (largely Massagetae and 
Dahae elements of the Saca horde), it can be seen that Parthia had 
played a dangerous game in weakening Bactria - and, if the theory about 
the party disagreement between the supporters of Plato and Heliocles has 
any foundation - so had Bactria in weakening Parthia. They hdd more to 
gain from alliance; and the argument for a Bactrian alliance with Parthia 
for mutual anti-nomad defence was in 141 - 135 as strong as it had ever 
been in the time of Diodotus II, who had reversed the original policy of 
Diodotus I to make it pro-Parthian (against the avenging Seleucids), or 
in the time of Antiochus III when independence of Seleucid rule seemed 
again to be justified - although this time in more general Greek terms -
because of the immediate nature of the nomad problem, explained by Teleas 
to Antiochus III as an argument for abandoning the siege of Bactra in 
206. We shall deal with the question of Parthian involvement with the 
Seleucid Empire in the period from Demetrius I in the next chapter. 
Mithridates II had dealt successfully with the nomad threat by 115, 
and was overlord of the Massagetae tribe as far as the lower Oxus and the 
Aral range, which brought his rule up to the boundary of the Aorsi (the 
An t'sai of Chang K'ien); this overlordship over one of the 'many 
nations' which Justin says81 he added to the Parthian empire was lost 
again after his death, though Parthia seems to have remained in 
possession of Merv which she had taken before 115. 
All the Greek territory in Bactria proper - the country north 
of the Hindukush - seems then to have fallen as the result of the final 
impetus given to the Yueh-chi movement by their confrontation with the 
Wu-Sun in the area round Lake Issyk Kul. By the time of Chang K'ien's 
visit in 128 it was allover, and he is able to report coolly on the 
people's fixed abodes and walled cities and the absence of a king 
(Heliocles having presumably died or been killed), their shrewd trading, 
weak and fearful army (presumably weakened by the drain of manpower 
southwards to India since the days of Demetrius), but 'full of rare 
h o ,82 t lngs • Trade with India is specifically mentioned to him by the 
people of Bactria with the implication that it was commonplace. This 
is a significant comment as it denotes a direction of trade and so of 
the focus of attention southwards: a process which will have brought 
Bactria to this unfortunate, vulnerable position in the first place. 
India has proved more of a drain than a reservoir it seems. 
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CHAPTER VII. 
The Seleucid Decline. 
The position of Syria and of the Seleucid kingdom generally 
had been weakened by the rule of Antiochus Epiphanes, whatever his 
intentions may have been concerning the strengthening of the Hellenistic 
cultural framework of his Empire. l The future course of Seleucid history, 
almost exactly a century, was to be marked by continuous dynastic 
conflict, wholly explicable by the situation which Antiochus' own 
usurpation of the Seleucid throne had created. Seleucus IV's line was, 
and remained, the legitimate succession, and both Rome and ~tiochus 
knew this and for their own diverse reasons saw fit to denj it. It 
seems inevitable that on Antiochus' death in Iran in 164, Rome would favour 
any scheme that would complicate the Seleucid succession and would 
prevent any attempt by the legitimate Seleucid line to reassert its own 
. t la soverelgn y. All future Seleucid history is more a tale of the wars of 
the competitors than of Seleucid foreign policy in action: foreign 
policy was in fact at all points hindered by an over-concentration on 
the fomenting or averting of domestic discord. The demonstrable 
interference of Rome has to be balanced against this internal dissension. 
Polybius was in a uniquely good position to observe and to 
record the early stages of this dynastic vendetta. As the friend and 
counsellor of the exiled Demetrius, the elder son of Seleucus IV and 
now a hostage of Rome, he could see Seleucid chances more clearly than 
the Seleucids themselves could. His honorary membership of the Scipionic 
Circle of philhellenes in the Roman administration made him aware of 
Roman political intentions, at least of one group, although it may have 
} b. 
blunted his own political edge. 
Demetrius' position was made critical because of the accession 
crisis on Antiochus' death, and more immediately because of the 
assassination of the Roman legate Gn. Octavius in 163, whose death the C 
agents of the regent Lysias were quick to disclaim. 2 Antiochus IV's young 
son could probably have had a trouble-free accession when he reached his 
majority had not Demetrius not only been the legitimate heir but capable 
also. Demetrius went to put this point to the Senate at the instigation 
of his young friend Apollonius, and predictably the Senate held that 
nothing had happened to change the circumstances,3 whereas, of course, 
it had: Demetrius' presence in Rome was not originally intended to be a 
permanent Seleucid presence there whoever was on the throne at Antioch. 
Really in view of this senatorial intransigence, Demetrius was encouraged 
by Polybius and others to try to effect an escape to Syria and reclaim his 
rightful throne. The time was propitious, and Demetrius had good 
intelligence of the Syrian political situation from his foster-father Diodorus. 
His Egyptian flank seems to have been stabilised by Roman approval of his 
first cousin Ptolemy Philometor, whom Demetrius met outside Rome with some 
show of friendship4: the Senate decided to assign Cyprus to Philometor 
in the face of his brother Eurgetes' counter-claims, and appointed Titus 
Torquatus and ¢naeus Merula to travel with Philometor to Cyprus to ensure C~ 
the transfer of Cyprus, and to reconcile the brothers 'without war,.5 
Demetrius' escape eventually took place, and is related vividly 
by Polybius (XXX, 2, 11 - 15): the Senate held their hand and appointed 
a commission to see what the attitude of the other kings of Asia was to 
this escape: the wise Tiberius Gracchus was included in this because of 
h o ° 5a 1S exper1ence. 
Demetrius' own character seems to have been resolute as well 
as convivial. A fine life-size hellenistic bronze in the Terme Museum 
at Rome is said to be a portrait of him, and if so, demonstrates him as 
6 
a fine, if somewhat arrogant, athlete. This is important because these 
same qualities of arrogance and a certain impetuous athleticism are 
aspects of Seleucid character common to the dynasty, and omit the two 
priceless virtues of wisdom and tact which they were increasingly to 
require. 
Demetrius landed at Tripolis and virtually the whole country 
rose for him. In the process of the initial security measures the troops 
who declared for Demetrius seized both Antiochus' sons,7 Antiochus V Eupator, 
and another one, and the army eliminated them. Although the indigenous 
Syrian population seems glad to have had Demetrius back, in Media things 
were different: there Timarchus seems to have had considerable success 
with the people of Western Iran: Kurdistan and the Zagros; and Artaxias 
of Armenia forsook his Seleucid alliance for Timarchus. Rome also, true 
to her policy of confounding the Seleucids, and encouraged by Timarchus' 
former friendship with Antiochus Epiphanes, granted Timarchus recognition 
but no active support. This was judiciously contrived to worry Demetrius 
without bringing him down. Diodorus Siculus seems to think his power 
greater than it actually became (/t.A.1 TUo, 1''l! 1"'C"/1UI(S ft<e.tl..T7S lll...,~ro), 9 
but Antiochus IV's appointee as Satrap of Babylon was in a good position 
to inflict damage. Demetrius countered Timarchus' invasion threat at 
Zeugma and the defeat and death of Timarchus followed, while Demetrius 
proceeded to Babylon to be hailed as Z~TL.c.. .10 Timarchus' hold on 
. t bl t l' ht lOa Babylon, according to the cunelform a e s, was very s 19 • 
The occurrence of Timarchus' revolt, similar in many ways to 
those of Molon under Antiochus III and Antiochus Hierax under Seleucus II, 
underlines the danger of dynastic or at least home-based discont~t for 
the stability of Seleucid rule in view of the distance of Antioch from 
the Eastern Provinces. In all these three cases not only was the 
Seleucid Ost-politik in danger - in Timarchus' case to the extent of 
his coining as B4\llI\En~ 1'lfr~"oY TWlA'Px.Or 11 - but the whole empire 
became dangerously split with two situations, not one, having to be 
dealt with in detail. And the longer this continued, the more able Rome 
was to use her Mediterranean hegemony to influence Antioch. This is a 
good indication of the wisdom of Antiochus IV's interest in Babylon as 
an adminstrative centre. Timarchus had administered the government at 
Babylon, but badly, (Appian, Syriaca 45 and 47). 
Rome further tied Demetrius Soter's hands in the matter of 
Cappadocia. Ariarathes III was probably the first king of an 
independent Cappadocia, an arrangement which Antiochus II had brought 
into being probably to help with the provision of a joint front against 
the Gauls who threatened Syria. The alliance was confirmed by a 
marriage between Antiochus II's daughter Stratonice and King Ariamnes' 
eldest son, this Ariarathes III - at first linked with his father in 
kingship, but on his death the sole ruler. 12 His son Ariarthes IV 
married a daughter of Antiochus III, but later made a treaty of 
friendship with Rome. The younger of two adopted sons of this marriage, 
later Ariarathes V Eusebes Philopator, grew to become a good philhellene' 
and a respectful son. When he came to inherit the Cappadocian throne in 
16313 he had already established an enviable reputation as a wise ruler, 
and in consequence Greek scholars and philosophers resorted there. 
Politically Ariarathes was wise enough to renew his alliance with Rome,14 
Tiberius Gracchus having asserted that the kingdom was well-governed. 
A proposed partition of Sophene, ruled by the house of Zariadris, was 
rejected out of hand by Ariarathes after overtures by Artaxias of 
A . 15 rmenl.a. Demetrius, on landing in Syria, tried to win over Ariarathes, 
who was his cousin, into an alliance, confirmed by marriage to his 
sister; but short-sightedly Ariarathes rejected this proposal in the 
interests of the Roman alliance, and the Senate, no doubt overjoyed not 
to say bewildered, showered him with approval and the sceptre and sella 
curulis. 16 Steps towards a hellenistic alliance against Rome were once 
more apparently frustrated, although by 157 Attalus was apparently ready 
16a 
to support Ariarathes; and Rome did not object. 
Demetrius then sent an embassy to Rome, along with Leptines 
the assassin of Octavius the Roman legate killed in 163, and a crown 
of 10,000 gold pieces;17 the Senate accepted the crown but not the 
prisoner, and temporised with Demetrius saying 'that he would meet 
kindness from them if his conduct during his reign was satisfactory to 
18 the Senate'. If this kind of language had been backed up by a formal 
move to reduce the Seleucid state to a client kingdom it would not have 
been surprising: Rome had after all been disposing of the affairs of 
the eastern Mediterranean since Magnesia; but this did not happen. 
It was to be in fact almost exactly 100 years before Pompey officially 
annexed the tiny remaining Seleucid kingdom of Philip II. The cause of 
this failure to act was to be found in Rome's own internal power struggles 
and partly in her energetic campaigning in the west against the 
Macedonians, Jugurtha and the Gauls. The coincidence of later Roman 
involvement with the Cimbri and the Teutones and the ensuing civil war 
between Marius and Sulla gave the dying Hellenistic Monarchies of the 
Near East a respite from Roman oversight. Edwyn Bevan observes that 
from the date of the return of Demetrius there is a great waning in 
overt Roman influence19 and no more of Popillius' statecraft, although 
her unseen presence was felt. 
In Judaea, where Demetrius' nearest and most active dissident 
people were strengthening their position after the unfortunate rule of 
Lysias, Demetrius was petitioned by Alcimus (Heb. Jakim) for the High 
Priesthood as a helleniser to confound the schemes of the now-dominant 
Hasmonean house. Demetrius complied with his request, and his general 
Bacchides was detailed to instal him by force. In Alcimus the difficulty 
of dealing with the Jewish situation was at its clearest and hardest 
and most intractible. He was of the line of Aaron: he was, therefore, 
a legitimate contender; or at least he was qualified to contend. The 
Hasmoneans, although they could claim to have a religious mandate in 
that they had won a religious war for the spiritual liberation of their 
countrymen, could not claim that legitimacy. And there continued to be 
within the Jewish body-politic those who would see Jakim's claim to that 
position as more authentic than that of the Maccabees, hellenist or not. 
The Hasidim, as this conservative party were called, reached an understanding 
with Jakim, and the Hasmoneans found themselves politically outflanked while 
th " " t d" 20 e~r enem~es re urne ~n force. Predictably the Hasmoneans, now in 
disfavour, became again a menace, and Jakim had to appeal to Demetrius. 
This time Nicanor was charged with the duty of reducing the Hasmoneans, 
but instead befriended Judas. On being reminded that he was to capture 
Judas, Nicanor tried an open confrontation with the priests of the temple, 
and on being denied Judas by them antagonised them by his imperious conduct. 
Judas meanwhile was ready to mount a regular engagement in the country 
against no proper Seleucid army but only Palestinian levies: the issue 
of the battle was never in doubt, and Nicanor and many of his troops were 
21 
left dead at Adasa (13th March, 161). 
In March 161 Rome had still not officially recognised Demetrius 
as king, and so, in order to add Roman approval to national aspiration, 
Judas sent a delegation of Eupolemus and Jason to Rome to make an alliance. 22 
Rome agreed, partly probably out of a desire to weaken the Seleucid cause, 
but also partly to keep the Eastern Mediterranean in a state of flux. 
Meanwhile Demetrius had taken swift steps to recoup the loss of Nicanor's 
army, and while the embassy from Judas was at Rome, the nationalist army 
, "II d 23 was routed by Bacchides at Eleasa, and Judas was k~ e. 
The remains of the Hasmonean resistance retired into the 
inhospitable low-lying country to the north of the Dead Sea, the Wilderness 
of Tekoah, and there participated in the continual tribal warfare among 
the bedouin. It was no place for a Seleucid army, and Bacchides lost 
contact with them. At that point the Hasmonean cause still had three of 
its original five leaders: Simon, Jonathan and John. The last was killed 
in a skirmish there, but it was fortunate for their efforts that the 
leadership was continuous: this was to have important consequences for 
nationalist resilience. Bacchides then strengthened the frontiers with 
strong points, one of which has been discovered and excavated at Beth Zur. 24 
This operation was a telling indication of the firm intentions of Demetrius' 
government, given a local situation which it could not only comprehend but 
deal with. There were, however, two serious limiting factors. 
Trouble arose again presently over Cappadocia, whose territory 
was contiguous with Seleucid possessions on the Taurus Range. The frontier 
policy of the Seleucids saw this as a natural danger which should be 
neutralised by annexation or agreement. Ariarathes V's elder brother 
Orophernes was to be backed by Demetrius as a contender for the Cappadocian 
throne for a sum of 1000 talents. 25 This backing involved a military 
undertaking, and the Seleucid army crossed the Taurus to support Orophernes 
in his bid for the throne: he was indeed successfully installed in Ariarathes t 
place. Ariarathes predictably complained to Rome, and shortly afterwards 
f 0 h . d t d f d h' ·t· 26 t b envoys rom rop ernes arrlve 0 e en lS POSl lon, 0 ear a crown 
dedicated to Rome and with orders to renew the alliance with Rome. Demetriu~ 
also sent one Miltiades to defend the Syrian action in backing Orophernes. 
Polybius has a very poor opinion of the veracity of Demetrius' envoy, and 
is clearly against the usurpation of Orophernes, which was in fact short-
lived as Ariarathes himself was presently restored to his throne as a joint-
ruler with Orophernes - according to a decree of the Senate. 27 The success 
of Demetrius' policy here does not seem to me to be as complete as Bevan (e.g.) 
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seemed to suggest Demetrius' change of power in Cappadocia was only 
half successful, and was subject to Roman agreement - or Demetrius' envoy 
would not have made his journey to defend the action. If this was the 
summit of his power it was weakly based: if we take the winter of 159 to 
s/s( tpring or ~ummer of 158 as the period taken by the various embassies and 
the settlement of the Cappadocian kingdom, Rome had had five years to deal 
with the problem and could be said to have taken no real action against 
Demetrius, although its psychological effect was no doubt considerable. 
But Demetrius was not just menaced by Rome. The rule of Orophernes was 
not worth the trouble that Demetrius had taken to bring it about: Diodorus29 
and Polybius30 tell a story of mass proscription and of extortion and 
avarice on a large scale. A passage quoted from Polybius by Athenaeus 
says that 'Orophernes reigned for a short time in Cappadocia, and despising 
their traditional customs introduced the refined debauchery of Ionia,3l: this 
was a disastrous result from Demetrius' diplomacy for it had no real cause 
other than Ariarathes' rejection of marriage to Demetrius' sister: 
certainly nothing that would inter alia satisfy the senate that it was 
proper conduct. In Cappadocia predictably there was widespread resentment. 
And Demetrius' own credibility seems to have been damaged by associating 
with Orop~nes: Appian tells us that a Senat~us Consultum was passed 
to the effect that the two kings should rule jointly. And it is too easy to 
see this just as Roman meddling. 3la It reads more like a lame attempt at 
mediation, and gave Pergamum a cause for action against Demetrius which it 
should not have been handed • 
In Pergamum, according to Diodorus,32 Eumenes wished to curb 
Demetrius' schemes, and to reinstate Ariarathes possibly. With this end in 
view he found a rival claimant to dispute the Seleucid throne, a young man 
whom he alleged to be Antiochus Eupator's brother, rescued from Demetrius' 
agents when Eupator was himself killed on Demetrius' accession, and living 
at this juncture at Smyrna in the Pergamene kingdom. There was just enough 
plausibility in the story to allow it credibility: Eumenes had the new 
aspirant brought to Pergamum and crowned him as the legitimate Seleucid 
king. Pergamum was in this at least being consistent, as it was the 
Pergamene troops of Attalus who had supported the equally illegitimate 
accession of Antiochus IV in 175: but it is also true to say that 
Pergamum could apparently never act without some latent fear of S~-ria on 
the one hand and the connivance of Rome on the other. 32a This simultaneously 
explains Pergamumts client-relationship with Rome and her activities against 
Syria of which this latest move to unsettle the Seleucid succession is 
probably the most potentially dangerous from Syria's point of view. It 
is just possible that the new usurper ~ the second son of Antiochus33 : 
but Pergamum's record on this matter does not inspire confidence that he 
was, apart from the fact that the reported reasons for the common people's 
acceptance of the new Alexander Balas were those of a people looking for a 
new freedom - not necessarily an authentic sovereign. The senate at Rome, 
Polybius relates, were 'frankly disgusted' with Heracleides34 , the supporter 
of Alexander's plaims - and, significantly, the brother of Timarchus: 
Polybius himself is patently sceptical of Alexander's claim, but the sober 
members of the Senate were out-voted by the majority 'seduced by the 
charlatanry (rJ./S yO~71'~ ) of Heracleides,35, and the Senate drew up 
a Consultum agreeing that Alexander and Laodice should go home to regain 
their father's throne with Roman help.36 Meanwhile, one Zenophanes a 
Cilician chieftain was involved by Pergamum in the support of Alexander, 
including the enlistment of troops. 
Meanwhile, in Cappadocia, Ariarathes was re-instated in his 
kingdom with the help of Pergamum,37 and Demetrius' position began to look 
very unsure. Demetrius had also encountered a check in his scheme to 
wrest Cyprus from his cousin Ptolemy Philometor by bribing the Egyptian 
garrison commander, who committed suicide when Philometor discovered the 
38 plot : this was in 154, and Demetrius was in danger of being 
discredited as well as simply being unsuccessful in his various 
enterprises. The dissatisfaction among the Syrian people which resulted 
from this is seen best perhaps in the attempt recorded in Diodorus to put 
one of Demetrius' own mercenary troops on the throne. 39 A man called 
Andriscus from Adramyttium, claiming to be the son of Perseus, and 
seemingly similar in build and appearance to the Macedonian king, who 
happened to have the necessary drive and magnetism to rally the populance, 
approached Demetrius with a request to put him (back) on the throne of 
Macedon. Andriscus' followers said that if he could not or would not 
help Andriscus to recover his alleged position in Macedon, Demetrius should 
abdicate. Quick thinking here saved Demetrius, for probably rightly 
guessing that it was his own throne that was in danger, he had Andriscus 
arrested and sent to Rome with a full account of what Andriscus had 
1 · d 40 c a1me ; this was possibly in 152 - 1. 
Having fled to Antioch on the collapse of his cause and the 
t · f h· 41 near-mu 1ny 0 1S men, a mutiny only avoided by the pillaging of 
Cappadocian Zeus' temple on Mount Ariadne, Orophernes now tried to make 
a plot with a mob at Antioch, as Justin says 'ingrato animo,.42 Demetrius 
learned of this scheme, spared Orophernes but ordered that he should be 
kept under guard at Seleucia-in-Pieria. 
There was now nothing political or military to delay Alexander 
Balas' next move: as Justin says)Demetrius' rule had become exceedingly 
unpopular,43 and this had in effect produced not only opposition at home 
but an alliance of powers against him and his schemes abroad: we have seen 
how Ariarathes/ Philometor and Attalus came to oppose him, and they did so 
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now in combination. This would not, as we have seen, have been his father 
SeleucusIV's intention, under whom an anti-Roman alliance was steadily 
building. 
As Will reminds us, Balas was officially recognised by Rome, 
Attalus and Ariarathes V as well as by Ptolemy Philometor - who had not 
simply been opposed to Demetrius. Alexander's first action was to take 
Ptolemais, and his fifth column had ensured that this would involve no 
actual fighting. 44 As was to happen with increasing frequency in the 
next hundred years, a rival court was set up by Alexander at ptolemais and 
the country's loyalty divided by war instead of united by actual external 
pressure. Ptolemy's hatred (Appian's phrase ~/~05 ) of Demetrius and the 
opposition of Ariarathes and Attalus was tested by the first military 
engagement, in which Alexander seems to have been defeated. 45 , in the final 
action, however, Demetrius' left seems to have pursued the enemy too far - a 
Seleucid military failing - and he was then surrounded by the section of the 
enemy which remained steady: he died 'very bravely' and 'invicto animo' on 
the battlefield in 150. 46 
Appian places the principal responsibility for the de-throning 
of Demetrius upon Ptolemy Philometor,47 and one can make a case for this 
latest pointless struggle being another in the long series of Syrian Wars 
whose object was to decide control of Coele Syria and of the timber and 
harbours of the Phoenician coast. But the political balance of power between 
Syria and Egypt was still, certainly to Egypt, more of an issue than the 
inimical attitude of Rome: whereas it is true that Roman influence was 
undergoing an eclipse, it was not a good moment to choose to renew quarrels 
between the two major Hellenistic powers who were capable, possibly in 
combination, of withstanding her. 
The first reason is through hindsight an obvious one: it 
only remained for Rome to find a genuine casus belli in Syria or Egypt -
or some nearby country - for Rome's interest to be quickly rekindled: and 
second, in supporting Balas, Ptolemy was gambling not only upon Balas's 
adequacy as a ruler, for which he can have had in the nature of the case no 
evidence, but also on the acceptability of the new intruder to the Syrian 
people, by this time growing restive from the alternation of would-be 
dynasties. As if to cement by personal ties what he could not guarantee 
politically, Philometor married off his daughter Cleopatra to Alexander 
soon after Balas' accession. This prudence was justified, for Balas was 
a worthless ruler, dominated by luxury and mistresses, and content to 
leave the government to his minister Ammonius who was probably of Egyptian 
t t · 48 ex rac lone A purge was carried out to remove opposition, and Diodorus 
records that the government of Antioch was placed in the hands of Hierax 
and Diodotus. 49 
The position of the nationalist movement in Judaea was, of 
course, able to profit considerably by the contest over the throne of 
Syria, playing one contender off against the other with an apparent 
heedlessness to the eventual effect this might have on the Eastern 
Mediterranean similar to that displayed by the contending Ptolemy and 
Seleucid themselves. In the end the Jews were to suffer more from the 
admission of Rome into the approaching power vacuum than any of the other 
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neighbouring states, although for the present Rome was seriously committed 
against Carthage in the Third Punic War, and so Rome's concern was 
peripheral to the interests of Coele-Syria and Judaea. Added to the 
understandable if imprudent nationalist fervour, we have the personal and 
clan ambitions of the Hasmoneans themselves who saw in each succeeding 
ruler an object for bribery or strife. In 152 Jonathan was able to wrest 
Jerusalem from Demetrius as the price of Jewish support, and then Alexander 
granted him the High-Priesthood; in the celebrations which followed 
Alexander's marriage to Cleopatra, recorded in I Maccabees, the Jewish 
delegation was prominent, and Jonathan was rewarded by being nominated as 
Strategos of Judaea. 51 
Not only in Judaea were secessionist indigenous kingdoms 
showing their power. In about 147 at about the time Mithridates was 
overcoming Media, a native dynast Kamniskires was installed at Susa 
where he had a seven or eight-year reign until expelled in the S~uth-Westwards 
expansion of Parthia. In Persis the dynasty of the Fratadara was, free 
now of the Seleucid control exercised temporarily under Antiochus III, now 
in a position to strengthen their hold on the country from their capital 
I h 5la f b . f d t t Parthia. at stak~r, be ore ecomlng eu a ory 0 
By 147 Alexander Balas' days as ruler of Syria were numbered. 
His coinage demonstrates by its propaganda purpose the tenuous nature of 
his claim to legitimacy. He uses the 'seated Zeus' type of Antiochus V, 
his I brother', and the legendgE.o.7r .L~'jo'Po Lis calculated to evoke a 
connection with Antiochus IV, whom he claimed as his father but which will 
not have endeared him to the Jews. 52 It is an interesting reflection on 
his own and his backers' attitude to Antiochus IV that his own claim to 
could still be taken seriously. Demetrius, the elder 
son of Demetrius I was now about 14 years 01d,53 and ready to assume 
with help his rightful throne; equipping him with mercenaries under 
Lasthenes who were largely Cretan but probably operating from Cilicia54 
where mercenaries could be obtained, his supporters let him appear in 
Syria, probably landing at Seleuciao At this point, Apollonius the governor 
of Coele-Syria declared for Demetrius, and Alexander was cut off in the 
north at Antioch: fighting took place in Coele-Syria between the two 
factions but Apollonius' army was defeated by Jonathan's Jewish army, 
supporting Alexander, near Azotus and destroyed in the temple of Dagon in 
that city by Jonathan's action in setting light to the temple. 55 
Philometor now began to take a hand in the prosecution of the 
war against Demetrius, and advanced together with his fleet up the Phoenicean 
coastline,56 viewing the carnage at Azotus en route: Philometor garrisoned 
the coast towns and so secured Alexander's rear; but at Ptolemais, 
possibly the seat of Alexander's court, Alexander and Ammonius formed a 
conspiracy against him. On discovering that Ammonius was involved, 
Philometor demanded that he be surrendered and punished. Alexander refused 
and the alliance between Ptolemy and Alexander was rescinded. To formalise 
the end of this connection he offered his daughter Cleopatra ;w.d .. wife to 
Demetrius II, and Alexander sent his own child by Cleopatra, Antiochus, to 
be brought up by an Arab chieftain Yamlik. Hierax and Diodotus, the 
governors of Antioch went over to Demetrius , and Alexander fled to 
Cilicia whence he had come. Ammonius was killed by the Antioch mob.
57 
Alexander's purpose in returning to Cilicia was probably to 
raise reinforcements for the continuation of his campaign, now made much 
less likely to succeed by the defection of Philometor. Hierax and 
Diodotus had actually offered Ptolemy the throne of Syria, and, being a 
as ( 
Seleucid on his ~otherfs side, this may have seemed attractive, except 
that Egypt will have been more than enough to handle in view of the almost 
continuous local unrest since the involvement of Egyptians in the phalanx 
at Raphia in 217. As Diodorus says, Ptolemy 'had no appetite for the 
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throne', but he did arrive at an arrangement in which he ruled Coele-Syria, 
and Demetrius ruled the rest of the Seleucid kingdom: the author of 
I Maccabees, possibly for his own partisan reasons, makes Ptolemy attempt 
to dispose of Alexander because 'he coveted his kingdom,59: there seems in 
the foregoing, as well as in Diodorus' words, good pragmatic reasons why 
Philometor should not want Alexander's kingdom: but he was involved in 
its accession question. Demetrius was duly installed as the new Seleucid 
king, and marriage to Cleopatra, who was destined to be a woman of amazing 
versatility, took place. 
The inevitable military conflict occurred60 in the early 
summer of 145 on the River Oenopares between Alexander and his Cilician 
forces and others still loyal to him, and the combined forces of Ptolemy 
and Demetrius. Defeat for Balas followed, and he fled with 500 survivors 
to Abae in Northern Syria (Diod. 'Arabia'). Ptolemy was badly wounded in 
the fighting. Alexander's eventual death five days later took place as a 
result of an arrangement by Demetrius and two of Balas' Greek officers 
Heliades and Casius that the death of Balas was to be obtained in exchange 
for their own freedom. So Balas was beheaded by Zabdiel an Arab Chieftain, 
and the head sent to Ptolemy who died three days later from his own wounds. 
Ptolemy's death was followed by a re-assertion of Seleucid 
sovereignty, and this took the form of annihilating the Egyptian garrisons 
in the Phoenician ports: survivors did reach Antioch, but this action on 
behalf of Demetrius II's new government, really under the supervision of 
his Cretan ally Lasthenes, had alienated the Jews who all along had been 
supporters of Balas because of the way he had dealt with them. Lasthenes, 
for his part, was only in Syria for what he and his troops could exact from 
it, and this became quickly apparent. 
With a shrewd eye to the likely course of events Jonathan 
quickly made overtures to the young Demetrius, and was confirmed in all 
his honours including the high-priesthood and made one of the king's 
IChief Friends t61 : we have the transcript of a letter said to have been 
written by Demetrius to Lasthenes detailing the release of taxes and of 
payments in kind, normally tribute from the Jewish state to the government 
at Antioch,62 all this being the result of Jonathan's bid for Demetrius
' 
support and vice-versa. It was now more than usually necessary for the 
reigning Seleucid to retain what support he could master, especially from 
such near neighbours. The districts of Aphairema, Lydda (modern Lod) and 
Rathamin63 were added to Judaea from Samaria, a territorial putsch which 
was to issue in continuous bad feeling, but was itself only the result of 
local anti-Samaritan expeditions under the earlier Maccabees. 
Demetrius, secure in his Cretan protectors, now dismissed 
his own troops - an action which not only alienated them but added fuel 
to the discontent already growing among the population of Antioch against 
the Cretan presence. Josephus states that money usually given to Syrian 
regulars now went to the Cretan sOldiery64: this provoked open rebellion 
in Antioch, and it is not an elevating chapter in Jewish history which records 
the ferocity of the slaughter which accompanied Jonathan's intervention in 
this civil strife at the bidding of Demetrius. 65 It was only to be 
expected that the barbarity with which this revolt had been put down would 
result in another contender for the throne. 
This person was one Diodotus, also called Tryphon, who took 
advantage of the growing disenchantment of the public and revolted from 
Demetrius, supported by large numbers of troops including possibly the 
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garrison of Larissa, colonists from Larissa in Thessaly. Tryphon then 
went to the Arab chief whom Diodorus calls Iamblichus,67 and with whom 
Alexander Balas had left his son Antiochus, and took the child back to 
Syria with him proclaiming him as Antiochus VI Epiphanes: Tryphon assembled 
his army at Chalcis on the Arabian border and prepared for hostilities. 
Attempts to stamp out this revolt by a regular military confrontation failed 
with the defeat of Demetrius' general. Moving northwards to the large 
Seleucid military base at Apamea on the Orontes, Tryphon was able to 
arrive at Antioch well-armed, where he was predictably welcomed by the 
citizens. The court of Demetrius moved to Seleucia-in-Pieria, and this 
became a base for Demetrius extending his territory southwards, while 
Tryphon and his proteg~ seem to have controlled Cilicia and most of the 
rest of the Seleucid realm, except Mesopotamia and Babylonia: Jewish 
support of Alexander Balas was continued for his son. Again here we should 
note the increasing military complications in the extreme West of the 
Seleucid Empire. 
In 143 - 2 Tryphon connived at the elimination of the young 
Antiochus68 and put himself forward for acclamation by the army as the new 
king, in this way setting aside all pretensions of legality which Alexander 
Balas had tried so hard to simulate. The process of acclamation was 
ancient Macedonian army practice but appealed to the source of military 
power rather than to the accepted method of dynastic succession; it can 
be seen as a shrewd move by Tryphon to win support. He coined using the 
title )A\JTOK..eJ.rN~ 69 which, as Bevan points out, was not a Macedonian 
title, and was only used by the Parthians after 77 BC. Its use by Tryphon 
may have been as a justification for his assuming the throne, or perhaps a 
re-statement of Seleucid authority viz-a-viz Parthia, now dangerously 
active. Tryphon's next move was to inform and placate the senate at Rome, 
which he did by dispatching envoys with a statue of victory to the value 
of 10,000 gold staters, not so much a gift as a bribe. It is to the senate's 
credit that it treated this with the contempt it deserved, kept the statue, 
(and its value), but inscribed it with the name of Antiochus VI, the young 
. t d 70 boy king Tryphon had assaSSlna e • 
The Hasmonean Jewish state was able to use the Seleucid 
predicament again to wrest almost complete control of the country, including 
permission for new fortifications, from Demetrius whose cause needed their 
support. The Jews proclaimed a new era, and the next year, with Simon as 
Ethnarch, the Seleucid garrison in the ~KG~ at Jerusalem surrendered. 71 
I Maccabees relates the joy with which the Jewish state welcomed the 
eventual success of its long struggle for independence from Seleucid rule. 
Meanwhile Demetrius, presumably hoping to replenish his forces 
and re-assert his authority in one move, set out for the East with the 
intention of recovering some of the ground lost to Parthia. Josephus 
stresses that ambassadors arrived at his court requesting that he should 
help the eastern Greeks against the schemes and power of Mithridates I who 
was pursuing an actively aggressive foreign policy towards the Greek states 
in Iran, both east and west in Bactria and Elymais. 72 In 138, despite 
the formidable force and successful progress of his troops, he was 
defeated, captured and taken to Hyrcania where Mithridates' daughter 
Rhodogune was given to him in marriage. The proximal cause of the expedition, 
if we discount the author of I Maccabees' short-range explanation, was 
Mithridates' threat to Mesopotamia - itself only made possible by the 
success of the Parthian arms on the eastern front: Babylonia had certainly 
still been Seleucid in 144,73 but at that time Parthian attention was fully 
occupied not only with an anti-Bactrian policy but with rising and more 
dangerous nomad activity which was later to recur, as we have already seen 
in the previous chapter. That Demetrius' army did in fact contain a 
Bactrian contingent is not in doubt,74 and it does raise the question as 
to what motives prompted its presence when, in 141 in Heliocles' Bactria, 
the danger of a serious nomad invasion must have been imminent. Perhaps 
at that time Parthia seemed, to Bactria, and had seemed for some time, the 
more menacing and marginally the~more dangerous enemy: in July 141 we 
have cuneiform evidence of Mithridates' (temporary) occupation of 
S 1 ° TO ° 74a e eUCla-on- 19r1s. It does seem that some co-ordination took place: 
a conceivable possibility is that by 141 northern Bactria, or possibly 
Sogdiana had already fallen, and that this contingent were not volunteers 
but refugees. This is, however, unlikely in view of the distance involved: 
their presence seems to have been arranged, and is important chronologically 
as well as politically for that reason. 
Meanwhile, in Syria the civil war ground on. An attempt by 
Demetrius' troops to take Ptolemais was defeated, but Tryphon's support was 
declining owing to his increasingly forceful and imprudent attitude to the 
Syrian people. His army mutinied and joined Cleopatra, Demetrius' wife, at 
Seleucia-in-Pieria; and Demetrius' brother Antiochus, from Side in 
Pamphyllia, then married Cleopatra at her invitation as her third husband 
and assumed the Seleucid throne as Antiochus VII. 75 
The Seleucid cause now had a genuine protagonist as its new 
leader, and the loyalty which the Seleucids seemed on many occasions to 
callout in their subjects re-asserted itself. Sidetes drove Tryphon out 
of upper Syria and into the fortress of Dor (Dora) in Phoenicia; eventually, 
driven out of Dor and Ptolemais, Tryphon went via Orthosia to the main 
Seleucid garrison town of north Syria Apamea where his reign had begun. 
N th h d f t d d t d d 11 d t Ot ° °d 76 ear ere e was e ea e an cap ure an a owe 0 comml SU1Cl e. 
Antiochus was faced with the difficult task of reducing his 
shrunken kingdom to order and this involved arriving at some accommodation 
with Simon Maccabeus who as High Priest, and the last of Judas' brothers to 
reign, was a powerful antagonist, although too old now to be himself a 
field commander. Antiochus proceeded against the Jews because of 
complaints of extortion and armed intrusion over their own borders by 
Jewish forces, and rejected attempts by Simon and his representatives to 
justify continued Jewish occupation of Joppa and Gazara which Simon 
claimed were an integral part of the Jewish state. When Athenobius, 
Antiochus' ambassador, reported a Jewish refusal to evacuate these cities, 
Antiochus declared war and sent his general Cendebaeus against the Jewish 
army via Jamnia. 77 Cendebaeus was defeated by Judas and John, Simon's sons, 
and Simon died shortly after, February 135. 
Antiochus himself took charge of operations against the 
Hasmonean state in 134, and the Jewish forces fell back on Jerusalem which 
was then besieged. John Hyrcanus had been occupied in avenging the death 
of his father Simon at the hands of his son-in-law Ptolemy, and for this 
reason had been involved in the siege of the fortress of Dagon near 
J 'h 78 erlC o. He had now to set about defending Jerusalem against a most 
determined and well-organised investment on the part of Antiochus VII. 
Antiochus' behaviour during the Jewish feast of Tabernacles, in which he 
had not only acceded to Hyrcanus' request for a seven-day truce but also 
had contributed a sacrifice of bulls and spices, convinced his Jewish 
antagonists that he was of a different nature from Antiochus Epiphanes. 79 
This in turn led to negotiations between Hyrcanus and Antiochus who had 
the wisdom to realise that the only political solution to the Jewish 
question, having once shown reasonable strength, lay in agreement and not 
in perpetrating another running campaign. The negotiations resulted in the 
garrisoning of the Jerusalem citadel, which Antiochus commuted to a money 
payment, and the exaction of tribute from Joppa and other border towns. 
Antiochus was also given a sum of money from the Tomb of David, possibly 
as an added incentive to raise the siege - the tomb of David was in an 
easily-defensible position anyway - and possibly to make a point of 
Hyrcanus' desire to be the ally of a strong Seleucid king. Whether or 
not that was the case, ~~~~.~ was to prove his alliance in 130 Be. by 
accompanying Antiochus on the ill-fated and the last of the grand 
Seleucid expeditions to 'reclaim the Orient'. 
In the meantime Demetrius II had been kept as a royal 
captive in Hyrcania, possibly in Hecatompylos, for a long time the 
Parthian capital, and while there had cultivated a Parthian beard which 
h ' t d' 1 80 1S coins la er lSP aye Mithridates I died soon after his capture of 
Demetrius in 138, to be succeeded by Phraates II, the heir to an 
immeasurably stronger Parthia than his father had inherited. Mithridates 
had given Rhodogune his daughter in marriage to Demetrius by whom the 
exiled Seleucid presently had children to complicate the Seleucid succession 
question to a further generation. An attempt was made by Demetrius, aided 
by a friend Calimander, to escape from his captivity but he was caught and 
returned: when this had happened a second time, Phraates became derisory 
in his attitude and gave Demetrius some golden dice, perhaps to while away 
h " t" 81 1S 1me : it,is interesting in the relations between the Parthians and 
Seleucids at this time that the Parthian attitude seems almost indulgent 
rather than genuinely respectful. Later Parthian actions show them quite 
capable of executing a foe they actually feared. 
At this point Antiochus VII entered the arena with an army 
of colossal size for Seleucid resources, put at 300,000 but probably much 
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smaller. Even so, 80,000 would have been a formidable force, and in 
this respect of size one can see by hindsight the roots of possible trouble 
for Antiochus. His object was to restore Greek rule in Mesopotamia and 
Media perhaps over the line of the Zagros into nearer Iran. He was 
successful in three battles and Justin says that many of the local rulers 
83 joined his cause. One of these actions, in which the Jewish contingent 
d J h H " 1 d 84 t k 1 "t th P th" un er 0 n yrcanus was 1nvo ve, 00 pace aga1ns e ar 1an 
general Indates on the Lycus river. The Parthian army seems then to have 
evacuated Babylonia and Antiochus advanced to recover Media: the Parthian 
S 1 " T"· 85 general Ennius was roughly treated by the Greek population of e eUC1a-on- 19r1s, 
and the revolt from Parthian rule became general. Winter came, 130, and 
the troops of this huge army with their unwieldy crowd of camp-followers 
went to winter quarters, billeted among the local Iranian population. We 
can only re-construct what went wrong from suspicions and the final result. 
Phraates' agents seem to have been zealously at work during the winter 
months stirring up discontent against the Seleucid troops who must have 
been a considerable trial to the local population, however much they may 
at first have been ostensible liberators from the Parthian yoke. 85a 
When spring came in 129 negotiations did take place between 
Phraates and Antiochus in which Antiochus agreed to peace on condition 
that Demetrius was returned; tribute would be paid and the Parthians would 
retire beyond the Seleucid border which was at this point taken to run to 
the west of Parthia and Astauene "his (Phraates ) ancestral domain".86 
Arsaces re'jected these terms, which were quite unrealistic and would have 
wiped out 100 years of Parthian intrusion (and their Philhellenic culture 
as well) at a stroke. They were also geographically unrealistic as there 
is no real geographical separation between the Elburz and the Zagros, when, 
from what was the original province of 'Parthia', further Parthian incursions 
westwards became a matter of seepage as first Hekatompylos and then Rhagae 
and finally Ecbatana became their capital. The Zagros range would have 
been feasible as a boundary, but Seleucid temperament from all we know of 
it would not have been likely to settle for such a modest outcome of this 
large expedition. In the meantime, with an astute insight into the 
realities of Seleucid home politics Phraates released Demetrius secretly 
to return to Syria and sow sedition there. In the long view that was the 
th ° 87 most damaging result of e campalgn. 
The Seleucid general Athenaeus had made the difficult 
circumstances of winter-billeting of troops worse for the native population 
by mistreating the villages,88 and theanger thus aroused enabled a general 
rising in the spring of 129 against Antiochus' army: Antiochus himself 
seems to have escaped the general slaughter and to have been caught with a 
section of his army in a valley where an unequal struggle ensued. He was 
killed in the battle that followed,89 unable because of the terrain to use 
his cavalry. As for Athenaeus, he predictably deserted in face of the 
enemy, but found that because of his extortion and misconduct he had 
alienated the villages from whom he now wished_food and shelter. 
0d 90 
died, as many others may have done, a straggler by the waysl e. 
So he 
In 
Antioch public mourning was proclaimed for the death of Antiochus, but 
everywhere in the cities families mourned the loss of relatives who were 
lost, wounded or missing in action, or who had become prisoners of the 
Parthians. 91 Retribution followed for the ill-treatment of Ennius by the 
people of Seleucia, and a deputation from the Greek city was faced with the 
sight of Pitthides, one of their fellow countrymen sitting on the ground 
with his eyes gouged out - a warning according to Phraates of the fate 
awaiting them all. 92 And Phra~tes duly handed over the city to his general 
Euhemerus, or as Justin calls him Himerus, to receive punishment. 93 This 
man seems to have been left in charge of Babylonia while Phraates hurried 
to the East to meet the advancing Sakas. He may have already seen action 
against them prior to Antiochus' own expedition. The captives of 
Antiochus' army were pressed into service against the Sakas in the 
desperate campaign on the eastern marches of the Parthian state as a serious 
situation developed. 94 In the event Phraates was killed in this campaign 
and so was Artabanus, his father-in-law who succeeded him; but the nomad 
tide, in country most favourable to it, was stemmed, and Parthian 
" "1" t" b th d "95 ClVl lsa lon rea e agaln. 
The Yueh-chi invasion of Bactria from the north-east had 
reduced Bactria's ability to offer any eastern support to Phraates' and 
Artabanus' campaigns against the nomads; and the virtual coincidence of 
dates raises again the question of who invaded Bactria. The evidence is 
fairly clear that these two thrusts - against Iran and Parthia by the 
Sakas, and against Bactria by the Yueh-chi came from different places and 
were aimed in different directions. But there is no reason to suppose that 
they were not both part of a general nomad pressure of which these two 
attacks were simply the driving points, owing their advance perhaps to 
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Diodorus XXXIV, 19. 
It is E. Will who observes the Seleucid problem acutely when he 
doubts whether Sidetes understood the irreversible change in 
Iran (Op. Cit., p. 347). 
Diodorus XXXIV, 15. 
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against Antiochus (in view of the scale of Antiochus' success 
militarily). (Op. Cit., p. 347 - 8). 
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CHAPTER VIII. 
The End of the Seleucids. 
The end of Antiochus Sidetes t eastern campaign was an 
appropriate place to break in an account of the problems of the later 
Seleucids because it marks the end of their last recovery. Demet· II rlUS , 
1 
now about 32, bearded in the Parthian style, and married to Rhodogune, 
a Parthian princess, was despatched by Phraates late in 129 to reclaim 
his throne and the remains of his empire. Demetrius' release had been 
premature, as the spring rising destroyed the Seleucid intentions 
without the need for this fifth column activity of Demetrius and 
Phraates. Justin2 tells us that horsemen were sent in pursuit of 
Demetrius to prevent his now unnecessary pro-Parthian action, but 
Demetrius was going to reclaim his kingdom and he could not be caught. 
An immediate Parthian invasion of Syrian territory was contemplated, 
but had to be abandoned because of a rebellion among Phraates' Saka 
mercenaries, Antiochus Sidetes' soldiers, pressed into service in 
this situation, having defected,3 on one view possibly to rejoin Greek 
elements in the Bactrian and East Iranian territories. 
Demetrius' position was bound to be weak: personally 
he was compromised in Cleopatra Thea's eyes by his marriage to Rhodogune 
who had borne him children. The resulting mistrust led to her two sons 
being sent away to be educated: Antiochus, the son of Demetrius to 
Cyzicus and Sidetes' son Antiochus, later to be called 'Grypus', 
('the hook-nosed') with reason, to Athens. 4 Of her other children, 
her daughter by Demetrius, and Seleucus, her son by Sidetes, were both 
captured by the Parthians after being unwisely taken east with their 
campaigning fathers. 
Demetrius' critical step to reasserting his authority was 
his occupation of Antioch; from there he was able to extend his power 
to Commagene, parts of Cilicia and Syria proper. At this point 
Hyspaosines of Charax,5 on the lowest reaches of the Tigris, extended 
his breakaway kingdom of Characene (Mesene) northwards to include 
Babylon and Seleucia-on-Tigris, an annexation of a city which should 
have been the mainstay of Seleucid power in the area. In the event 
his accession of power here was to prove ephemeral. Once an ally of 
Antiochus Sidetes, he had been able to benefit from local revulsion at 
the excesses of Himerus the Parthian viceroy, who was himself presently 
to be dispossessed by a satrap of Mithridates II who succeeded 
Artabanus as king of Parthia in 124/3. Mithridates, whose splendid 
6 portrait we have on many tetradrachms, reasserted his power over 
Hyspaosines' kingdom in 122/1 and also later over Armenia which had 
slipped from Seleucid control after Antiochus IV's reign. 6a In Armenia 
Artavastes was deposed as king and his son Tigranes taken prisoner. 
By 113 the Parthian army had overrun Mesopotamia and had entered Dura 
Europos:7 Mithridates II had succeeded by roughly 100 in imposing 
Parthian authority in Western Asia as far as the Euphrates. 
In the further East, Mithridates had asserted his 
stabilising control, as we have seen, on the nomad situation; and the 
Annals of the Former Han credit him with control over the area round 
Merv and the Massagetae region. 8 Eventually the Han emperor Wu-ti 
was to send an embassy to the Parthian court which was later reciprocated, 
and a trade route for silk commerce opened. With Bactria now in nomad 
hands, at least the political situation between the Parthians and their 
Eastern neighbours had become less complicated. And, with the passage 
of the Saka down the Eastern borders of Parthian domains into Sacastane, 
the northern nomad threat was removed because the Saca themselves were 
to be occupied with securing their own eastern border with the Greek 
domains of the later Greek rulers of the Punjab and the Kabul valley 
who were to prove secure and competent enough to keep the Saca at bay 
for the next hundred years or so.9 It remains true that in the years 
following his accession Mithridates II will have had to watch his 
eastern frontier with much more care than was required on the western 
front. Had the Seleucids composed their differences even at this late 
date things might have been different, and the Parthian army might not 
have been able to win control of the Mesopotamian region. Mithridates' 
coinage is significantly ubiquitous demonstrating the commercial vigour 
of his kingdom, and it includes for the first time the title 'EnJPA.NOY1... 
which is now added to the accurate description of him as 3ALIJ\E.Ql. 
M£.r~ A,oy .10 Cuneiform inscriptions report that Mi thridates assumed 
the title 'king of kings' in about 109 BC. and this appears on coins 
(Selwoodts type 27).11 
Parthian territory now extended from Mesopotamia to the 
Oxus and a future clash with Rome could not long be delayed. From 
being a major asiatic power the Seleucid kingdom was now reduced to 
the status of a bUffer-zone between Rome and Parthia, and with the 
installation of his protege Tigranes as king of Armenia, Mithridates II 
was to occupy a position in which he could intervene in the affairs of 
Syria more directly, and even in those of Asia Minor. Before long 
Armenia would pursue her own policy of expansion at the expense of 
the Seleucids. 
The progress of work on Parthian Iraq and Iran, some of 
whose findings are dealt with in the a-d.tt~du", to this chapter, continues 
to provide evidence of the quality of the culture with which Antiochus 
Grypus and his various successors were faced when he came to the throne 
of Syria as Antiochus VIII in 121. Apart from Dura, which was in many 
ways peculiar because of its trading position, slavery was not a 
Parthian custom: the whole domestic culture had been mobile for two 
hundred years of Parthian geopolitical advance, and while slavery may 
have gone on to develop at this conclusion of Parthian migration, Greek 
slavery was a function of the state economy, particularly in mining. 
It is predictable that we observe philhellene style in plastic art, 
and philhellene coin-inscriptions, changing or disappearing as the 
Seleucid state which had evoked them itself disappears from history. 
If we were to need a justification in a political background for a 
change in artistic and philosophical attitudes there could be few 
better examples. 
Palestine - the extended Jewish kingdom - had resumed its 
formal secession from Seleucid power, interrupted by the strong 
arrangements of Antiochus Sidetes. 12 John Hyrcanus, who succeeded 
Simon Maccabaeus as Ethnarch and High Priest in 134, had accompanied 
this Antiochus on his ill-fated Parthian expedition, but on his own 
safe return from the debacle had taken the opportunity provided by 
Seleucid confusion to strengthen his rule both north and south: north 
by capturing Samaria, south by the annexation of Idumaea and the 
forcible circumcision of its inhabitants: Josephus tellsl3 us that 
this action was acceded to by the Roman Senate. From this point 
onwards the Jewish kingdom becomes a separate entity, involved, as 
occasion arose, in the disputes of the Seleucid state, but never its 
vassal again. 
Demetrius II was drawn into the politics of ptolemaic 
Egypt as the result of action against his mother-in-law Cleopatra, the 
former wife of Philometor and now married to Ptolemy VII Physcon. 
Lured on by Cleopatra's promise that she would make him king of Egypt14 -
an old Seleucid dream - Demetrius went south with an army to invade 
Egypt, an act of incredible folly in view of the likelihood of 
usurpation at Antioch when his back was turned. The invasion failed, 
the Syrian army mutinied and the usurpation took place: Antioch and 
Apamea revolted,15 and one Alexander Zabinas ('the bought one') was 
placed on the throne of Syria by Egyptian troops as an adopted son of 
Antiochus Sidetes. 16 Whether he was or not is unclear. It has been 
noted that Ptolemy PhY7'on (Euerg,etes II) employed the same policies Ci 
against Demetrius II as Philometor had against Demetrius 1.17 
We have no detailed information about this contest, but 
know that Demetrius coined at Ptolemais, which was presumably his base. 
Fighting continued until 126 - 5 when he was defeated at Damascus, 
and finding himself shut out of Ptolemais, was subsequently poisoned 
18 
at Tyre on the orders of Cleopatra Thea, the daughter of the 
Cleopatra who had lured him into the struggle. His son Seleucus (by 
Thea) assumed the throne as the legitimate successor, but was promptly 
killed by Thea (Appian, Syriaca 69), 19 who assumed the position 
herself as the opponent of Alexander Zabinas who was still at large in 
the north of Syria. Coins of her reign are extant, first alone,20 and 
then in association with Antiochus (Grypus), then aged about seventeen. 21 
In the meantime Ptolemy Phy~nts wife Cleopatra was persuaded to come c~ 
back to Egypt, and as Physcon abandoned his championship of Zabinas 
he now backed Antiochus VIII as the new king of Syria, sealing the 
arrangement by marrying off his daughter, another Cleopatra (Tryphaena) 
to Grypus~ In time the continuing alliance between Cleopatra Thea and 
Grypus became very strained at Ptolemais, and seems to have ended in 
th ." 22 120 or thereabouts with her dea by pOlsonlng. In the meantime 
Alexander Zabinas had been defeated and disposed of by Grypus at some 
time in 123,23 after having attempted to escape first to Seleucia in 
Pieria where the inhabitants barred his way into the city, and then to 
E b " 24 h Poseideium along the coast where, according to use lUS, e was 
captured by pirates who delivered him to Grypus. The Diodorus 
passage points out that he had had an army of 40,000 men when at the 
height of his power. Without Physcon's backing there was no real 
25 
chance that Zabinas would make any further headway. 
Alexander had been well-disposed towards John Hyrcanus 
who was then the autonomous high priest of the Jewish kingdom, and 
Grypus seems to have meditated and abandoned a possible invasion of 
Judaea at this juncture. 26 It would have been an extraordinarily 
foolish move to have left his newly-won power, as his brother seems 
to have been making preparations for war. How long these preparations 
were in progress we do not know. In the period between poisoning his 
mother and taking up arms against his brother Grypus may well have had 
a peaceful and uneventful reign! Justin says this eight-year period 
was one of quiet and the securing of Grypus' kingdom, presumably also 
economically. In the meanwhile Mithridates II of Parthia had set the 
Saca invasion well behind him and could concentrate his forces again 
in the west untroubled as yet by the civil strife in his own kingdom 
which was presently to occupy him. The Rock relief from Bisutun in 
Iran, dated from 123 to 110 BC. shows Mithridates facing four of his 
vassals: Gotarzes, Mithrates, Kopasates and one other, ,and in 122 or 
~7 
121 Mithridates forced Hyspaosines to evacuate Charax. 
It is probable that the final stage of the Seleucids t 
struggle with each other started in 114 with an attempt by Grypus to 
~i 
forestall trouble by attempting to poison his half-brother, Cyzicenus. 
It was an ancient and frequently successful way of eliminating the 
potential usurper, but in this instance may have been the final blow 
to a reconciliation between the rival houses of the Seleucid line: 
apart from this long-term result which Grypus may not have foreseen, 
his action was also the immediate cause of this next round of 
hostilities. Egypt was now linked inseparably with the quarrels of 
the Seleucid house, seeing that Ptolemy Physcon had now involved 
himself in the cause of the legitimist line against Alexander Zabinaso 
However, when Physcon died in 117, his widow, conventionally known as 
Cleopatra III, attempted to seize power, but legalised her position by 
sharing the throne with Ptolemy Soter II (Ptolemy VIII): this led to 
factional strife between the party supporting Ptolemy and those ~ 
who sided with his mother. The situation was exacerbated by Ptolemy 
Alexander, the governor of Cyprus, Ptolemy VIII's brother, who took the 
side of their mother, who seems to have continued her championship of 
Grypus which Physcon had begun. 29 
Cleopatra III now tried to break up the marriage 
Ptolemy Soter had contracted with his sister Cleopatra because of a 
suspected disaffection towards herself; and in fact she forced Ptolemy 
to marry his other sister Selene instead, whereupon his erstwhile wife 
fled to Syria where she offered herself as wife to Antiochus Cyzicenus, 
no doubt equally despising her husband and her mother. Along with her 
30 she seems to have brought Ptolemy Alexander's army from Cyprus as her 
own way of settling the issue with both Syria and Egypt. It is clear 
that with this access of strength Cyzicenus was in a very strong 
position, and seems to have won most of Syria including Antioch31 - to 
which Grypus then laid siege accompanied by his wife Tryphaena, 
Cleopatra's sister. 32 On the fall of Antioch, Tryphaena, more one 
suspects out of family bitterness than loyalty to Grypus, ordered 
Cleopatra's brutal execution at the precinct of Daphne.33 ptolemaic 
Egypt was now in serious danger of neglecting the tense social state 
of native Egyptians in an over-concentration in Seleucid affairs: 
Ptolemy II's careful commercial organisation of Egypt was now in 
d · 34 lsarray. 
The fall of Antioch is dated to 112 and seems to mark a 
temporary eclipse of the otherwise considerable success of Cyzicenus 
who seems to have held most of the south of Syria. Grypus, who was 
stronger in the north, now went to Aspendus in what had been Pergamene 
territory up to the time of the Attalid transfer of power to Rome in 
~~~ 
133. Seleucia-in-Pieria seems to have remained loyal to him through 
35 
this period, which occupied the time to July or thereabouts, Ill. 
During this period the Hasmonean King John Hyrcanus had 
carried the aggressive foreign policy of his house to the coastal 
plain of Palestine, where he had captured all the ports and cities, 
previously valued so highly as bases for naval operations, to Ptolemais 
which he was at present besieging, and which, because of their own war, 
neither Cyzicenus nor Grypus was in a position to help.36 Samaria seems 
to have called on Grypus to help her against Hyrcanus before the 
accession of Aristobulus whose reign was to be only a year long. 
Josephus relates the dispatch of six thousand Egyptian soldiers from 
Ptolemy Lathyrus to help Cyzicenus37 much to the disgust of Cleopatra III. 
It is sad to relate that the army of Cyzicenus could be described by 
Josephus as ravaging Hyrcanus' territory 'like a brigand',38 but it 
seems a true measure of the aimlessness of the fighting in Coele-Syria 
in years of ever-growing strength for the Jewish state that the activities 
of Cyzicenus could be described in this way. In the meantime Tyre 
(126 - 5) and Sidon (Ill) had already become 'free cities': Seleucia-in-
Pieria was granted independence out of gratitude by Grypus in 109 _ 8. 39 
Gradually the Seleucid kingdom was being strangled by independent or 
Jewish or Parthian or ex-Pergamene cities in a ring, north, south, east 
and west around its borders - a process which had been gradually 
increasing throughout the second century. It has been observed that 
at one point towards the end of the second century there was a ptolemy 
and a Seleucid engaged in each side of the double civil war in Syria. 40 
In November 108 Samaria was taken by the Jews,4l Cyzicenus' 
help against Hyrcanus having been of no avail, and the city was destroyed. 
Scythopolis (Beit She'an) was betrayed to Hyrcanus' army by one of 
Cyzicenus' generals: what we now know of Beit Shetan is largely Roman 
as far as classical remains are concerned, but its strategic position, 
facing the increasingly pro-Parthian wastes on the east bank of the 
Jordan,4la will have made it an important prize for the Hasmonean kingdom. 
Hyrcanus died in 104, to be succeeded in an ephemeral rule by his elder 
son Aristobulus, who was not only the first Hasmonean to call himself 
'king', but also took the title 'Philhellene'. It is another Seleucid 
paradox that such a reversal of the original Maccabean attitude to 
Hellenism comes so late in the Seleucid era, possibly to be explained 
on the grounds that the Jewish Kingdom had nothing now to fear from the 
Seleucids. 
Josephus speaks of the co-operation between Cleopatra and 
her generals Hilkiah and Hananiah, whose father Onias had built a temple 
for the Jewish community at Heliopolis: in the event this alliance 
seems to have lost her the support of many of her subjects who went to 
join the army of Ptolemy 1athyrus in Cyprus, only the Jews in the Oniad 
district of Egypt remaining 10yal.42 The alliance of Lathyrus and 
Cyzicenus had sustained reverses in the newly-formed pact between 
Cleopatra III and Ptolemy's brother Alexander, Ptolemy IX. 1athyrus 
does seem to have been able to consolidate his position in Cyprus, for, 
after the accession of Alexander Jannaeus to the Hasmonean kingdom on 
the death of Aristobulus in 103, he was asked to give protection to the 
city of Ptolemais, whose eponymous connection with Egypt may have 
prompted the citizens who feared the attacks of Jannaeus on the coastal 
towns: it was hoped by those who invited him that their cause would be 
joined by people from Gaza, Strato's Tower and Sidon.43 1athyrus duly 
landed at Scamina, a port south of Mount Carmel, and camped at ptolemais 
with an army of 30,000. Alexander Jannaeus thereupon tried to make an 
alliance with him to dispose of Zoilus, and a clandestine agreement with 
Cleopatra: this attempted change of loyalties stung Lathyrus into 
conducting a raid on Galilee, recently forcibly annexed by Aristobulus 
to the Hasmonean kingdom,44 during his one-year reign. 
The main threat which this new alignment of Ptolemy Lathyrus 
and Antiochus Cyzicenus posed for Cleopatra was an attack on Egypt itself. 
We should not be persuaded by the factional fighting in these campaigns 
into under-estimating the strength of the forces involved, an easy 
..... 
mistake if one despises the period. Cleopatra now persuaded Grypus to 
marry her daughter Selene, presumably as the price of her support in 
terms of troops: financially, and in terms of economy generally, Egypt 
was still far stronger than Syria. Ptolemy Alexander's agreement with 
Cleopatra, we may presume, was as much in her interests as his, in view 
of the possibility of an invasion of Egypt. Grypus seems to have held 
Damascus from 104/3 to 102/1, and in the interval until Grypus was 
himself murdered by Hercleon, his minister for war in 96, desultory 
fighting continued and Cyzicenus seems to have held Tarsus and Antioch. 44a 
On Grypus' murder Cyzicenus seems to have married the luckless queen 
Selene himself (Appian, Syria 69). In nothing that Cyzicenus did, as 
far as our records go,~e d9 get the impression that he brought saving 
gifts of humanity or compassion to the failing Seleucid state. His 
portraits on coinage, though well-carved, betray no gentleness of 
character. 45 In much the same way Cleopatra III seems to have enjoyed 
the manipulation of power and politics rather than to have actually 
understood them. The enemies to both Egypt and Syria were still Rome 
and now, increasingly to both states, Parthia. Rome was about to be 
involved in the disastrous series of wars between rival consuls such as 
Marius, Sulla and Cinna which ought to have given to the eastern 
Mediterranean states time and reason and energy to regroup in the face 
of the threat that Rome continued to pose: Parthia also had her own 
dynastic troubles at this time - one Gotarzes was certainly reigning 
in Mesopotamia before the end of Mithridates II's reign,45a and tablets 
record his expUlsion from Babylon, while Orodes I was also active. 
But there was no-one we know of who had the wisdom to see this foreign 
political disarray. Cleopatra herself could have done so, but self-
47 interest was more of an issue than grand strategy, and so the chance 
was lost. Both Rome and Parthia would recover. 
.... 
Contemporary with the period of civil war between 
Grypus and Cyzicenus had been the calamitous northern invasions of the 
Roman Republic by the Cimbri and the Teutones which had required all 
the resources and concentration which the senate could bring to bear 
against them. The ensuing struggle between Marius, the victor at 
Aquae Sextiae, and Sulla and the Senate certainly was a feature in 
senatorial thinking which seems to have involved a lower profile in 
diplomacy towards Syria until in 96 Ptolemy Apion willed Cyrene to Rome. 47a 
Ernst Badian's important work on the circumstances 
surrounding Roman foreign policy in the late republic provides a cogent 
series of reasons why, as he says, Rome pursued 'open aggression and 
expansionism against barbarians; hegemonial imperialism with careful 
avoidance of annexation towards cultural equals or superiors'. The 
difficulty of administering large areas of new territory was realised 
and avoided, the self-aggrandisement of conquerors like the Scipios was 
not encouraged; and a case can even be made for the Senate's not 
wishing bad government to exist in areas it did administer, and 
consequently restricting expansion for that reason. 47b A change came, 
as it did in the first century BC., with the demands of the populares 
and the decline in the morality of the ruling class. The warlord was 
becoming aggressively independent of Senatorial control, and booty and 
conquest followed. Full-blown provincial annexation followed as the 
only conceivable rationalisation of an imperial position wished on to 
the senate by its maverick field commanders and business interests. 
All this is not to say that Rome had not much earlier looked east with 
envy, deliberate interference, possible malice and a good deal of 
obstruction. Her treatment of the Seleucids bears this out. But it 
is true that at times her lack of willingness to annex and administer 
properly, as in the case of Pergamum in 133 and Cyren~after 96 point fu 
an inability to take on serious imperial commitments, voluntarily arrived 
at, in a serious manner. 
Part of Rome's apparent inaction on the eastern Mediterranean 
question may possibly be attributed to an unwillingness to annex, amounting 
to a dereliction of imperial obligation, given that territories were, as 
we have seen, now being willed to her. But it is also true to say that 
she seems to have seen the major threat in the Eastern Mediterranean not 
in any country or combination of countries but in the growing pirate 
menace, against which she passed a Pirate Law in 99. Commercially this 
was extremely serious and it is arguable that connections between Cilicia, 
which in the weak state of Seleucid control was now more or less a pirate 
state, and the Seleucid kings themselves - notably Alexander Balas _ 
made the desirability of dealing with the pirate question an issue for 
eastern Mediterranean politics as well. On this understanding, resolute 
action against them would weaken the Seleucids as well: but that is a 
conjecture. 
Ptolemy Lathyrus seems to have waited until Grypus' 
legitimate successor, Seleucus VI Epiphanes Nicator, had assumed control 
in Syria and had defeated and killed Cyzicenus in battle before 
interfering again in Seleucid affairs. Cyzicenus' son Antiochus X 
Eusebus Philopator seems to have arrived at Aradus on the Syrian coast48 
with an army and to have waged a series of victorious actions against 
Seleucus, driving him out of Syria into Cilicia and the city of 
Mopsuhestia. Seleucus' death at the hands of the inhabitants when they 
set fire to the palace (or, according to Appian the Gymnasium)49 followed 
swiftly. His twin brothers Antiochus and Philip, both named Epiphanes 
Philadelphus, raided Mopsuhestia in retaliation, stormed it and took it: 
Philip became an independent king as Philip I and Antiochus became 
Antiochus XI Philadelphus. Philip seems to have held northern Syria 
for a time, and Philadelphus to have been caught and defeated by Eusebes 
in battle near Antioch and subsequently drowned in the Orontes on 
horseback. 50 
At this juncture Ptolemy Lathyrus took a hand in events 
again, and aided another son of Grypus, Demetrius III (Theos Philopator 
Soter) to establish a reign in Central Syria. Ptolemy was still living 
in Cyprus, and his actions seem to be those of a man who simply backed 
the most likely usurper and maintained chaos; the time when Egypt 
could conceivably gain by this kind of action had now gone for good. 
So Demetrius began his reign as Demetrius Eukairos, and each time we 
see them on coin reverses, the legends become less credible and more 
fulsome, while the portrait, in this case of Demetrius III, scores a new 
low in Hellenistic artistic expression. 51 Parthian numismatic art on 
the other hand was at its apogee. 
Three separate Seleucid kingdoms - in North, Central and 
Southern Syria - had now emerged, and an alliance took place between 
Demetrius and Philip against Eusebes. Eusebes then seems to have taken 
part in an expedition to help Laodice the queen of the Samenians, an 
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Parthia. Philip and Demetrius seem at this stage to have ruled Syria 
jointly; and in the Hasmonean kingdom at this juncture the cruelty and 
excesses of the rule of Alexander Jannaeus gave rise to a violent 
rebellion in Judaea: his own aggressive foreign policy against Moab 
and Galaaditis in the east had nearly led to his own death. 53 The 
Jewish people sought and obtained an alliance with Demetrius III against 
Jannaeus: an action fought near the city of Shechem led to Jannaeus 
being defeated, and in this desperate situation Jannaeus was joined by 
6000 Jews. Demetrius seems to have withdrawn to fight against Philip 
his erstwhile ally,54 and Jannaeus was left with no substantial opposition 
to wreak a frightful vengeance, for which the Hasmonean line has never 
been forgiven, upon the Jewish rebels. 55 
In 88 Demetrius was involved in a siege of Beroea where 
Philip was allied to Strato the ruler of Beroea, and who in turn brought 
in an Arab phylarch as an ally, and also incredibly Mithridates Sinakes, 
the Parthian governor of Mesopotamia,56 no doubt himself testing the 
quality of the surviving Seleucid kingdom. Demetrius was himself besieged 
in his camp by this coalition: with no water and plagued by the ubiquitous 
Parthian arrows,57 Demetrius surrendered and he was sent to Mithridates II, 
who by that time will have been at Ctesiphon, the new Parthian capital 
to succeed Ecbatana. One of Mithridates' last recorded actions was the 
display of courtesy with which he treated Demetrius, yet another Seleucid 
prisoner of the Parthians, and significantly the last. Eventually Demetrius 
died of an illness in Parthia, and Philip was left as king of Syria with 
his capital at Antioch. 
Almost inevitably, as though the hands of both Parthia and 
Rome had been stayed by the death of Mithridates II, the war with 
Mithridates VI of Pontus and the rivalry between Marius and Sulla, the 
last son of Antiochus Grypus plunged into the place of Demetrius III as 
a rival for Philip I to deal with, calling himself Antiochus XII Dionysus 
Epiphanes Philopator Kallinikos. 58 His coins, dated 227 = 86 - 85 BC., 
are struck in Damascus. Part of any ruler of Damascus' problem was how 
to keep the constant Arab inroads at bay; increasingly penetrating and 
heavily Parthian-infiltrated they must have posed a constant threat. So 
it was that Antiochus XII was involved when Philip attacked his capital, 
but was forced to withdraw without any success after having been briefly 
admitted by its governor Milesius and then expelled. 59 
Antiochus thereupon resumed his expedition against the 
Arabs under King Aretas, being ineffectually blocked by Alexander Jannaeus 
en route, but finally, falling victim to a sudden massed cavalry attack 
. 60 ·t by Aretas' Arabs, was killed with most of hls army. Aretas' opportunl y 
to consolidate his remarkable rise to power was presented by Damascus, 
now without a competing Seleucid dynast in occupation. Aretas occupied 
tt 1 of Chalcis, then it first as protector against Ptolemy, the pe Y ru er 
k . 61 as ~ng. In that capacity he was involved in hostilities against 
Alexander Jannaeus, but after defeating Jannaeus at Adida, near modern 
Lod, Aretas annexed Damascus as a new addition to the Nabatean state. 62 
Alexander Jannaeus' campaigns in the wild country to the east of the 
Jordan occupied the three years from 83 to 80 Be., and in conducting 
them he had practically isolated Syria from Egypt and had become a 
significant Middle-Eastern power to counterbalance the continued westwards 
pressure of Parthia and to hold Aretas' new kingdom at bay. It was a 
position of some influence and might have been so used by him had he not 
died after a three-year illness which Josephus tells us was the result 
of heavy drinking (iK f~ 9~ I YOuov 
exacerbated no doubt by continuous campaigns. He died during the siege 
of the fortress of Ragaba, but not before his wife had prevailed upon him 
to make peace with the Pharisaic party, whose courageous stand against 
him had greatly increased the Pharisees' power and standing in the eyes 
64 
of the Jews, a power which was now to be confirmed by statute. 
Peace was signed between Sulla and Mithridates of Pontus 
in 84, but before then Mithridates had used the unease in Rome's domestic 
I 
politics between the factions of Marius and Sulla to extend his rule 
southwards and westwards for a time over most of Asia Minor. His hand 
had been strengthened by the venality of Roman provincial administration 
there, itself surely the result of senatorial slackness and incompetence. 
King Philip I, now at Antioch, was there, as we know with at least the 
tacit agreement of Parthia: it is entirely possible that Parthia was 
herself watching the progress of Mithridates Eupator, and wished now to 
65-let matters rest as far as the Seleucids were concerned with whom 
Parthia bad no specific casus belli any way. Philip's reign, which could 
be described as restoring some security to the late Seleucid scene, was 
terminated by two quite different movements. 
Mithridates Eupator, unbowed from his treaty with Sulla, 
was a northern threat too near to ignore; and, connected with this 
activity in Pontus, the rise of Armenia as a major power took place 
under Tigranes who only had to march south to take up residence at 
Antioch in 83.
66 
In fact his governor Magadates occupied the palace, 
and coins were struck at Antioch in Tigranes' name. 67 Seleucia-in-Pieria 
seems to have held out against Tigranes, possibly becoming the base for 
Antiochus Eusebes' sons who were later recognised by the Senate at Rome 
'k" of S " , 68 J t" "f t as ~ngs yr~a • us ~n ~n orms us hat in the event Tigranes 
came to Antioch as the result of an invitation to do so.69 
Tigranes had himself been a hostage at Mithridates' court, 
and seems to have been released in return for seventy valleys in 
70 Atropatene. On his accession he annexed Sophene, and, consequent on 
discontent in Parthia late in Mithridates II's reign, Tigranes was able 
to recover this part of Atropatene, thus uniting his kingdom west of the 
Euphrates. He occupied northern Mesopotamia between 88 and 85, and had 
previously secured his own northern flank by a marriage alliance with 
71 Cleopatra, the daughter of Mithridates Eupator of Pontus. His own 
fortunes were presently to change, and after defeats by Lucullus before 
his own capital Tigranocerta, and later decisively by Pompey, he sued 
for peace in 61 Be. 
Rome's capacity to mount this action against Tigranes 
followed the ~ of actual Seleucid power in Syria, and Pompey's eventual 
victory against Mithridates Eupator at Nicopolis. Tigranes withdrew from 
Syria to deal with the defence of his own country and his general 
Magadates who had been his viceroy in Syria left to face Lucullus, and 
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with him the short period of Armenian control over Syria ended. It had 
been gained by an invited occupation and Justin describes Tigranes' 
fourteen years' rule over Syria as 'tranquillissimo regno',73 presumably 
in the sense that a strong, unified military presence, even if foreign 
or especially if foreign - was the only hope of forestalling yet more 
domestic discord. Queen Cleopatra Selene had induced Ptolemais to hold 
out against Tigranes74 for a time until it was eventually captured, but 
Alexandra, Queen of Judaea contrived to bribe Tigranes to leave the 
Hasmonean state in peace.75 And at that point Tigranes had to withdraw 
his forces northwards. 
Selene had herself been attempting to win favour from 
Rome; in 75 her two sons were sent to Rome laden with gifts to impress 
the senate and to back up their claim to Syria. Rome confounded matters 
by agreeing to their claim to Syria - but not to Egypt, and so the 
question of the Egyptian succession, following Lathyrus' death in 80 BC. 
was still in confusion. Tigranes' eventual capture of ptolemais seems 
to have been his last success in Syria: the city was taken in 69, and 
Selene deported to Seleucia on the Euphrates, where Strabo tells us that 
76 Tigranes killed her. Her son Antiochus, on the other hand, went north 
to somewhere in Asia Minor where he lived for a short time, and from which 
sojourn he took the title 'Asiaticus', in the circumstances an extraordinary 
name. Tigranes' move northwards, followiDg Rome's peremptory request to 
surrender Mithridates Eupator, Tigranes' father-in-law, gave the young 
Antiochus his unexpected chance to reclaim his throne, and he went back 
to Syria in 69 or 68. 77 He did coin at Antioch but his reign lasted only 
a year: however, we do know that Lucullus seems to have agreed to this 
brief reign and did not object to Antiochus exercising his 'ancestral 
) 
..L..e X1S This authority was 
soon in conflict with the objectives of Sampsiceramus, the sheikh of 
Emesa, whose territory had by now eaten into much that was left of northern 
Syria. A . 79 Antiochus seems to have been defeated, possibly by one ZlZ 
who was later to support a rival for the Seleucid throne, and to have 
made an alliance with Sampsiceramus. As the result of this particular 
defeat Antiochus had to withstand Antiochene pressure to withdraw from 
Antioch, and those who had attempted to depose him fled instead from 
Syria and gathered in Cilicia, proposing to support Grypus t grandson 
Philip, the son of Philip I. Philip agreed with the plan of usurpation, 
and so for the last time we have a Seleucid dynastic contest. 80 The 
difference this time was that both men, Philip - known as the theavy-
footed', and Antiochus Asiaticus were backed by a different Arab Chieftain 
who had more to gain from disposing of the Seleucid than from supporting 
him. 
Antiochus, therefore, met Sampsiceramus, unaware of the 
pact now devised between the Arabs, and was promptly arrested by 
Sampsiceramus, later to be put to death by him. Aziz was unable to 
hold Philip who escaped to Antioch;81 there he was to succeed Antiochus 
as the last Seleucid king, while the command of the Roman war against 
Mithridates passed from the able, courageous but uncharismatic Lucullus 
to Pompey who was eventually able, as we have said, to bring the 
Mithridatic Wars to a successful end, having finally attained some 
control over the Pirate menace in the Eastern Mediterranean.82 
Philipts brief reign was entirely ephemeral, and must have 
ended before 64/3 by which time Pompey was resident in Damascus and had 
tregulated' the affairs of Syria by making it a Roman province and 
Antioch a Ifree cityt. Appian observes that Antiochus XIII had done 
the Romans no wrong,83 and we may draw the conclusion, which seems 
inevitable, that the Seleucid line finally fell because there was not 
enough muscle left in its members to sustain it. Usurpation, gratuitous 
internecine conflict, unwise use of money and military potential had 
done their work, and the Seleucid cause was at an end. There was a 
strong and ever-strengthening outside pressure, but the eventual 
collapse was internal as well, certainly. 
ADmNDUM 
From this period we have records of the wine store of the imperial 
property of Mihrdatkart found in the ruins of a Parthian fortress at the 
village of Bagin near Ashkabad. 2000 ostraka found here indicate the value 
of the discovery in this estate which, like the other estates, was the 
personal property of the Arsacid ruler. 84 From Avroman in Kurdistan we 
have three parchments (two in Greek and one in Aramaic), being contracts 
for the sale of a vineyard, dating (according to the Seleucid Era) from 
88 B.C., the year before Mithridates II died, 22 - 1 B.C. and 11 A.D. 
respectively. The documents establish the ownership of the small 
vineyard there by the brothers Baraces and Sobenes, and deal with 
maintenance and cultivation.85 
From an earlier Median site at Nush-i-Jan near Malayer in Western 
Iran comes the recent discovery, with pottery fragments, of a Parthian 
village built on the Tepe occupied by a Median fire-temple on a spectacular 
expanse of what is now rather sparse rough grazing land.86 The unfortunate 
history of the 19th century French excavations at Susa leading to the 
destruction of much of the Seleucid and Parthian layers, has been 
compensated for by many other successful examinations of Parthian sites 
including that of Kuh-i-Khwaja by Aurel Stein and the Parthian temple at 
Shami in Khuzistan with its bronzes, including the mask of Antiochus 
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Epiphanes. 
Perhaps the most significant Parthian discoveries have been at 
Dura Europos, where artistic as well as historical conclusions about the 
Parthians themselves in a Hellenistic environment could begin to be drawn 
"th 87 Wl accuracy. On the Upper Euphrates Dura was re-discovered 
fortuitously in the 1920s, and James Breasted and Franz Cumont worked on 
the site until in 1928 the Yale Expedition under Rostovtzeff took over. 
Fragments of wall-paintings of Palmyrene deities (Malakhbel, Aglibol and 
Jahribol) were discovered at an early stage; and the city is important in 
the context of the present chapter chronologically as it was to become one 
of the nearest major Parthian centres to the declining Seleucid kingdom: 
it was not more than 200 miles from Damascus and 250 from Antioch. It 
was founded in about 300 B.C. as a Seleucid city under Seleucus I 
demonstrating Seleucid urbanisation (Europos is a Macedonian place-name), 
and it became - by virtue of its location - a trading caravan-city on the 
route from Syria to Iran and the East, and also, like any Seleucid military 
settlement, an outpost of Hellenisation. Excavations carried out before 
the Second World War revealed extensive areas of houses, temples and 
public buildings and tombs: and, in the more specifically artistic field, 
wall-painting, pottery, domestic equipment and tools. The wall-painting 
in particular overthrew some commonly-held assumptions about the lack of 
an iconography in dispersed Jewish settlements, of which the Jewish 
politeuma at Dura had been one for a long time. Written documents, 
inscribed sherds, graffiti and parchments came to light here in Aramaic, 
Palmyrene and Greek. 
Also in Mesopotamia, Assur and Hatra88 (which was to have 
a stormy history in Roman times) were brought to new life under the 
Parthians. Andrae's work at Hatra was continued by Iraqi archaeologists 
in 1951 - 54, and these excavations have so far disclosed ten temples, a 
palace, dwelling houses and an amphitheatre. And all this is in addition 
to the glories of Ctesiphon, built deliberately, at the end of our period 
in this work, opposite Seleucia - on the eastern bank of the Tigris - as 
though to make obvious what was implied anyway, the eclipse of Greek rule 
in the Middle East. All that said, one must note the astonishing 
persistence of Greek life, language and literature at Seleucia in the 
first century A.D. - a mark, as are the Avroman parchments, of the staying 
power of Greek culture. From an almost ostentatiously philhelline position, 
preserved on coins until the time of Phraates II in 2 B.C., the Parthian 
state was to assume - at least in artistic terms - an overt anti-hellenic 
position, reverting, in a kind of cultural reaction, to an earlier more 
obviously Asiatic artistic koine of Oriental art, in the concepts of 
frontality and an uncompromising stylization of portraiture. In this 
reaction the Zoroastrian religion will have played a part, even to the 
extent of influencing Hebrew literature in the erstwhile Greek-controlled 
Jewish kingdom, now almost contiguous with Parthian-held territory. In 
all this period it is to be remembered that certain parts of Seleucid Iran, 
notably Persis (Fars), which revolted in about 280 B.C., had not been 
Seleucid territory for two hundred years, and had continued to develop 
native art-forms owing more to the influence of the Achaemenid age, to 
which they emotionally responded, than to the imported Western artistic 
canons of the Seleucids. 
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EXCURSUS 
Poleis in the Hellenistic World: Development and influence. 
A part of any study dealing with the history of the hellenistic 
world must concentrate on the role played by the nOA'5 in the historical 
process. I believe this to be particularly true when dealing with the eastern 
provinces, partly because they were far from the orthocentre of Greek 
civilisation, and also partly because their wide dispersal raised questions of 
a cultural nature in a particularly acute form. This excursus stands separate 
from the main narrative because it was thought sensible to deal en bloc with 
the question of the polis and its implications and not to try to integrate 
it into the main body of the thesis which has been intentionally narrative and 
chronological in character. This excursus will deal with a selection of 
archaeological discoveries to illustrate various aspects of the polis in its 
distribution, siting, character, political purpose and cultural implications, 
but it will also discuss the reasons why such features were important in the 
historical process. 
, flOAt-I) in the hellenistic world traced their development back 
to the early foundations of the city states of mainland Greece, Ionia and 
Magna Graecia before, during and after the colonising waves of the seventh and 
sixth centuries; and their character was dictated by the necessities of civic 
organisation in small, frequently mountainous and geographically separate civil 
communities. Their mode of government was dictated by the requirements of the 
location, and a certain homogeneity resulted from the similarity of their 
individual situations. 
In the hellenistic world the self-government which had been a 
feature of the original nO~£.I5 whether in the hands of an oligarchy, a 
democracy or a rvG~~~o, , became subservient to the hellenistic ruler of the 
day, with the important qualification that the concept of a 'free city' able to 
decide very largely its own affairs and to mint coinage, was generally viewed 
with reverence and care by hellenistic rulers, particularly during times in 
wh1ch the alignment of such self-determining poleis (or at least their ability 
to exercise this freedom) could all too clearly be seen as a status which ~uld 
not be interfered with without a consequent resentment which might be difficult 
to handle. In the Seleucid empire in particular, with its extended frontiers , 
fluid composition and very large area, such rights as 'free cities' possessed 
required to be respected. l Antiochus II 'conceded' privileges in the form of 
freedom from tribute to Erythrae on receiving an embassy from the city which 
reminded him of this status being granted to the city under Alexander and 
Antigonus. This example seems to indicate that in each case the new ruler had 
to ratify what his predecessor(s) had granted to the city, and he did so on 
receipt of honours (r~" ) which the city sent him. 2 The system seems to 
have acted as a means of royal control, and the status was applied for by 
hellenistic cities and peoples in a more general way also, not purely 
confined to autonomous poleis: for instance, the Jews were anxious, after 
Antiochus III took over the ptolemaic hegemony in Coele-Syria after 200, that 
he should respect 'the customs of their ancestors,.3 
The situation in which long-established cities found themselves 
in the hellenistic age was created not only by the centralised, imperial style 
of government by a king whose sway over political affairs was theoretically 
absolute: the conquests of Alexander had also created poleis, and raised to 
4 polis-status many settlements over the Asian land-mass, as far as the Jaxartes. 
In some cases the character of these places is known to us through excavations 
which we will be noting, while in other cases the sites have developed to be 
cities in later ages, overbuilt on the hellenistic foundations, the most 
famous being Alexandria in Egypt. 5 Two possible Alexandrias are at present 
being excavated in Afghanistan at Kandahar (Alexandria Arachosia) and 
Ai Khanum (Alexandria Oxiana).6 
Alexander's foundations, estimated at 70 in number
7
, were 
supplemented on his death by a similar policy on the part of Seleucus, 
although his own foundations were less prolific (Appian, Syriaca 57); 
other hellenistic rulers, e.g. Antigonus, the Ptolemies and various kings 
(usually Seleucid) called Antiochus also carried out this policy, as may have 
been the case with Eucratides, Euthydemus and Demetrius in Bactria and India. 8 
The founding of Alexander's (and his successors') cities in Asia was in many 
cases the consequence of a military settlement subsequently being raised to 
pOlis-status; and the foundations arose for military reasons - particularly 
perhaps in the case of Alexandria Eschate and Alexandria in Margiane - in 
order to safeguard frontiers against external attack, and to ensure a Greek, 
or at least a Macedonian presence in the area. The issue of a cultural 
influence being deliberately devised, and the further issues of such settlements 
being founded with a predetermined cultural objective, is a good deal more 
tendentious and debatable. It is much easier to argue from hindsight (on the 
basis of a few examples which evidence does suggest to have had this purpose, 
e.g. Jerusalem-Antioch in 1671°) that all must have had such an objective, 
than to prove that such poleis actually had this task as a rule. There has 
been a certain amount of 'post hoc ergo propter hoc' in such discussionll 
What is not in question is the evident arrangement of the 
Asiatic foundations along trade routes and frequently using ancient, already-
important towns for the purpose. In these cases culture-change did take place 
as a matter of fact and the reorganisation in planning terms can be seen 
clearly at, for example, Gerasa in modern Jordan. Founded as Antioch-on-the-
Chrysorrhoas, possibly by Seleucus I or Antiochus I, excavations have 
t · 12 d revealed that Gerasa was occupied in Neolithic and Early Bronze lmes ,an 
the same observations apply to Kandahar. 13 
The provision in genuine poleis of the symbols of cultural 
and civic organisation such as the acropolis, administrative headquarters, 
gymnasium and places like a mausoleum and necropolis, as well as the expected 
pieces of statuary, have all been found at even such a remote site as 
A· Kh 14 l anum • They seem to indicate the tenacity with which the founders and 
subsequent settlers of such outlying sites held on to their civic (and cultural) 
principles 0 
It is interesting to note the tension, seen in the various 
, ~ 
inscriptions to exist between the Greek love of £~$V&t~'~and the concept 
of the 'free city', to which we have already drawn attention, and the 
obsequious nature of such cities' dealings with the current sovereign. 15 The 
reason seems to be that a relationship which would incur minimum hindrance 
was an advantage to both parties - even if obtained at a price in terms of 
self-respect; and there is evidence that such cities were, if treated in a 
cavalier manner, a serious threat to the reigning Seleucid, in the accounts 
(e.g.) of Antiochus Ill's progress in Asia Minor prior to his invasion of 
Greece, and of course after his retreat to Magnesia. 16 That rulers as secure 
in their position as Seleucus II had had to woo the cities (because of the 
competing claims of his brother Antiochus Hierax) shows, as do the declarations 
from Smyrna, Mylasa and Ilium, that the king had to be almost as ingratiating 
to his subjects in these cities as they were to him.17 The reality of the 
situation seems to be that these free cities were a collection of bargaining 
counters which could be used individually by either party to extort concessions 
of alliance or neutrality as required by the situation. 
Cities whose origins were to be found in ancient native 
communities frequently sought a status as a hellenic polis for reasons of trade, 
and their own cultural advancement and economic development, and again 
Jerusalem is a well-documented case in point where the citizens - or rather the 
hellenic party within the citizen body - sought to have the city renamed 
'Antioch' (after Epiphanes)18, and pressed this objective (as we have seen in 
chapter 5) against the wishes of a more conservative element in the native 
population, and with tragic consequences. 19 
In the early days of Alexander's Asiatic enterprise the 'free' 
Greek cities of Asia (Minor) were expected to join in the hellenic crusade 
against Persia, and therefore to contribute finance to this end. So a ~~v~~~~ 
would be levied as though these cities were members of a league, contributing 
finance as a part of the obligations of membership20. As treasure kept being 
accumulated from various sources, notably Egypt, this arrangement ceased, 
although the actual payment of contributions did not21 • Badian points out 
that 'control' of Greek cities, liberated by Alexander's campaign from Persian 
rule, was regulated in 330 and developed out of the function of collecting ~V~~~'~ 
Some such person as Philoxenus, who had originally had a financial role in 
respect of ASia,22 (which included at least 'some Greek cities,)23 may now 
have exercised a general supervision of the Greek cities in his area, not 
confined to matters of finance - indeed the collection of finance, at least by 
this method, may have dropped from Philoxenus' brief;24 but the control in 
~ , 
some form of 'free cities' continued to pose a question over the ~VTO~o~/~ 
into which these cities had been liberated by Alexander - but also, in the 
disturbed times of the wars of the Diadochoi, to present the cities themselves 
'\ ' with the bargaining counter we have mentioned. ~~1u~~,~ could be used as a 
concept to be traded. As Seleucid control weakened during the second century, 
the practice increased. 
We have mentioned native insistence on the re-naming of the 
city with a Greek (in that case a Seleucid) dynastic name. This was a widespread 
practice in the hellenistic east25 , but the fact of genuine dynastic foundations 
of cities in the Seleucid east is not in dispute, and continued in most regions 
down to the time of Antiochus IV. In some cases these foundations were indeed 
the elevation of native settlements, or Achaemenid centres, to polis-status; 
but in others, military bases developed a civilian administrative apparatus and 
the appurtenances of a regular polis. Ai Khanum is a good example of a city 
of this type. In these military settlements veterans could be installed and 
26 the wounded rested ,and usual agricultural activity to raise crops for 
subsistence was encouraged. For example Strabo represents the fertility of 
Margiana as a prime reason for Antiochus I refounding Alexandria-in-Margiana 
as Antioch, and enclosing a circuit of 1500 stades with a wall: the Seleucids 
were able to benefit from the wine-producing capacity of this site, even if 
. ,27 Strabo's estimate of the quality of the grapes is exceSSlve. 
As hellenic foundations, whether under Alexander's or some 
later empires the ~OA~~ thus set up in Asia kept their traditional structure ~ 
popular assembly1council (/~ou}~ ), annual officials and law courts. 
Ehrenberg points out that the mutual relations of "O~5 and the Seleucid 
monarchy defy neat definition,28 but we can conclude from inscriptions from 
many places that the cities acted as the king's bidding;29 and their creation 
of foreign policy initiatives, for example, was obviously a thing of the past30 ; 
although in the days when Seleucid control was less strong than at the 
beginning of the third century, it is not uncommon to find a city declaring 
for a particular monarch on its own initiative, no doubt after prudent 
consultation as to its own likely fate if it refused. The presence of Seleucid 
garrisons in the citadel of the polis, particularly if its hellenic associations 
were new or weak, as at e.g., Jerusalem31 , exacerbated relations between the 
population and that species of royal control which the presence of the 
garrison was felt to epitomise. This might in turn make it more receptive to 
a foreign takeover if it was threatened or likely, as in the case of Tigranes' 
invitation to Antioch by its inhabitants in 83, now thoroughly disillusioned 
with all Seleucids and their garrisons, heralding a lengthy period of Armenian 
occupation before Seleucid rule resumed ephemerally in 69. 33 
Perhaps it is enough to say that ultimately the success of the 
Seleucid kingdom (or indeed any other Hellenic state in the Hellenistic Age), 
viewed as a governmental operation, depended on the stability of the city 
organisation, as well as on the loyalty of its civil service, and that this was 
not an arm of the state which could be treated in a cavalier fashion. It all 
placed a heavy responsibility upon the king's personal representative, the 
!«'fT~'~ who was an 'intermediary' (Ehrenberg's phrase) between the polis 
and the king. Even the privileges of granting asylum and freedom from taxation 
were things to be earned rather than assumed. 
Every polis was a mixed community, and tended eventually to be 
composed of varying proportions of citizens,K~~IKo' and "~{Ol~~ (whose 
status could be raised to that of full citizens35 ), and the inevitable number 
of slaves and serfs to be found in any ancient Greek city. These could, of 
course, be liberated, and there is evidence that in the reign of Attalus III 
of Pergamum, for example, the king liberated in his will his own royal serfs. 36 
n~(PIKOI were the equivalent of ;\~TOIKOt elsewhere in the Greek world, and 
the status of metics had long been an issue of some controversy. One way in 
which the problem of foreigners could be solved was to create a community within 
the polis specifically devoted to them, the ~oArTt~,. In the case of 
Alexandria in Egypt, the Jewish community there constituted such a politeuma, 
and as such formed a 'ghetto' whose character the Jewish community strove to 
preserve. 37 
The existence of poleis in the Seleucid Empire in particular, 
because of the widely-dispersed nature of its settlement patterns, gave rise 
to problems of reinforcement and resettlement by new colonists. The impression 
is strong that, although several Seleucid kings created poleis, the first flush 
of colonisation died soon, and - more seriously - the replenishment of those 
that did exist, in Parthia, Hyrcania and Bactria for instance, was impeded by 
the distance and by the isolation which this involved. 38 The problem was to 
become acute with the rise of Parthia as a nomad power creating an alien wedge 
between the Greek communities in Media and Bactria respectively, and - even more 
serious - the cutting of the northern trade route between Media and Bactria 
which was the obvious means of access for any new colonists to Bactria. This 
had the other obvious result that the Greek community in Bactrian poleis, and 
in later Indian ones, tended to become more mixed: the implications of that 
were both good and bad; while oecumenism was fostered in religion and coinage 
(and presumably marriage), national Greek identity seems to have become more 
blurred. 39 
In the sense that settlers came out or were sent, or placed 
by royal command, the poleis in the distant parts of the Seleucid state were 
dependent for their survival upon the king; but Welles makes the point that 
these poleis in some way guarded trade routes, which were also military lines 
of communication, and, as he says, 'they might offer a secure repository for 
40 the revenues'. It is too bleak, and in the light of our new knowledge ( e.g. 
about Ai Khanum) probably inaccurate, to believe Arrian's description that such 
settlements were planned as fortified camps and nothing more. 4l Their longevity 
alone raises serious questions about Arrian's own view, and we ought not to 
treat it as binding. 
The structure of the polis was a strong factor in ensuring 
this sometimes-remarkable longevity. With walls and militia, frequently with 
a mint, and often with the esprit de corps which, in the case of Ai Khanum, 
involved a representative being sent to Delphi to discover there the epigram 
subsequently engraved on the temenos of the city's founder Cineas,42 the 
Hellenistic poleis in the Seleucid east were a powerful political and cultural 
factor in Seleucid statecraft. And they were, generally speaking, able to 
exert this influence because of the stability which their structure gave them. 
The royal official who was the responsible link between the king and the colony 
, 
was the t~/~T~~~$ • Among the cities which we know had such an official, the 
relatively recent inscription from Laodicea-in-Media (Nihavend) dating to 193 BC 
is addressed to 'Apollodorus and the magistrates of the town of Laodicea,43 by 
Menedemus who was the governor of the satrapy of Media. The epistates was 
merely concerned with civil affairs; the military side was dealt with by the 
fe0v~~)ro) .44 A distinction between a polis-proper and a colony which might 
in time become one, is probably to be found in the extent to which it could 
enter into free arrangements with a king, which he would actually honour: for 
/ 
instance whether it could enter into a ~~~~X)~ or not, or could be 
declared free or autonomous. But as Getzel Cohen points out,45 the way in 
which a colony became a polis - where colonies had been set up near existing 
native towns - is nowhere made clear; and, in view of the frequency of the 
occasion in which such a transformation will have happened, (and the commonness 
of the situation geographically, as at Kandahar, for instance46 ), it would be 
interesting to know. 
Pausanias indicated (X, 4, 1) that a polis had to have 
, 
J...tXS,IJ. ,a rV/VAt',ov - which created a considerable cultural shock when 
introduced with its customs into native Jerusalem47 - a e~T~OV and the 
~(O~~ · In his translation of the edict from Nihavend, Louis Robert renders 
~exou~1 as I magistrates,48, and it may well be that archons as such were not 
involved at that stage (or in that place). 
A method of government by prytany and boule, representing a 
democratic constitution, had become the norm for the Greek communities of the 
Mediterranean by the time of Alexander; and it was the apparatus of this 
arrangement - tribes and demes as voting categories which was, at least in 
theory, transplanted to the new Seleucid noJ.'£15 and other hellenistic 
f d t · 48a oun a lons 0 The democratic model was adopted by cities which had recently 
been native communities (Diod. XXXIII, 5a) - in the case of, e.g. Balbura; but 
the degree to which it operated as a political fact, in the sense in which it 
had been envisaged, is difficult accurately to uncover: as we know from 
numerous inscriptions, including the one from Nihavend, poleis were required 
49 to undertake activities by the king, and were expected to comply. Plutarch 
alleges that Antiochus Hierax, when ruler of the province of Asia Minor 
(co-regent from 242/1) practised sovereignty over subjugated cities; his 
, 50 
authority is described as ~!)(7 ' and the poleis are the recipients of orders. 
This in its turn gave rise to attempts, to which we have already referred, to 
win the loyalty of cities by what Orth calls 'splendid-sounding proclamations,51 • 
The economic organisation of cities was helped by the creation 
of the posts of Xtt 0 ¢ " ~ ... ~ and f ~( J 10 f (I M{ - I keepers of contracts I and 
'keepers of documents', whose documents and records, rolled into circular clay 
cylinders (bullae) and stamped with a seal, have been discovered and studied 
in the excavations at Uruk (Orchoi) in Babylonia where they may well represent 
52 
a compromise between the Greek and Babylonian methods of sealing documents. 
The officials in question signed thems e 1 ve s te.t 01 U~J..KII<: 0) - v~ XIJ" , or 
whatever the town might be. Rostovtzeff stresses that both state and private 
business interests were served by the organisation of such registry offices as 
these officials operated, and taxation was facilitated by such city record 
ff ' 53 o 1.ces. 
Parchments from Dura and Susa indicate the activity of 
)\tfo1u~~~ there as well, and discoveries at Susa (Seleucia-on-the-Eulaeus) 
tell a similar story: the Xe..<;.o ;U~GC.. ( seems to have been a crown officer 
appointed by, and answerable to, the reigning Seleucid. 54 There appears to 
have been a slave tax in operation at Orchoi in 220 BC, and this coincides with 
Antiochus IIIls first offensive activity after the revolt of Molon, for which 
he required money to pay his troops. It seems that this could have been 
introduced as a tax to provide money for this purpose: 55 salt tax and ship 
tax were already in operation, but the chronic need of the Seleucids for 
revenue - even before the crushing demands of the Romans' Apamea indemnity -
argues the likelihood of an introduction of slave tax at this time (as the 
bullae date suggests, but does not of course prove). 
When colonies became fully-fledged poleis, with a city-organisati l 
such as we have described, they frequently had a wall and not just lighter 
fortifications, and sometimes, as at Alexandria-in-Margiane, this was a major 
feature of their plan, allied to a square-grid structure of roads after the 
ideas of HipPoda~s of Miletus. Walls are readily-detectable in recent 
) 56 hellenistic excavations at Ai Khanum and Alexandria-on-the-Caucasus (Begram • 
The right to coin varied in different parts of the Seleucid 
realm: the right to coin in the Greek cities of Asia Minor was confined to the 
emission of copper cOinage,57 and the answer to the question whether the Greek 
cities of Bactria coined on their own account is partly dependent upon whether 
the mint-mark connotes the mint-city or the moneyer in question; even so, it 
is the kingls image and canting-badge which invariably appear. There is nothing 
like the city coinage of Athens. 58 
The settlers l associations of colonists became citizens of 
th Pl'O \ t t t b l·t and as 1.' n the case of Jerusalem-e '(., I\'~ when ci y s a es ecame a rea 1. y; 
Antioch, e.g., it was by a sectional (not a general) request that the polis was 
c 
inaugurated: the native community or communities formed 'politeumata', as 
did the Jewish community in Alexandria in Egypt59• The fact that the nO~lr~l"aT~ 
were created, or allowed to develop, apparently as an expedient in view of the 
need at least to accommodate a native, frequently Asian population, is not to 
be used as a justification for their separate, alien status: whereas the politcum~ 
acted as a structural vehicle for separating the Graeco-Macedonian 
inhabitants from the rest, that was also its weakness when the need was to 
integrate the native population and not to separate it off. It is a tendency 
which persists. Whether it was a conscious act of Seleucid and Ptolemaic 
policy, or a spontaneous growth, is matter for speculation. 60 
The philosophical basis for the government and character of 
hellenistic poleis can only be derived from what Plato or Aristotle wrote 
about the ideal constitution of the polis as they envisaged it: 60a C. B. Welles 
61 
rightly stresses, in writing about Dura Europus in its pre-Roman phase ,that 
Dura was not hellenic but hellenistic, and he goes on to point out - with a 
side-reference to the fact that, as Seleucus I's wife Apama was Iranian, 
therefore the succeeding Seleucids partly were - how mixed a community in 
racial terms Dura was. There was a small Graeco-Macedonian core, whose wives 
already included some Aramaeans, and the population as a whole included both 
Aramaeans and Arabs. The city was bi-lingual in Greek and Aramaic, and the 
religion was largely local. As Welles observes wryly: 'It was not so easy to 
62 import Apollo and Artemis into the purlieu of Bel and Nana' ,although as we 
read, later on syncretism did exist - as in this very case of Artemis-Nanaia, 
in the district of Elymais. 63 
Even in the midst of this mixed cultural scene the Greek or 
Macedonian settlers of Dura seem to have maintained, until the introduction of 
a Bbman garrison in the Third Century AD, a form of 'conservative and correct' 
Attic in their writing of texts. Welles takes this to be some evidence for 
64 
such small hellenistic poleis being centres of quite a stable culture ,and 
this comment is borne out by the quality of Greek inscription-carving, at for 
instance, Kandahar in Afghanistan, where the quality of the lettering is 
considerable - although much earlier - being both sharp and accurate. 65 Thls 
observation also holds true for the inscription from Nihavend, often referred 
to in this work, and illustrated as a frontispiece. 
The question of writing style and accuracy, with its 
inevitable cultural indebtedness, raises the issue of education in Near and 
Middle Eastern poleis. We can reasonably conclude from the inscriptional 
evidence we have quoted from Dura, Nihavend, Ai Khanum and Kandahar (for 
example) that the inhabitants were literate in Greek (and often, as at 
Kandahar, in Aramaic as well); and that this implied an educational 
establishment where the children of citizens were taught to read and write. 66 
Later on, the youth were usually educated as Epheboi in the 
Ephebeion where Rhetoric and more advanced studies, added to physical training, 
went to produce the young Greek in his correct cultural environment, with his 
chlamys and his petasos exhibited for all to see, as in Antiochus IV's pompe 
at Daphne in 16667 , and whose very Greekness was unacceptable to the 
conservative wing of the Jewish community at Jerusalem, for instance. 68 
Alexandria in Egypt, with its celebrated Museum and Library 
was, because of these buildings, a city apart from the normal city-organisation 
of the hellenistic world; but libraries as such are noted elsewhere in the 
69 hellenistic east, and in particular there is a record in the Suda of 
Antiochus III appointing Euphorion of Chalcis in Euboea to be librarian of 
the public library at Antioch in Syria, although there is no trace of the 
b Old ° to 70 Ul ing itself in other literature or ln excava lons. 
The philosophy which lay behind the institutions of the polis, 
and indicated how they should ideally operate (for instance, Aristotle's 
)70a precept that a city had to be of a certain size to do its work adequately , 
found expression in the planning of the cities and the type of buildings they 
contained. The Administrative Quarter of Ai Khanum has been uncovered: the 
lower city there has northern and southern administrative units, a large 
colonnaded area here is held to be a governmental, or even a royal 
residence,7l and this grand ensemble of 116 columns and 4 colonnaded 
porticoes is to be distinguished from an agora (as at Athens) by the lack of 
shops. In Athens we now have, of course, the remarkable American 
reconstruction of the Pergamene stoa presented by Attalus. At Ai Khanum, 
gateways (Propylons) and portico columns have Corinthian capitals of a type 
of Corinthian which Paul Bernard has described in various articles,72 and 
which he associates with the Olympeion at Athens and the Bouleuterion at 
Miletus, both of them dating, in this respect, to the time of Antiochus 
Epiphanes, whose enthusiasm was devoted to their construction under his 
architect Decimus Cossutius. We do also have from Ai Khanum its gymnasium, 
a residential quarter to the south west of the city overlooking the 
intersection of the rivers K&~cha and Oxus, and a mausoleum - the Heroon73 -
with a shrine (cella), whose building and modifications spread over four 
separate building phases, all dedicated to the memory of Cineas, the KT/~S 
of the polis, and his family, for whom the inscription was sought at Delphi 
by Clearchus. The whole group is referred to as the Temenos of Cineas. 
An examination of the recovered remains of hellenistic cities 
from Pergamum in the west to Charsadda-Pushkalavati in the east indicates 
the similarity of the collection of buildings which constituted the polis. 
Of these poleis Susa (Seleucia-on-the-Eulaeus) is a typical example, and 
indicates the compactness of the settlement as well as its defensive 
capability, with a prominent acropolis,74 perhaps less dramatically situated 
than those at Ai Khanum or Kandahar. At Susa the components of that city-plan 
include the village of Susa itself, the acropolis, the royal quarter, the 
necropolis, an artisan quarter and the tomb of Danie175 • The ancient royal 
palace of Darius and Artaxerxes Memnon underlines its previous importance as 
a centre in Achaemenid times and illustrates the Seleucid practice of 
building new settlements or founding colonies, later to become poleis, near 
to, or as a part of, a pre-existent town. 
There are of course exceptions to this rule as particular 
local, geographical or strategic requirements demanded radical reshaping or 
restructuring of old foundations or idiosyncratic approaches to their 
defence, as for example at Alexandria-in-Margiane; at others like Kabul 
(Kophen) and Herat (Alexandria-in-Aria) we can only presume that what 
subsequently became the citadel for later generations and other ethnic 
communities as the Bala Hissar served that purpose also for the Greeks. At 
Charsadda-Pushkalavati76 and Kandahar this certainly seems to have been the 
case - and perhaps for Bactra also, of whose siege under Antiochus III notice 
has already been taken, but of whose Greek remains it is astonishingly 
difficult to uncover traces. 77 
Ghirshman, in a review of the work done on the Seleucid and 
Parthian levels at Susa, says that the excavations there demonstrate the 
existence of a mixed population in which Iranians and Susites rubbed 
shoulders with Greeks and Macedonians: 'In one area native houses with 
central courts stood beside villas with courtyards having peristyles, tiled 
roofs adorned with terracotta acroteria and living rooms embellished with 
78 frescoes'. 
Nineveh seems to have acquired the semblance of a polis during 
the hellenistic period. An inscription found in 1904, during the excavation 
of the Nabu temple there, records the dedication by an Apollophanes, the son 
of Asclepiades on behalf of Apollonius, who is described as the strategos and 
epistates of the city, to the 'theoi ep~koi,.79 These officers, mentioned 
~'V 
here in a Parthian context, demonstrate how the Seleucid organisation lived 
on into the Parthian period which began about 130 Be. It is difficult to say 
whether the citadel was continuously occupied: the pottery and architectural 
remains of the hellenistic stratum, according to Oates, 'are too confused to 
°t 1 ° I 80 b t h to perml ana YS1S, u e con lnues: lIt seems probable that the greater 
part of the town lay in the plain below, where a small shrine of Hermes the 
travellers' patron, particularly appropriate to a bridgehead site, was 
) 
tl °d tOfO d 81 recen y 1 en 1 le 0 No direct evidence for its date was available: the 
cult statue was a provincial hellenistic product which, Oates thinks, might 
have been made at almost any time in the Seleucid or Parthian periods. 82 
Alexandria-in-Margiane, which we have mentioned in the context 
of the settlements Alexander required to found in order to preserve the 
frontiers of his empire, was - as we saw - refounded, probably after a 
nomadic irruption early in the third century, as Antioch-in-the-Waters. It 
was an example of a pre-existent, possibly an Achaemenid city, founded about 
500 BC, and became a huge city under the Parthians. 83 What we have now, the 
'archaeological Merv', is a great complex of several cities 30 km. east of 
the modern Mary. Its area seems originally to have been about 940 acres. 
In the centre of the ancient city of Antioch was the powerful fortress of 
Erk Kala, the citadel-feature common to most Asiatic poleis, probably built 
in the second century BC, and reconstructed later under the Parthians. This 
would seem to indicate a Bactrian rebuilding, as the date coincides with the 
reign of Eucratides, or perhaps that of Antimachus Theos. 84 
From the remains of the old Antioch (Giaur Kala) has come, 
inter alia, a stucco capital of Corinthian inspiration which represents a 
female head among acanthus leaves and is reminiscent of the remains at Termez 
on the Oxus. Such hellenistic motifs also occur at Munchak Tepe, Angka-Kala 
(Khorezma), Airtam and Kara Tepe in Uzbekistan as well as at Surkh Kotal in 
Kushan-period Bactria. Margiane has no monuments comparable with those from 
Nisa, and no object of outstanding artistic value such as the rhytons from 
Nisa, sixty of which have been reconstructed so far. The representations on 
the Nisa rhytons are, according to Frumkin, 'mostly expressive and typically 
Greek', but seem occasionally to exhibit the 'rigid and hieratic Parthian 
style,.85 Frumkin adds that this evolution of style seems to represent the 
replacement of hellenism by local elements and also the growing decentralisatio 
of the Seleucid empire when some provinces, in this instance Margiane 
86 increasingly autonomous ,or became a part of the Bactrian state. 
became 
Nisa, whose life in the Parthian period has been illustrated 
by the ostraka discovered there and written in a cursive form of Aramaic, is 
18 km. from Ashkabad in Turkmenistan at the foot of Kopet Dagh, and is 
referred to by Strabo (Nesaea,XI, 7, 3), Ptolemy (VI, 101) and Isidore of 
Charax in his Parthian Stations who calls it 'Parthaunisa' and informs us 
that it contains the tombs of the Parthian Kings.87 Excavations, halted by 
the war, began again in 1946, and have revealed a funerary temple (?) - which 
may indicate the necropolis mentioned by Isidore at the site known as New Nisa.' 
'Old Nisa' has revealed the ruins of a powerful walled fortress which the 
ostraka say was built by Mithridates - 'Mihrdatkart'. This was possibly the 
work of Mithridates I, but is more likely to have been Mithridates II, whose 
89 dates are on a large number of documents • A large pillared hall serving as 
a treasury perhaps dates from the first century AD, and it was near this 
building that the ostraka came to light between 1948 and 1957. By 1960 
170 had been published, although the total number discovered is about 2,200. 
Most of these concern the etiquette related to the royal wine cellars, but 
their most valuable contribution to the history of this hellenistic city is 
the light they shed on the chronology of the Parthian period by indicating 
unambiguously that the dating begins on 1st. Nisan 247 BC. 90 
In the Kafirnigan valley in South Tadzhikistan, Key-Kobad-Sakh 
is a typically-fortified Bactrian town on the River Kafirnigan, said to have 
been founded in the 3rd or 2nd century and to have been inhabited throughout 
the Kushan period to the 3rd or 4th century AD. It displays similarities 
with Be.gram, and among the remains found in the Kobadiyan district are big 
bases of columns and 'Corinthian' capitals of demonstrable hellenistic 
influence, similar - according to Frumkin - to those found by Bernard at 
A· Kh 91 l anum. In the Vaksh valley of south-west Tadzhikistan the later 
Bactrian period is represented by the remains of the fortified building 
compound at Kukhna Kala, discovered in 1954 by Litvinsky near Voroshilovobad. 
The building of this site, apparently never finished, contains some 
similarities to Begram; and as it stood in the track of the Yueh-chi and 
Sakas as they passed southwards, is judged to have been left incomplete for 
92 
that reason. Remains of stone architecture, terracottas of hellenistic 
type and other artefacts have been removed from other sites in south 
Tadzhikistan. 
Seleucia-on-Tigris itself was a polis founded by Seleucus I 
the site of Opis, and serious colonisation took place when the inhabitants 
on 
of Babylon were transferred to Seleucia by Antiochus I twenty years after 
the founding. It is worthy of note that the arrangements made by Seleucus I 
(and AntiochusI) for the heir apparent to reside at Seleucia modify, though 
they do not actually cancel out, the view taken in this work that the main 
emotional centre, and the administrative and military headquarters of the 
Seleucid Empire, still lay dangerously far west at Antioch-on-the-Orontes if 
the area to be ruled had its geographical centre approximately in Media. 
This no doubt explains the strategic thinking which led Seleucus I and his 
successors to leave relatives at Seleucia as Governor of the Upper Satrapies 
(or some such designation). We have from the discoveries at Seleucia 
indications of a possible revolt of Antiochus Its son Seleucus against 
Antiochus II Theos when he had succeeded to the throne93 • From Seleucia 
also comes a tablet in clay bearing the name of Alexander Balas, and 
indicating that he was still acknowledged as king in Babylonia in the eighth 
month of the Babylonian year, i.e., late in 146/5. 94 
We do know that the polis was regarded as an autonomous 
municipal unit, and that even when quite small frequently had a mint, as Dura 
Europus had - coining in the reign of Antiochus I with distinctive coin-types 
(a horned horse, a Macedonian helmet and an elephant)95. There also seems 
to have been, under Antiochus I and Antiochus II a royal official with the 
power to countermark currency emanating from the capital city at Antioch
96
1 
although Bellinger makes a point of the dependence of Dura upon Antioch, at 
least as far as coinage is concerned97 - another instance of what we could 
call the gravitational pull of Antioch-on-the-Orontes. And whereas Antioch, 
Pergamum and Seleucia-on-Tigris were all capital cities, this status was no 
guarantee of autonomy but rather a reason for even stricter royal control. 98 
Lastly, in our brief survey of some sites of individual poleis 
in hellenistic Asia, mention should be made of Pushkalavati, which - there is 
good reason to suppose - was the principal city of Greek India in Menander's 
day. Some of the more detailed finds from this site have been mentioned in 
the main work, but as a major Greek city in India a survey of poleis would 
be wrong to ignore it. The site of the Greek city at Charsadda, now known 
as Shaikhan (Deri) was discovered by aerial survey at the instigation of 
Mortimer Wheeler, who handed the work over to A. H. Dani of the University 
of Peshawar. Coinage did include 15 Menander coins at least,99 as well as 
coinage from the reigns of Antialcidas, Heliocles (II), Lysias, Telephus and 
Philoxenus; and Dani ascribes the foundation of this city 'substantially' 
100 to Menander. Coinage of Agathocles and Agathocleia is also to be found 
there, dating from near Menander in time. 
Wheeler's original excavation at Charsadda in 1962 exposed 
several cultures in Gandhara from the 6th to the 1st centuries BC in the 
Bala Hissar mound: it was this excavation which Dani extended to Shaikhan 
Deri. This site is virtually surrounded by water and is at the intersection 
of the Khaili and Adezai rivers (which join to form the Surdenjab), and the 
site is watered on the east by the Abazai and Shambar Nala: it is also on 
the western side of the River Sina, a branch of the Swat. The mound stands 
on an alluvial plain and is itself 1045 feet above sea level. lOl This 
topographical information indicates the similarity of siting to Ai Khanum 
and Begram in its combination of easy defensibility and strategic location 
at the intersection of prominent waterways. 
The fact that the hellenistic city at Taxila (Sirkap) is 
demonstrably laid out according to strict Hippodamian canons of street planning 
suggests the pervasiveness of Greek architectural models; and the progress 
of excavations in recent years at Ai Khanum for instance, and previously at 
Taxila, demonstrates how far and how accurately such concepts could travel. 
The Jandial temple at Sirkap, complete with columns and cornices, although 
without images, is eloquent testimony to this cultural buoyancy in a Buddhist 
milieu in a way that the temenos of Kineas at Ai Khanum is not. 102 Ai Khanum 
asserted Hellenism in a wilierness: the Jandial, and indeed Sirkap in many 
respects, asserted Hellenism in partibus infidelium. 
It was the task of Greek and Iranian, and also Indian, artists 
to embellish the poleis created by the settlement and colonisation movement 
which Alexander and the first Seleucids instigated, and in this they were 
governed by the twin streams of history and artistic antecedents to which 
they were indebted. It is now not enough to say that what they produced was 
. G k I . 103 nelther ree nor ranlan • We have now produced and cited examples of 
genuine Greek planning and architecture which Iranians in the broad sense had 
not seriously altered in the case of Ai Khanum, nor Indians violated in the 
case of the Jandial. It is true that the Ai Khanum capitals are 'different', 
but in many details the spirit lived on; and the same thing can be said 
about the Corinthian capital without its abacus at Istakhr. l04 
The excavations at Failaka in the Persian Gulf demonstrate how 
in hellenistic times a small site could include, in a complex only 60 metres 
long by 60 metres broad, various buildings including a temple, so that it 
could be described by the excavators as 'the island's cultural and 
administrative centre t ;105 and this complex could contribute the working 
base for what was in effect a sacred community. In the context of this 
brief look at the art and architecture which the poleis gave rise to, we 
should note at Failaka the small temple containing the sanctuary of a 
106 
saviour-goddess, as the inscription found there makes clear. The 
inscription itself may date from the time of Antiochus Epiphanes although 
the settlement probably goes back to Alexander's day (Arrian VII, 20, 3 f.). 
A base for the cult statue has been uncovered in the course of the excavation. 
The pillars of the temple have Persian bases, but it is thought that this 
is the result of pre-existent architectural members which were re-used, so 
the pillar would not be an architectural hybridl07 - indeed it is asserted 
by Jeppesen that 'nothing actively was done to continue pre-Greek building 
108 
methods'. 
The spread of hellenistic artistic elements, and their longevity, 
have frequently been discussedl09 ; and the subsequent Roman invasion and 
settlement of the Near East in the 2nd century AD continued the proliferation 
of hellenistic features in buildings (e.g. at Palmyra)110 which were Roman 
and not Greek in origin. The Roman theatre at Beit She 'an in Coele Syria 
(Northern Israel) demonstrates this in a considerable state of preservation. 
And, of course, the economic life of the poleis of the Greek world generally 
gave both impetus and resources for the production of works of art such as 
the four bronze statuettes recovered from the temple at Nihavend in Media 
whose hellenistic style is as pronounced as their artistic quality.lll 
Further afield the workmanship displayed in the silver vessels with their 
scenes from Euripides, and attributed with good reason to Bactria, demonstrate 
what purity of style could be achieved in extremely remote areas of the 
hellenistic world. 112 The recent excavation of a splendid mosaic pavement 
in the residence of the administrative quarter at Ai Khanum, whose technique 
suggests similarities to Olynthus and Pella, is further proof of the durability 
of hellenistic style and its careful preservation when transplanted to the 
O 113. ms • 
Although the coinage from the Greek kingdoms in Bactria and 
India is mostly useful as a guide to the reigning kings in those parts, and 
as a basis for arriving at some workable chronology, such coins are eminent 
examples of portrait carving and coin engraving, achieving in this field 
results so convincing as to suggest really authentic representation and not 
merely an idealised likeness. As has been often pointed out, their value as 
royal propagandal14 was distinct from their usefulness as currency - and 
again the mastery of realism and style seem to show, down to the time of 
Hermaeus and Archebius (in fact to the end of the line), an esprit de corps 
in those eastern parts which tends to confirm our findings from the other 
areas of political and city life. In so far as coins are the product of 
the mint cities - at Seleucia, Bactra, Ecbatana, Gardez, Pushkalavati or 
Taxila, for example, so their quality was also a genuine product of the life 
of these cities. 
Sufficient has been mentioned in this excursus, and elsewhere 
in this work, of the presence of, and construction and embellishment of 
shrines and temples to make it clear how important religion was, on the 
surface at least, in the hellenistic age, although with a varying impact and 
a much more syncretistic ambience than in classical times. The rebuilding 
of the temples of E-Sagila and Borsippal14a under the Seleucids indlcates 
how seriously this aspect of city and national life was regarded, until the 
later Seleucids' chronic lack of available finance led to the temples' wealth 
being seen as a more important factor in the political equation than respect 
for religious customs and shrines. 
The fact that poleisdid tend, because of their demographic 
composition and location, to be Greek or Macedonian Oases of culture in an 
alien (but not uncultured) population was increasingly to lead to a social 
and economic cleavage seen clearly in the construction of poleis. Colledge 
makes the point l15 that the Hippodamian principles of a rectangular, walled 
layout replaced a much more pronounced division in Achaemenid times between 
palace complexes and the rest of the towns' surface area which was left to 
semi-chaos. But whether this was consciously politically intended, to 
dissipate tensions which would certainly exist between Greek and native 
communities, is doubtful. As Cohen points outl16 , the first need of a 
colonial site was to ensure security and protection for the settlers, and 
• 
the attitude taken to the Greek garrison on the ~~~~ is well-known in the 
case of Jerusalem. 117 S. K. Eddy has performed a valuable service in 
underlining the hostile reaction to the Hellenising movement in various 
countries in the Middle East, frequently as the result of religious or religion 
inspired opposition: it can no longer be maintained that this was a purely, 
or even primarily Jewish phenomenon. Persis, Media and Elam at least 
reacted violently. 
The class tension, endemic in the hellenistic world, between 
a hellenised, or hellenising middle class, whether Jews, Iranians or 
Egyptians and the peasantry of town, or more particularly country, has been 
underlined,119 and it made the effort to instil hellenistic culture - even 
if consciously intended - doubtful of accomplishment. There were too many 
social imponderables to guarantee a genuine pro-Greek, by which I also mean 
pro-Macedonian, popular movement. The popular movement, when it came, was 
invariably in the opposite direction, as this work has indicated - in Egypt, 
Judaea, Elam or Media, and this is in part attributable precisely to the 
concentration on poleis which was the Greeks' great contribution to the 
Orient. Paradoxically it heightened rather than resolved tensions which 
made continued Seleucid rule intolerable - as the inhabitants of Media 
graphically demonstrated to the troops of Antiochus Sidetes, the last great 
Seleucid. Ghirshman gives excellent social reasons for concluding that 'the 
conquest of Iran was a defeat for hellenism' 120, because the hellenism which 
arrived with the Macedonian conquest only touched the surface of Iranian 
society, and by implication, further divided that society. But results do 
not prove intentions. 
Possibly involving the military settlers in the new colonies 
were the KOIV~ of the hellenistic world, and the existence of these clubs 
goes some way to confirming Ghirshman's conclusions about the fissiparous 
nature of Greek settlement patterns. Associations, which may well have 
121 
'satisfied the social and religious needs of the colonists' - along with 
the gymnasia and the other features which archaeology has revealed as the 
superstructure of the poleis of Asia - simply make plain a process which 
further separated the Greeks and Macedonians from the natives 'on site'. 
While it would probably be unrealistic to see in the normal soldiery of such 
Greek settlements active proponents of hellenism, that is not to say that the 
cities they were helping willy-nilly to create could not themselves have 
become at least Hellenic landmarks which did have influence and could not 
be ignored. 
The later history of Seleucid-on-Tigris in Roman times , 
which C. B. Welles (rightly) cites as 'a symbol of Hellenism in the East tl22 
confirms the longevity and vitality of such poleis - as do Gerasa, Ba'albek 
and Beit She'an-Scythopolis, for example, which all had a considerable role 
to play in Syria under the Romans. All these cities - and others too _ 
indicate how anxious the Romans were to embellish and preserve them so that 
their life continued, transformed rather than supplanted. 
It is always difficult to talk about what founders intended 
the cities to become: all we have is the evidence of their existence, their 
siting, their embellishment and their economic, and in some cases cultural 
activity; but what we have outlined is, I believe, sufficient to indicate 
that the contribution they made was a positive one, whatever its ethnic and 
cultural failings may have beenl23 • It was a worthy contribution to the 
life of the ancient world - very much underplayed in recent discussion, 
which tends to dwell on the origins of the polis rather than its later 
development, principally under the Seleucidsl24 : not only is this process 
important from the point of view of trade and commercial development in the 
Greek East, but it delineates an attempt to produce a working political idea 
in scores of locations - notwithstanding the self-interest in terms of 
defence and commerce which the presence of the polis no doubt implied. As 
Welles points out,125 the Seleucids were told by their court poets that 
'they were setting up model communities for future generations to enjoy', 
and we should accept Libanius' encomiuml26 for the Seleucids t progenitor -
that 'by hellenising the barbarian world he brought it to an end' - as a 
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and it is unhistorical - as it cannot be cleansed of recent assoclatlons 
to use it to describe, or to decry, hellenistic arrangements. 
E.g. in the recent Centenary Colloquium of the Hellenic Society in 1979, 
where the spread and development of the polis received scant attention, 
even in papers ostensibly devoted to this topic. 
Welles, OPe cit., p. 157. 
CONCLUSION. 
The year 280/281 not only saw the Battle of Corupedion and 
then the death of Seleucus I; it also marked the secession of Persis 
(Fars) from the Seleucid Empire, to be only temporarily reclaimed, and 
to that extent it set in train a succession of territorial losses for 
reasons usually connected with the rise or establishment of local 
political autonomy, but sometimes dependent on the military or political 
situation which governors on the spot had to face. Examples of this were 
the Bactrian satrapy under Diodotus I, and possibly the Parthian satrapy 
under Andragoras. If the evac~ation of Indian and Bactrian territory 
under Seleucus I in 305 could be seen as intelligent pruning of an 
over-extended land-mass (and therefore as the partial solution to a 
problem of control), this rationale could not be applied to the secession 
of Parthia or Bactria, whose demise as Seleucid-controlled territory came 
about as the result of no agreement that we can detect. The contextual 
picture which we have endeavoured to sketch does suggest that a 
description of the secession of either of these states as a 'revolt' 
would be open to doubt, and would depend upon one's point of view. But 
the fact remains that, shorn of them, the Seleucid State not only lost 
provinces, and therefore also the ability to control the defence of such 
provinces against external attack, but further, that a process had been 
started which would encourage attempts at 'reclamation' - under Seleucus II, 
Antiochus III, possibly under Antiochus IV, certainly Demetrius II and 
eventually Antiochus VII - which expeditions were themselves exercises 
which diverted and weakened the Seleucid state instead of stabilising 
and strengthening it. 
This process of secession in Persis, Bactria and Parthia, 
I for examples, was tackled by Antiochus III by agreement and a relationship, 
possibly of vassalage, but/was in effect a legal, or tacit recognition of 
~ 
the state of affairs which had come into existence in these parts and with 
which Antiochus may well have been in reluctant agreement by that time. 
Certainly his offer of a marriage arrangement to Euthydemus I of Bactria 
suggests accommodation to an acceptable compromise rather than an attempt 
at an impossible revanche. 
Such secessions were of course followed by those of Media 
Atropatene, Characene, Elymais and Judaea under their own native rulers, 
and sometimes as the result of military campaigns, notably so in the case 
of Maccabean Palestine. It is not suggested that all these states 
seceeded for the same reasons or combination of reasons: Judaea had 
grounds which, although possibly similar to those of Elam as far as the 
perceived Seleucid contempt for religious sanctuaries was concerned, 
really had a considerable bearing on the understanding which near eastern 
natives had of Hellenism. l 
The concept of Hellenism as a cultural force was far too 
closely tied up with the aspirations of a particular social group within, 
e.g. Judaea. In a country as strategically vital to the Seleucids as 
Coele-Syria this was a dangerous social polarisation; and the Seleucid 
cause never recovered from the Maccabean Revolt, which took place during 
a period of particularly careful balancing by the Seleucid state between 
the interests (and advances) of Parthia on the one hand and Rome on the 
other. As we have attempted to demonstrate, if Antiochus IV's usurpation 
was a cardinal error of policy with enduring consequences for dynastic 
succession, the character of his involvement with Jewish religion was a 
bad reflection on the culture he was commending and attempting to impose. 
John Hyrcanus' involvement with Antiochus Sidetes' expedition to reclaim 
the East cannot, we think, be interpreted as a final admission that 
Hellenism was worth fighting to preserve against Parthia. Rather it 
was an inevitable consequence of a political arrangement with the current 
(and strong) Seleucid which he wished, and was probably bound, to preserve. 
This leads us to suggest that the whole issue of the Greek 
IEffondrement ' in Asia is wrapped up with the personality of the Seleucid 
rulers and the loyalty they were able to command or enjoy (or not) to 
an extent which reduces the weight to be attached to Hellenism as their 
enterprise. We cannot argue that the dissemination of Greek culture did 
not happen - or that it was not frequently welcomed: there is too much 
evidence, much of which we have cited, ~ Graeco-Macedonian influence f6Y~ 
upon Literature, Art, Architecture, Political Thought, Town Planning, 
Religion and Philosophical concepts and attitudes to allow of any such 
bleak conclusion to Alexander's Inabasis in Asia and its consequences. ,., / 
What we do, I believe, have to say is that such influences were a 
by-product of the presence of Graeco-Macedonian personnel and not its 
cause, and that therefore the Seleucids were not in occupation in order 
to commend Hellenism. 
This conclusion enables us to see what they did actually 
achieve in rather a different and a better light. Treatment of captured 
Seleucid kings by the Parthians was generous and courteous up to and 
including Demetrius Eukairos, and this suggests a tolerance of the 
Seleucid house, even in its death throes, which is remarkable if nothing 
else. It comes as no surprise to find even later Parthians, after the 
bl ;attle of Carrhae, being entertained by a performance of the 'Bacchae' 
i/ of EuripIdes, or to note that for two centuries Parthian sculptors 
imitated Hellenistic style. This only changed when the Seleucid line 
.-t ri#x ittr 1 
became extinct. 
The eclipse of Greek influence in India is another, but 
related, issue, and is not treated in this work except tangentially; 
but there too are the marks of respect in coinage and in literature of 
Greek for Indian and vice-versa. The Seleucids' substantial contribution 
to trade between India and the Mediter~anean world, for instance by the 
building and maintenance of harbours, seems a genuine example of 
constructive economic thinking; and although the actual arrangements in 
Greek India around the Rann of Cutch in Sigerdis and Saraosto h s are s rouded 
in mystery, there is good reason to believe that Antiochus IV rebuilt an 
Alexandria as Antiochia on the Persian Gulf (later Charax Spasinu) to 
revive and to stimulate trade between India and the rivers of the Persian 
Gulf. Ambassadors were appointed to the courts of both Chandragupta and 
13i~SA..""~ his successor, under Seleucus I and Antiochus I, and from 
the pen of Megasthenes the Seleucid state obtained graphic impressions of 
the culture of contemporary India. The final independence of Persis in 
about 150, and the defeat of the Elymaeans under Kaminiskeres by the 
Parthians between December 141 and February 140, put this Indian seaborne 
trade into Parthian hands at its western end. 
The quality of life in the Babylonia which the Seleucids 
left to Mithridates has revealed traces in the excavations at Uruk/Orchoi; 
and Goosens' sad article describes the spiritual deadness of this 
Babylonian city as disclosed by the cuneiform tablets - or rather the 
'sealed' character of its arrangements as though the city were a 'little 
world apart', from which only two families stay 'loyal to Hellenism': 
those of Kephalon and Strato. I think we must deduce from this that 
where colonisation was strong and continuous and Greek life could be not 
only self-supporting but also self-perpetuating (and perhaps self-commending), 
as at Seleucia-on-Tigris, it enjoyed remarkable longevity. Where this 
municipal and cultural strength was lacking, it shrivelled away. Such 
a conclusion is supported by what we know to have been the political and 
military pressures upon an elongated Seleucid state from its inception. 
Colonisation had to succeed emotionally in order for it to be politically 
effective. 
280 was the date also of the 'War of Succession' in Syria 
as Antiochus I attempted successfully to hold onto his kingdom in the 
face of Ptolemy Philadelphus t drive for power in the Eastern Medi terrane::;.~·. 
And we must assign to the Seleucid-Lagid conflict for control of the 
Eastern Mediterranean coast (and the separate struggle for Coele-Syria) 
a role in the erosion of Greek power in the east, because of the constant 
distraction the five Syrian Wars provided - requiring finance, military 
force and above all oversight. Only at the eventual instigation of Rome 
were such hostilities terminated, and then not until 58, by which time 
Egypt had become more or less a pawn of Roman policy, and Ptolemy Auletes 
was heavily financially dependent upon Rome. The last Seleucid king, 
Philip II, was invited by the people of Alexandria to govern Egypt; and 
Aulus Gabinius, by then Roman pro-consul of Syria, forbade him to accept 
(Eusebius I, 261). In the intervening two hundred years, the ptolemaic 
dynasty had ensured that all dynastic measures were employed to disturb 
the smoothness of the Seleucid succession; and the comradeship between 
Seleucus and Ptolemy Lagus never returned in their descendants. 
As for Rome, her influence on the Seleucids seems to have 
been intended to distract them from hindering Roman plans, and it 
developed into a systematic constraint on Seleucid policy. A species 
of oversight arose which antagonised Seleucid rulers, for example 
Antiochus III, Antiochus IV and Demetrius I, and diverted the Seleucid 
house from eastern responsibilities it had to discharge. Polybius noted 
this development, and as Walbank declares, Books XXX to XXXIII 'furnish us 
with an almost unbroken run of cynical comments on Roman policy'. 
The Seleucid responsibility for Greek rule in the East had 
been assumed at Babylon in 311 as the result of military conquest of 
Antigonus' territory, and in circumstances in which Greek rule might have 
taken over successfully the Achaemenid mantle. Within thirty years 
Antiochus I had evidence from the activities of Demodamas and his own 
experience that the northern marches of his state were critically 
vulnerable. Despite valiant and continuing efforts to stiffen resistance 
to invasion from that quarter (and to reclaim territory subsequently 
invaded by Parthia), that northern frontier proved ultimately indefensible _ 
and the pressures upon it remained, even after the Parthians had established 
control, for Mithridates II to deal with after the loss of two Parthian 
kings to the Saca. 
The Greek poleis lived on, with their municipal arrangements 
now adopted by the Parthians and their language preserved for hundreds of 
years as perhaps the most tangible of the Seleucids' considerable achievements. 
We may philosophise over the eclipse of Greek rule in the 
East and regret it, as Tarn so notably did)but with what Welles warned was 
the beguiling tongue of the lawyer used to presenting a case. We may 
merely comment, but from an antipathetic standpoint as Narain did. 
Nowadays we have (rightly) to adopt a more independent and possibly a 
more objective stance, and not to try to be cultural proponents. So we 
follow Will, Pulleyblank and Lozinski among others and report on what 
the state of affairs appears to have been. This lets us off the 
accusation of bias and imperialism and enables us to say what we can and 
not what we like; but no one can prevent regret at the demise of a 
notable experiment (the first) of western rule in the East. We should 
not allow feelings of annoyance, frustration or dismay at the internecine 
feuding of the Seleucid line's last hundred years to blind us to the 
real ~uality of the Seleucid achievement. If their most enduring memorial 
was their colonisation programme and the poleis which emerged from it, 
that success must itself have been the result of the settlers who 
inhabited the poleis and operated their institutions. 
It is paradoxically only in the closing years of Greek 
hegemony in Asia that the powers who had been attacking the Hellenistic 
monarchies, and had in the end prevailed, themselves assumed the pattern 
of Hellenistic state-organisation and proclaimed themselves 'Philhellenes': 
of these states Parthia, Judaea and the Nabatean kingdom of Aretas III are 
good examples. . A· should And perhaps a last comment on Greek rule ln Sla 
come from Antiochus Epiphanes (this time of Commagene) who claimed to be 
descended from Alexander and Darius, and proclaimed a Graeco-Iranian 
syncretism: he also called himself a Philhellene - perhaps a wistful 
3 
recollection of Alexander's dream and of Apama's own marriage. 
Notes. 
2. 
A point made in detail throughout S. K. Eddy's work 'The King is 
Dead', Lincoln, Nebraska, 1961, but also very recently by 
M. Hengel' in 'Jews, Greeks, and Barbarians', London, 1980. 
B. Goosens: Au declin de la civilization Babylonienne: 
Ourouk sous les Seleucides: Bulletin de la classe de lettres, 
Academie royale de Belgique V, 27, p. 222 f. 
T. Goell in Anatolian Studies V, 1955, p. 13 - 14. Inscription 
from Com~agene (Nsmrud Dagh) in SEG. XXVI, Alphen aan den Rijn, 1979. 
ALEXANDER THE GREAT, HIS SUCCESSORS AND 
THE SELEUCIDS 




Seleucus I Nicator 
Antiochus I Soter 
Antiochus II Theos 
Seleucus II Callinicus 
Seleucus III Soter 
Antiochus III (the Great) 
Seleucus IV Philopator 
Antiochus IV Epiphanes 
Antiochus V Eupator 
Demetrius I Soter 
Alexander Balas 
Demetrius II Nicator 
Antiochus VI Epiphanes 
Antiochus VII (Sidetes) 
Demetrius II Nicator 
Cleopatra Thea 
Cleopatra Thea and Antiochus VIII 
(Grypus) 
Seleucus V 
Antiochus VIII (Grypus) 
Antiochus IX (Cyzicenus) 
Seleucus VI Epiphanes Nicanor 
-Demetrius III Philopator 
Antiochus X Eusebes 
Antiochus XI Philadelphus 
Philip I Philadelphus 
Antiochus XII Dionysus 
(Tigranes of Armenia) 
Antiochus XIII Asiaticus 
Philip II 
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SELEUCID COINAGE I 
Antiochus II (0) Antiochus Hierax (0) Seleucus II (0) 
Antiochus II (R) Antiochus Hierax (R) Seleucus II (R) 
Antiochus III (0) Antiochus IV (0) Demetrius I (0) 
Antiochus III (R) Antiochus IV (R ) Demetriu I (R 
COINS OF SELEUCUS IV ARE NOT INCLUDED 
Alexander Balas (0) 
Alexander Balas (R) 
Antiochus VII (0) 
Antiochus VII (R) 
SELEUCID COINAGE II 
Demetrius II 
(First Reign) (0) 
Demetrius II 
(First Reign) (R) 
Antiochus VIII (0) 
Antiochus VIII (R) 
Tryphon (0) 
Tryphon (R) 
Antiochus IX (0) 
Antiochus IX (R 
COINS OF ALEXANDER ZABINAS ARE NOT INCLUDED 
SELEUCID COINAGE III 
Seleucus VI (0) Antiochus X (0) Antiochus XI (0) 
Seleucus VI (R) Antiochus X (R) Antiochus XI (R) 
Philip I (0) Demetrius III (0) Tigranes (0) 
Philip I (R) Demetriu s III (R ) Tigran 
COINS OF ANT IOCHUS XII, t\1'\T IOClIlIS XIII ..\1'\0 PHILIP II ARE N T I~ ' OFI 
Diodotus I (0) 
Diodotus I (R) 
(Inscr. Antiochus II) 
Euthydemus I (0) 
Euthydemus I (R) 
BACTRI AN COINAGE I 
Euthydemus I (0) 
Euthydemus I (R) 
Diodotus I (0) 
Diodotus I (R) 
Euthydemus I (0) 
Euthydemus I (R) 
BACTRIAN COINAGE II 
Demetrius I (0) Eucratides I (0) 
Demetrius I (R) Eucratides I (R) 
Eucratides I (0) Eucratides I (0) Hdiodes I (0) 
Eucratides I (R) Eucratides I (R) Heliode I (R 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
.LITERARY SOURCES: 
Revised Standard Version of The Apocrypha, Ed. B. M. Metzger, 1961. 
Appian: Roman History, Loeb Ed. Horace White, 1912. 
Arrian: Anabasis of Alexander and Indica, Loeb Ed. E. I. Robson, 1933. 
Arrian: Parthica, Libris XVIII, ed. Mftller, Paris, 1877. 
Ch'ien Han-Shu (Annals of the Former Han), Chh. 61 and 96A tr. Wylie in 
'Notes on the Western Regions', Journal of the Anthrop. Institute, Vol. X, 1881. 
Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker, Ed. Felix JacobA, Berlin, 1926. 
Diodorus Siculus: Books XXI - XXXIII, Loeb Ed. E. R. Walton, 1967. 
Isidore of Charax: Mans Parthikoi, 'Parthian Stations', Geographi Graeci 
"" Minores, ed. MThller, Paris, 1882 and W. H. Schoff, Philadelphia, 19140 
Josephus: Antiquities of the Jews, Loeb Ed. R. Marcus, Vols. XII - XIV, 1961. 
Justin: Epitome of Historiae Philippicae of Trogus Pompeius, Teubner Edition, 
Ed. Seel, Leipzig, 1935. 
Libanius: (Loeb) Selected Works, with an English translation and notes by 
A. F. Norman, London, 1970. 
Livy: History of Rome, Loeb Edition, Ed. Ewen Sage, London, and History of 
Rome, translated by H. W. Bettenson, with an introduction by A. H. MacDonald, 
Harmondsworth, 1976. 
The Milindapanha or 'Questions of Milinda' Ed. Rhys Davids in 'Sacred 
Books of the East', Ed. I. B. Horner, London, 1969. 
Pliny: Natural History, Book VI, Loeb Edn., 1942. 
Plutarch: Lives of Lucullus and Crassus, ed. J. & W. Langhorne, London, 
(ND) Moralia, Loeb Edn. 
Polybius: History, Loeb Ed. W. R. Paton, 1922 - 7. 
y 
F/ 
Poseidonius of Apamea. i) The fragments ed. Edelstein and Kidd, Cambridge, 1972. 
Strabo: Geography, Loeb Edition, Ed. H. L. Jones, (Vol. XI). 
The Story of Ching K'ien, from Ssu-ma-Tsien: Shi-Ki, in.Journal of the 
American Oriental Society, Vol. XXXVII, 1917, Ed. Fr. Hlrth. 
Yuga Purana of the Gargi Sarmita, ed. D. R. Mankad. Vallabhvidyanagar, 
1951. 
Polyaenus: Teubner, Ed. Leipzig, 1887. 
Claudius Ptolemy: Geographica, ed. Renou, Paris, 1925. 
ARCHAEOLOGY AND EPIGRAPHY. 
Altheim and Steihl: Der Seleukidenschrift aus Failaka: Klio 46, 1965, 
p. 273 - 281. 
Bernard, P.: Chapiteaux corinthiens hellenistiques d'Asie centrale 
decouvertes ~ Ai Khanoum. Syria XLV, 1968, p. III - 151. 
Paul Bernard: Fouilles dlAi Khanum, Campagnes 1965 - 68, Paris, 1973, 
and separate reports in CRAI from 1966 to 1976 inclusive. 
A. D. H. Bivar: 
A. D. H. Bivar: 
M. L. Chaumont: 
The Kushana trilingual, BSOAS XXXIX pt. 3, 1976, p. 333 - 340. 
The First Parthian Ostrakon from Iran. J.R.A.S.1970-l, p. 63 - 66. 
Les Ostraca de Nisa. Journal Asiatique, 1968, p. 11 - 35. 
M. L. Chaumont: Etudes d'histoire Parthe I, Documents royaux a Nisa, 
Syria, XLVIII, 1971, p. 143 - 164. 
British Institute of Persian Studies: Excavations in Iran: The British 
Contribution, Oxford, 1972. 
A. T. Clay: Babylonian Records in the Library of J. Pierpoint Morgan, Vol. II. 
F. Cumont: Nouvelles Inscriptions Grecques de Suse. CRAI 91931), p. 233 - 250. 
A. H. Dani: Excavations at Charsadda, Ancient Pakistan II, 1965. 
W. Dittenberger: Orient is Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae (OGIS). 
Elisabeth During-Caspers: Review of Paul Bernard's Fouilles d'Ai Khanum in 
Bibliotheca Orientalis XXXIII, Nos. 3 - 4, May - July, 1976. 
Moses Finley: Atlas of Classical Archaeology, London, 1977. 
p. M. Fraser: The Son of Aristonax at Kandahar. Afghan Studies Vol. II, 
1979/80. 
G. Frumkin: Archaeology in Soviet Central Asia, Leiden, 1970. 
G. Fussman: Notes sur la topographie d'ancienne Kandahar, Arts Asiatiques, 
1966. 
T. Goell: Nimrud Dagh in Anatolian Studies V, 1955, pp. 13 - 14. 
G. Gullini: Fifth Preliminary Report of the Excavations at Seleucia-on-Tigris. Mesopotamia VII, 1974. 
J. Hackjin: Nouvelles Recherches a Begram, MDAFAXI, 1954. 
N. Hammond: An Archaeological reconnaissance in the Helmand Valley, 
East and West. Vol. XX, 1970. 
W. B. Henning: The Bactrian inscription, BSOAS XIII, 1960, p. 47 - 55. 
S. V. Helms: Preliminary Report on Excavations at Kandahar (1976) 
Afghan Studies Vol. II, 1979/90. 
E. E. Herzfeld: 'Sakastan' in Archaologische Mitteilungen aus Iran IV, 1938. 
ARCHAEOLOGY AND EPIGRAPHY - continued. 
Ko Jeppesen: A Royal Message to Ikaros: The Hellenistic Temples at 
Failaka. KUML, 1960. 
S. Kambakch-Fard: Fouilles Archaeologiques ~ Kangavar in Revue 
d'Archaeologie et d'art Iraniens, Nos. 9 - 10, December 1972. 
V. G. Lukonin: The Ancient Civilization of Persia, II, Geneva, 1970. 
Ro H. McDowell: Stamped and Inscribed Objects from Seleucia-on-Tigris, 
Michigan, 1935. 
John Marshall: A Guide to Taxila, Cambs. 1960. 
Anthony McNicoll: Excavations at Kandahar, 1975. Afghan Studies, I, 1978 - 9. 
E. H. Minns: Parchments of the Parthian period from Avroman, JHS 35, 1915. 
A. Mongait: Archaeology in the USSR, Moscow, 1959. 
David Oates: 'Nimrud 1957 1 ; The Hellenistic Settlement, IRAQ Vol. XX, 
1958, pp. 114 - 157. 
A. T. Olmstead: Cuneiform Texts and Hellenistic Chronology. Class. Phil. 
XXXII, 1937, p. 1 ff. 
10 A. Orbeli: Inscriptions of the Seleucid and Parthian Period: 
Saka Documents, Corpus Inscriptionum Irani carum , Pt. II, Vol. V, 1971. 
,H44\., 
Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecarum: ed. Plecket and Stroud, Vol. XXVI, 1979. 
'" '--.... 
Louis Robert: Inscriptions Seleucides de Phrygie et Iran, Hellenica VII 
and VIII. 
" Inscription Hellenistique d'Iran, Hellenica XI - XII. , 
Encore une inscription Greque de ltIran, CRAI, 1967, p. 281 - 297. 
Inscriptions from Ai Khanum in C.R.A.I. 1966 and 1967. 
Inscription from Bisutun, Gnomon 1963, p. 76. 
Sachs and Wiseman: A Babylonian King-List of the Hellenistic Period. 
IRAQ XVI, 19540 
Daniel Schlumberger: The Excavations at Surkh Kotal, London, 1961, 
Ai Khanum: une ville hellenistique en Afghanistan CRAI,1967. 
Une nouvelle inscription Greque d'Asoka, CRAI, 1965, 1964, p. 126 - 40. 
La Prospection archaeologiques de Bactres, Syria XXVI, 1949. 
Une Bilingue Greco-Arameenne d'Asoka, Journal Asiatique, 1958. 
(with M. Le Berre): Observations sur les remparts de Bactres, MDAFA, 1964. 
Eo F. Schmidt: Flights over ancient cities of Iran, Chicago, 1940. 
M. Sznycer: Ostraka d'epoque parthe trouv~s ~ Nisa. Semitica V, 1955, p. 65 f. 
R. K. Sherk: Roman Documents from the Greek East, Baltimore, 1969. 
E. Sollberger: Greco-Babylonica: (Textes Babyloniennes en caracteres 
grecs). Iraq, 1962. 
., 
I 
ARCHAEOLOGY AND EPIGRAPHY - continued. 
Excavations at Pasargadae - D. Stronach in IRAN, Vol. III, 1965. 
D. Stronach and J. Hansman: Excavations at Shahr-i-Qumis, JRAS, 1967, 
1970, 1974 and IRAN 1977. 
M. N. Tod: A Greek inscription from the Persian Gulf, JHS 63 (1943). 
E. A. Wallis-Budge: The Rosetta Stone. British Museum. Latest reprint, 1956. 
C. B. Welles: Royal Correspondence in the Hellenistic period, New Haven, 1934. 
R. E. M. Wheeler: Flames over Persepolis, London, 1968. 
David Whitehouse: Excavations at Kandahar, 1974, Afghan Studies I, 1978. 
Ao Go Woodhead: The Study of Greek inscriptions, Cambs., 1967. 
Rodney Young: The South Wall of Balkh-Bactra in AJA, 1955, Vol. 59. 
L. Van den Berghe: Archeo1ogie de l'Iran ancien. Leiden, 1959. 
NUMISMATICS: 
A. R. Bellinger: Seleucid Dura: the evidence of the coins. 
Berytus VII, 1948. 
../ 
, 
A. R. Bellinger: Antiochus V and cuneiforms, A.N.S. Museum notes 1945, e'i 
p. 43 f. I 
A. D. H. Bivar in Numismatic Chronicle, 1951, p. 23 - 39 and 1965, p. 69 _ 108. 
A. D. H. Bivar: The sequence of Menander's Drachmae, JRAS, 1970, p. 123 _ 136. 
R. Curiel and G. Fussman: 
p. 66 f. 
/ ./ 
Le Tresor monetaire de Qunduz, MDAFA 19, 1964, 
R. Curiel and D. Sch1umberger: 
1953. 
./ ' Tresors monetaires d'Afghanistan, MDAFA 14, 
N. Davis and C. M. Kraay: The Hellenistic Kingdoms, London, 1974. 
P. Gardner: The coins of the Greek and Scythic Kings of Bactria in the 
British Museum, London, 1886. 
P. Gardner: The Coinage of Parthia, 1887; New Ed. San Diego, 1968. 
A. Haughton and G. +e Rider: " Un tresor de monnai.es he11enistiques. 
RN. 1966. 
G. K. Jenkins: Coin Hoards from Pasargadae, IRAN, Vol. III, 1965, p. 41 f. 
Kraay, Thompson and Mprkholm: An Inventory of Greek Coin Hoards, New York, 
1976. 
G. K. Jenkins: 
G. K. Jenkins: 
G. K. Jenkins: 
in 'Nimrud, 1957', IRAQ, Vol. XX, 1958, p. 158 - 168. 
A Group of Bactrian Forgeries. RN. 1965, p. 51 f. 
Ancient Greek Coins, London, 1972. 
C. Kraay and M. Hirmer: Greek Coins, London, 1967. 
A. N. Lashiri: Corpus of Indo-Greek Coins, Lahore, 1949, 
G. le Rider: in Revue Numismatique 1959/1960. 
Gil le Rider: Monnaies de Characene in SYRIA XXXVI, p. 229 f. 
G. le Rider: Un atelier monetaire Se1eucide dans la province de 1a mer 
Erythree. R.N. 1965, p. 36 - 43. 
D. W. MacDowall and N. G. Wilson: Apo11odoti Reges Indorum, NC, Vol. XX, 
1960 0 
D. W. MacDowall: The Azes hoard from Shaikhan-Deri: fresh evidence for 
the context of Johonika, from South Asian Archaeology, 1973. 
R. H. MacDowall: Coins from Seleucia-on-the-Tigris. Ann Arbor Michigan, 
1935. 
Michael Mitchener: Indo-Greek and Indo-Scythian Coinage, Vols.l,II and 
III, London, 1975. 
NUMISMATICS: - continued o 
o. MPrkholm: Seleucus IV a Nisibe, Rev. Num. 1965, p. 46 f (with G. le Rider). 
O. MPrkholm: Seleucid Coins from Cilicia.. A.N.S. Museum notes 11, 1964. 
00 MPrkholm: A Greek Coin hoard from Susiana, Acta Archeologia 36, 1965. 
o. ~rkholm in A.N.S. Museum notes 16, 1970, p. 31 - 44. 
Eo T. Newell: Eastern Seleucid Mints, New York, 1938. 
- - -
David Selwood: The Coinage of Parthia, London, 1971. 
A. Simonetta: A note on the so-called Indo-Greek coinage, East and 
West, 1956, p. 44 fo 
ART AND ARCHITECTURE: 
Ancient Art from Afghanistan, Catalogue of an exhibition, London, 1969. 
R. Do Barnett: The art of Bactria and the treasure of the Oxus in 
Archaeologica Iranica in honorem R. Ghirshman, Leiden, 1970. 
M. A. R. Colledge: Parthian Art, London, 1977. 
O. M. Dalton: The treasure of the Oxus, London, 1926. 
No C. Debevoise: When Greek and Oriental culture me~t at Seleucia, Asia 
38, 1938. 
Karl Jettmar: The Art of the steppe, London, 1967. 
A. Uo Pope: A survey of Persian Art, Oxford, 1938. 
A. Uo Pope: An introduction to Persian Art, Oxford, 1970. 
B. Rowland: Hellenistic Sculpture in Iran. The Art Quarterly XVIII, 1955. 
M. I. Rostovtzeff: Dura and the problem of Parthian Art, Yale Class. Stud., 
1935. 
S. I. Rudenko: Die Kultur der Hsiung-nu lind die HUgelgraben von Noin Ula, 
Bonn, 1969. 
I D. Schlumberger: Descendants non-Mediterraneens de llart Grec, Syria 
XXXVII, 1960. 
Kamila Trever: Monuments of Greco-Bactrian Art, Moscow, 1940. 
T. B. L. Webster: Hellenistic Art, London, 1967. 
Ko We~mann:.· Three Bactrian Silver Vessels. The Art Bulletin XXV, 
1943, po 289 f. 
GENERAL HISTORICAL WORKS: 
F. Altheim: Alexandre et l'Asie. Paris, 19540 
F. Altheim: Geschichte der Hunnen, Vol. I, 1959, 'Fratadura'. 
K. M. To Atkinson: The Seleucids and the Greek cities of Western Asia Minor. 
Antichthon, 2, 1968, p. 32 - 57. 
A. Aymard: Du nouveau sur la chronologie des Seleucides. REA 57, 1955, 
p •. 102 f. 
A. Aymard: Une Ville de la Babylonie Seleucide. REA 40, 1938. 
Bachhofer: Greeks and Sakas in India, JAOS 61, 1941. 
E. Badian: Foreign Clientelae. Oxon, 1958 
Eo Badian: Rome and Antiochus: a study in Cold War. Studies in Greek and 
Roman history, Oxford, 1964. 
E. Badian: Roman Imperialism in the late Republic, Oxford, 1968. 
R. S. Bagnall: The Administration of the ptolemaic possessions outside 
Egypt, Leiden, 1976. 
Ao R. Bellinger: The End of the Seleucids, Connecticut Academy Transactions, ~I 
Vol. 38, 1949, p. 51 f. 
Eo Badian: Titus Quinctius Flamininus: Philhellenism and Real politik, 
Cincinatti, 1970. 
Alexander Belenitzky: The Ancient Civilisation of Central Asia, London, 1970. 
J. P. V. D. Balsdon: Romans and Aliens, London, 1979. 
J. P. V. D. Balsdon 1£ Phoenix 1967 Vol. 21, p. 177 f. 
A. R. Bel+lnger: Mithridates I of Parthia. Yale Classical Studies XI, 
1950, p. 312 - 315. 
A. R. Bellinger: Hyspaosines of Charax, Yale Classical Studies, Vol. VIII, 
1942. 
Ho Bengtson: Neue Seleukidendaten: Historia 4, 1955, p. 113 f. 




Edwin Bevan: The House of Seleucus, Vols. I and II, London, 1905 (new rep. 1970). 
John Briscoe: Eastern Policy and Senatorial Politics 164-146, Historia 18, 
1969, p. 49 f. 
John Briscoe: A Commentary on Livy, Books 31 ,- 33, Oxon., 1973. 
Edwin Bevan: Jerusalem under the High Priests, London, 1927. 
GENERAL HISTORICAL WORKS: - Continued. 
E. J. Bickerman: Institutions des Seleucides, Paris, 1938. 
E. J. Bickerman: The Chronology of Ancient World, London, 1968. 
W. Bouche-leclerq: Histoire des Seleucides. Ptt""f"'!> 19'~-1't . 
. / 
To Ro S. Broughton: Magistrates of the Roman Republic, 1951. 
Cambridge Ancient History, Vols. VII, VIII and IX. 
Charles Edson: Imperium Maccedonicumoo the S 1 "d E" C1 e eUCl mplre •.• ass. Phil. LIII, 1958, p. 153 f. 
M. Cary: History of the Greek World, 323 - 146 B C London 1950 . ., , . 
Getzel Cohen! The Seleucid Colonies. Historia Einzelschrift, Wiesbaden, 
1978. 
M. A. Ro Colledge: The Parthians, London, 1968. 
J. M. Cook: The Greeks in Ionia and the East, London. 1962. 
K. Walton Dobbins: The Successors of Mithridates II of Parthia. NC. XV, 
1975, p. 19 - 45. 
A. von Ie Coq: Buried Treasures of Chinese Turkestan, London, 1928. 
P. S. Derow, Polybius, Rome and the East. JRS. 1979. 
C. N. Debevoise: A political history of Parthia, Chicago, 1938. 
Granville. Downey: A history of Antioch in Syria. Princeton, 1961. 
De la Val~e-Poussin: L'Inde au temps des Mauryas et des Barbares, 
Grecs, Scythes et Yue-Tchi, Paris, 1930. 
AE• Ehrenberg: The Greek State, 2nd Edn. London, 1969. 
S. K. Eddy: The King is dead: studies in the near-Eastern resistance 
to Hellenism, Lincoln, Nebraska, 1961. 
Festugiere: 'Trois Rencontres' in Etudes de phi1osophie Greque. 
V i "\. 
C. Edson: Review of W. W. Tarn: The Greeks in Bactria. Class. Phil. 1954, 
p. 114 - 116. 
V. Ehrenberg: (essays in honour) Ancient Society and institutions, ed. 
E. Badian, Oxon., 1966. 
John Ferguson: The Heritage of Hellenism, London, 1973. 
Robin Lane Fox: Alexander the Great, London, 1974. 
P. M. Fraser: ptolemaic Alexandria, Oxford, 1972. 
Richard Frye: The Heritage of Persia, London, 1962. 
GENERAL HISTORICAL WORKS: - Continued. 
B. Goosens: Au declin de la civilization babylonienne Bulletin de la 
classe de lettres Academie Royale de Belge V, 27. • 
R. Ghirshman: Iran: Parthians and Sassanians, London, 1962. 
R. Ghirshman: Iran; Harmondsworth, 1954. 
Pierre Grimal: Le Siecle des scipions, Paris, 1975. 
Pierre Grimal: Hellenism and the Rise of Rome, London, 1968. 
R. Ghirshman: Essaie de recherche historico-archeologique in Artibus 
Asiae XVI, 1953. --
G. Haloun: Zur Ue-Tsi Frage, ZDMG 91, 1937, p. 243 - 318. 
M. Hengel: Judaism & Hellenism. 2 vols. London, 1976. Jews Greeks and 
Barbarians, London, 1980. 
Eo Herzfeld: Iran in the Ancient East, Oxford, 1941. 
M. Holleaux, La mort dfAntiochos Epiphanes. Etudes d'Ep. et d'Hist. Grecs. 
III, 1942. 
Edgar Knobloch: Beyond the Oxus, London, 1972. 
A. H. M. Jones: The Greek city from Alexander to Justinian, Oxford, 1940. 
w. V. Harris: War and Imperialism in Republican Rome: 327 - 70 B.C. Oxon, 
1979. 
S. Bar Kochva: The Seleucid Army, Cambs., 1976. 
w. Kolbe: Beitr~ge sur Syrischen und Judischen Geschichte, Stuttgart, 1926. 
H. Kreissig: Wirtschaft und Ge&ellschaft im Seleukidenreich, Berlin, 1978. 
M. L. W. Laistner: History of the Greek World, 479 - 323 B.C., London. 
J. E. Van Lohuitzen de Leew: the Scythian Period, Leiden, 1949. 
B. p. Lozinski: The Original homeland of the Parthians, Den Haag, 1959. 
Macdonald and Rapson in Cambridge History of India, Vol. I, Ancient India, 
Bombay, 1962 (latest reprint). 
A. H. MacDonald: The Treaty of Apamea. JRS, 1967. 
A. H. MacDonald and F. W. Walbank: The Treaty of Apamea: the Naval 
clauses, JRS, 1969. 
R. B. McShane: The foreign policy of the Attalids of Pergamum, Urbana ILL, 
1964. 
O. Maenchen-Helfen: Huns and the Hsiung-nu and The origin of the Huns 
in Byzantion XVII (1944 - 5), p. 222 f. 
O. Maenchen-Helfen: The Yueh-chi problem re-examined, JAOS 65, 1945, 
p. 71 - 81. 
GENERAL HISTORICAL WORKS: - Continued. 
David Magie: The 'Agreement' between Philip V and Antiochus TI{ ••• 
JRS 29, 1939, p. 32 f. 
R. C. Majumdar: Classical accounts of India, Calcutta, 1960. 
J. Marshall: Greeks and Sakas in India, JRAS, 1947, p. 3 f. 
E. H. Minns: Scythians and Greeks, 1913; new ed. Cambs., 1965. 
Otto M~rkholm: Antiochus IV of Syria, Gyldenal, 1966. 
D. Musti: Lo Stato dei Seleucidi in Studi classici et orientali, 1966. 
A. K. Narain: The Indo-Greeks, Oxford, 1957. 
Sirarpie der Nersessian: The Armenians, London, 1969. 
S. A. Nodelman: A preliminary history of Characene, Berytus XIII, 1960, 
p. 83 f. 
David Oates: Studies in the Ancient History of Northern Iraq, London, 1968. 
Wolfgang Orth: K8niglicher Machtanspruch und St~dtische Freiheit, Munich, 1977. 
Senarat Paravitana: Greeks and Mauryas, Colombo, 1973. 
p. Pedech: Deux campagnes d'Antiochus III chez Polybe. REA 60, 1958, 
p. 67 - 73. 
Stewart Perowne: The life and times of Herod the Great, London, 1956. 
E. D. Phillips: The Royal Hordes: nomad peoples of the Steppes, London, 
1965. 
O. Ploger: Theology and Eschatology, Oxford, 1968. 
E. G. Pulleyblank: The Wu-Sun and the Saka, and the Yueh-chi migration. 
B.S.O.A.S. XXIII, 1970, p. 154 - 160. 
H. G. Rawlinson: Bactria, 1912 (New ed., New York, 1970). 
Georges le Rider: Suse sous les Seleucides et les Parthes, Paris, 1965. 
M. I. Rostovtzeff: Iranians and Greeks in South Russia, Oxford, 1922. 
M I Ro tovt eff · Seleuc;d Babylonia in Yale Classical Studies III, 1932. o • s z. ,.J.. 
M. I. Rostovtzeff: Some remarks on the monetary and commercial policy of 
the Attalids of Pergamum/Anatolian Studies, Manchester, 1939, p. 277 f. 
M. Rostovtzeff: Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World, 
Cambs., 1953. 
K. S. Sacks: Polybius' other view of Aetolia. JHS, 95, 1975, pp. 92 - 106. 
H. H. Scullard: From the Gracchi to Nero. London, 1959. 
GENERAL HISTORICAL WORKS: - Continued. 
H. C. Schmitt: Untersuchungen zur geschichte Antiochos d~ Grossen und 
Seiner Zeit. Historia 1964. 
F. F. Schwarz: A:rian's Indike, on India, Intention and Reality. East 
and West (New Serles), Vol. 25, Nos. 1 - 2, March - June 1975. 
H. Seyrig: Aradus et sa Per~e. Antiquit~s Syriennes 49, Syria XXVIII, 
1951, p. 206 f. 
H. Seyrig: Seleucus I et la fondation de la monarchie Syrienne. 
Syria XLVII, 1970, pp. 290 - 311. 
Aurel Stein: Innermost Asia, Oxford, 1928. 
T. Sulimirski: The Sarmatians, London, 1970. 
J. W. Swain: Antiochus Epiphanes and Egypt. Class. Phil. 39, 1944. 
W. W. Tarn and H. G. Griffith: Hellenistic Civilisation, London, 1952. 
W. W. Tarn: Queen Ptolemais and Apama. Class. Quarterly XXIII, 1929, p. 138 f. 
W. W. Tarn: Notes on Hellenism in Bactria and India, JHS, XXII (1902), p. 268 f. 
W. W. Tarn: Seleucid-Parthian Studies, London, 1930. 
W. W. Tarn: Tarmitha, JHS 62, 1942, p. 45 f. 
W. W. Tarn: The Greeks in Bactria and India, 2nd Ed., Cambs., 1952. 
w. W. Tarn: Two notes on Seleucid History, JHS LX, 1940. 
V. Tcherikover: Hellenistic Civilisation and the Jews, Philadelphia, 1961. 
J~rg Wagner: Seleukeia am Euphrat, Wiesbaden, 1976. 
F. J. Teggart: Rome and China, Berkeley, 1939. 
F. W. Walbank: Political Morality and the Friends of Scipio, JRS 55, 1965. 
F. W. Walbank: Commentary on Polybius, 3 vols. Oxon., 1957-79. 
F. W. Walbank: Polybius, California, 1968. 
F. W. Walbank: Polybius and Rome's Eastern Policy. JRS 53, 1963, p. 1 - 13. 
J. B. Ward-Perkins: The Roman West and the Parthian East, London, 1965. 
Josef Wolski: Lleffondrement de la domination des Seleucides en Iran au III 
e siecle avant J.C., Bulletin International de l'Academie Polonaise, 
Supp. 5 1939-45, Cracow, 1947. 
C W "Th H 11 . t· O· tit·. The idea of history in the • B. elles: e e enlS lC rlen In. 
ancient near-east, 1955. 
C. B. Welles: The Hellenism of Dura Europos, Aegyptus XXXIX, 1959, p. 23 - 28. 
GENERAL HISTORICAL WORKS: - Continued. 
C. B. Welles: Alexander's historical achievement. Greece & Rome XII, 
1965, p. 216 f. 
Josef Wolski: Les Parthes et leur attitude envers Ie monde greco-romaine.B.C.H. 
Josef Wolski: The decay of the Iranian Empire of the Seleucids and the 
chronology of Parthian beginnings, Berytus XII, 1956-7, p. 35 f. 
Josef Wolski: Les Iranienes et Ie royaume Greco-Bactrien, KLIO 38, 1960. 
Josef Wolski: Arsaces II et la genealogie des premiers Arsacides, 
Historia 1962. 
Josef Wolski: Arsaces II, in EOS 41, 1940-46. 
Josef Wolski: L'histoire d'Arsaces I er, Historia VIII, 1959, p. 222 f. 
G. Woodcock: The Greeks in India, London, 1966. 
Edouard Will: Histoire ~itique du monde hellenistique, 2 vols, Nancy, 
1967 and (Vol. II rev.), 1979. 
, 
Edouard Will: Les premieres / annees du regne d'Antiochus III, REG. 75, 
1962 , P • 76. f. 
... 
G. Widengren: Quelques rapports entre Juifs et Iraniens a l'epoque des 
Parthes. Supplement to Vetus Testamentum 4, 1956, p. 197 - 241. 
Avi-Yonah, M.: Hellenism and the East: Contacts and interrelations from 
Alexander to the Roman conquest. Ann Arbor, 1978. 
Edouard Will: Comment on ecrit l'histoire hellenistique. (Notes critiques), 
Historia 1978. 
Late additions: 
E J Bickermann: The Parthian Ostrakon No. 1760 from Nisa, 
Bibiiotheca Orientalis, 1966, Vol xxiii, pp 15-17. 
Paul Cloche: La Dislocation d'un empire, PariS, 1959. 
C.B. \'ielles: Al"xal'uler and the Hellenistic Viorld, Toronto, 1970 
Pailly-Wissowa: Realencyclopadie A ltertums Wissenschaft. Stuttgart, 1963. 
